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ABSTRACT 
 
This study addresses the general research question of how collaborative governance has 
impacted on environmental outcomes in Australian natural resource planning and 
management. The thesis argues that the discrepancy between theoretical expectations 
and practical results of collaboration lies in the implementation arrangements of 
collaborative governance. Within these arrangements, collaboration does not occur in a 
‘pure’ form but rather, it is mixed with other governance approaches, such as hierarchy 
and markets. Collaborative governance not only is ‘impure’, but also inconsistent, as it 
occurs within a multi-level setting of governing centres. This mix of governance 
approaches and levels lead to a range of tensions within the overall collaborative 
framework. As a consequence, collaborative governance fails to coordinate the different 
actors and levels of governance involved in environmental policy and planning to achieve 
improved natural resource conditions. In practice, some actors are excluded, authority or 
power-sharing is limited, responsibility sharing is not properly defined, and mixed 
implementation instruments generate conflict.  
This thesis focuses on the regional level of governance −represented by a set of Natural 
Resource Management (NRM) regions− in its interaction with federal and state levels of 
governance. The regional level is more directly involved with the implementation of 
natural resource planning and management. The study argues that there is an indirect 
relationship between governance and environmental outcomes. One in which 
governance represents an indirect driver or facilitator in the achievement of improved 
environmental conditions. The research adopts a mixed methods approach, based on 
qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. Semi-structured interviews, water 
quality data and the application of the process-outcomes governance evaluation 
framework supported the analysis of the impact of collaborative governance on water 
quality outcomes achieved by a water quality plan in the Great Barrier Reef. The 
interpretation of the findings draws on concepts of metagovernance and governing 
approaches as well as on the conceptualization of the relationship between governance 
and outcomes. 
The key findings are organised around three themes. The first theme relates to the 
limited, but mildly beneficial role played by collaboration in the achievement of water 
quality outcomes. Despite the marginal focus on the impacts of collaborative governance, 
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this governance approach has become the foundation of further water quality planning 
efforts in the GBR. The second theme focuses on the different impacts of regional 
collaborative governance approaches on environmental outcomes as a means explain 
the relationship between governance and environmental outcomes. It highlights potential 
positive associations between collaboration-environmental outcomes variables, based 
on a proxy variable of collaboration. This analysis is complemented by an explanation of 
the role of external factors to the indirect (but decisive) relationship between governance 
and environmental outcomes. The third theme relates to the tensions created by the 
intersection of different governance approaches within collaborative governance. This 
final theme focuses on the implications for collaborative governance approaches, based 
on the recognition of these tensions. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
In 2008, the Australian government introduced an ambitious policy to improve the water 
quality of the Great Barrier Reef (GBR), one of its most important ecosystems. The 
policy was represented by the Reef Rescue program and it had a budget of A$200 
million. Reef Rescue subsequently became the main implementation strategy of the 
Reef Plan, which was a water quality plan that relied on a collaborative governance 
approach to achieve a set of water quality targets. The targets had the goal of reducing 
the amount of pollutants generated by land-based runoff from agricultural activities. The 
collaborative delivery of the water quality plan was managed by natural resource 
management (NRM) organisations, responsible for the six NRM regions of the Reef 
catchment.  
The budget of Reef Rescue was used to offer incentives to the landholders to voluntarily 
change their management practices. Landholders received money to improve the way 
they managed their land and this in turn, would reduce the run off that had become one 
of the major threats to the GBR catchment. The Reef Plan concluded after five years, in 
2013, but the water quality condition of the Reef was considered poor by official 
evaluations (Australian Government, 2014a; Queensland Government, 2014). It 
seemed that — despite the collaboration and the money invested — the Reef Plan and 
Reef Rescue did not have a significant impact on water quality. Furthermore, water 
quality remains a major issue in the GBR even after other planning and management 
efforts have been put in place, such as the 2013 Reef Plan and the Reef 2050 Long-
Term Sustainability Plan. 
Regional NRM organisations were the main vehicle to implement the Reef Plan. Staff 
within these organisations had strong views on the Plan’s possibilities as well as its 
pitfalls. One participant of this study was a regional NRM manager known here as 
George1. I asked him about the water quality issue, trying to find out what could have 
achieved better results for the GBR Catchment. Was it a problem of not having enough 
money to deliver the water quality plan? George said that it was “definitely not” due to 
not having enough money to deliver the water quality plan. In his view, the issue was 
                                                          
1 Following the ethical protocol that supports this research, I use a pseudonym to protect the identity of 
the research participant. 
2  
not insufficient funding to implement the plan. There was enough money. The problem 
was a lack of what he referred to as ‘integration’ and ‘consistency’ in delivering the plan. 
“The only thing we didn’t do well was integrate”. In particular he added, the issue was 
the poor collaboration between the federal and state governments. During the 
implementation of the Reef Plan, the state government decided to introduce regulations 
within the collaborative framework to complement changes in land management 
practices and that, George considered, was a major disruptor.  
George believed that the challenge was establish effective collaboration between the 
stakeholders involved: the three tiers of governments as well as the other actors. For 
him, the primary route to improve water quality in the Reef is through voluntary change, 
which requires collaboration: 
“The only way we can achieve the water quality targets and the level of management 
practice change, and the high level of management practices is if landholders volunteer to 
do it, because no government is going to regulate everybody to achieve precision 
agriculture, high-level cutting-edge management practices. No government is gonna be 
able to do that."  
Without being explicit, George was alluding to a problem of governance within the water 
quality planning and management efforts. Using words such as ‘integration’ and 
‘voluntary change’, he was describing a problem with collaborative governance. 
Therefore, rather than being a financing problem, water quality issues were a 
governance problem.  
Using George’s observations as stepping off point, I investigate the impact of 
collaborative governance on the water quality outcomes achieved by the Reef Plan. 
Through this analysis, I explain how collaboration unfolded in the delivery of the plan. 
Then, I identify what worked and what failed in the collaborative approach, based on the 
water quality outcomes achieved. In the examination of the GBR case study, I offer a 
set of recommendations that could help address concerns such as those expressed by 
George. The findings of this evaluation of collaborative governance also have 
implications for other national or international cases.  
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1.1 Research problem 
Environmental issues have become increasingly complex: their solution not only 
requires technical skills and scientific information, but also involves multiple state and 
non-state actors that interact at different levels of decision making and implementation. 
Coordinating these actors, and their actions, to address environmental issues, such as 
water supply, water quality or land degradation, is a matter of governance. During the 
decade of the 2000s, collaborative approaches to governance were widely adopted by 
governments to manage environmental problems. Collaboration was seen as an 
alternative to hierarchical or market forms of governance: this was due to the recognition 
by state and non-state actors that no individual actor had the capacity to solve these 
issues (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; and Olvera-Garcia, 2012).2 
Collaboration was considered more appropriate than hierarchical or market governance 
approaches to manage the complexity of environmental problems. In theory, it was 
expected that — by including the interests of all actors in the decisions and actions, and 
integrating their diverse knowledge — better solutions would be attained (Wondolleck 
and Yaffee, 2000; Taylor and de Loe, 2012). However, in practice there has been no 
strong evidence to support these expectations. Moreover, other studies argue that, 
given the multiplicity of interests involved, collaboration leads to an impasse or endless 
negotiations without clear actions (Lubell, 2004).  
Overall, it is uncertain how the collaborative governance approach has contributed to 
the solution of environmental problems. One key issue is whether collaboration has led 
to improved environmental conditions. Recent research has focused on environmental 
outcomes achieved by collaborative approaches to provide more robust evidence about 
what can be expected from collaborating (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015; Newig and 
Fritsch, 2009; Scott, 2015; Scott, 2016, Ulibarri, 2015). Through different methodologies 
and case studies, this small body of research have explained the complex proceedings 
of the collaborative approach. As a consequence, they are cautious in offering straight-
forward conclusions, such as affirming that collaboration leads to better environmental 
outcomes than other governance approaches. This study follows up on their research 
focus in order to expand the body of evidence provided so far. Building on this existing 
                                                          
2 This agrees with George’s remarks about the inability of the government to use a hierarchy approach, 
regulating everyone to improve water quality. 
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literature, my study has the research aim of finding the impacts of collaborative 
governance on environmental outcomes by focusing on the implementation phase of a 
collaborative policy. In this aim, I use the Australian context to analyse the impacts of 
collaborative governance on environmental outcomes. This research is significant as to 
date has been no clear attempt to examine the impacts of collaborative governance in 
the Australian context. Poor evidence about governance responses, such as 
collaboration, and their impact upon environmental issues is reinforced by the following 
statement from the United Nations report Water in a Changing World:  
“Most governance structures today are too weak to tackle current water problems, much 
less prepare for emerging problems, including climate change. And there is still very little 
evidence about which types of governance responses work in which contexts and what 
their impacts are on water equity, efficiency and sustainability” (UN, 2009, p. 73). 
In Australia, as in many other developed countries, collaborative governance 
approaches were adopted in the 2000s in response to increasing land and water 
degradation issues. The collaborative approach was represented by the regional model 
of NRM established by the Australian government to improve the management of 
natural resources (Curtis et al., 2014). Among these NRM efforts, the GBR represents 
one of the most complex environmental problems. The GBR is one of the most important 
Australian ecosystems, and is recognised by the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Area. Different economic 
activities, such as mining, agriculture, coastal development and tourism impact on its 
natural resources, such as land, water and biodiversity. 
Despite numerous efforts to improve the environmental condition of the GBR, concerns 
persist about the lack of progress — or worse — failure to achieve more enduring 
solutions. In 2014, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) concluded 
that, despite environmental planning initiatives to reduce threats and improve resilience, 
the GBR condition is poor and getting worse (GBRMPA, 2014). One of the most 
important issues relates to the impact of agriculture on the water quality of the GBR. 
Land-based run off caused by agricultural activities, such as grazing or sugarcane 
crops, represents the most important non-point source pollution of the Reef catchments, 
and is considered one of the major threats to the GBR (Hockings et al, 2014). Moreover, 
water quality from land based run off remained poor even after positive actions — such 
as Reef Plan — were undertaken in 2009, (GBRMPA, 2014). For this reason, in 2015, 
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the GBR risked being listed as a World Heritage in Danger area by the United Nations 
(UN) (Day et al., 2014). Diverse stakeholders from government, industry, community, 
and environmental sectors have interests in the resources of this ecosystem, which 
reflect the complexity involved in planning and management to achieve better natural 
resource conditions.  
Since 2003, water quality planning and management efforts were established to improve 
the water quality condition of the GBR. The GBR catchment extends along six NRM 
regions that are managed by community-based NRM bodies through collaborative 
governance arrangements. The community representation within the NRM bodies is 
considered as ‘shorthand for governance that starts from the ground up but deals with 
cross-scale interactions’ (Berkes 2005 cited by Curtis et al. 2014., p. 176). It is basically 
about ‘managing people-environment relationships’ (Curtis et al 2014., p. 184).   
Collaborative governance was adopted based on a regionalisation strategy devised by 
the Australian government, which intended to shift the responsibility of delivering water 
quality planning and management from the federal level to the NRM regions. The 
regionalisation strategy involved a decentralisation process in the implementation of 
environmental policy and planning. Nonetheless, the Australian government still 
retained control of the overall delivery of the Reef Plan. From the geographical point of 
view, ‘the region’ was considered to be the most appropriate scale for environmental 
governance, as the NRM regions were defined according to natural catchments or agro-
ecological regions rather than political boundaries (Wallington, Lawrence and Loechel, 
2007; Dale et al., 2013a).  
In 2009, water quality planning adopted a collaborative governance approach that was 
expected to reduce significantly the impact of land runoff on the water quality of the 
GBR. The 2009 Reef Plan was underpinned by Reef Rescue, an ambitious investment 
program from the federal government that represented the main implementation 
strategy of the 2009 Reef Plan (Queensland Government, 2009). The main goal was to 
improve overall water quality in the five year period from 2008 to 2013. To understand 
the impact of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes, this study focuses 
on the 2009 Reef Plan and the water quality outcomes it achieved. Environmental 
outcomes (e.g. the condition or health of natural resources) are used as an indicator for 
examining the type of contribution of collaboration in addressing environmental 
problems and, more specifically, how collaborative governance arrangements have 
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performed as responses to the issue of water quality.  
Previous evaluations of the impact of governance in Australia focused more on the 
processes than the outcomes of environmental planning and policy efforts. For instance, 
Lockwood et al. (2009), undertook a study of the regional NRM model in three Australian 
states, which focused on the performance of protected areas based on a benchmark of 
‘good governance’ criteria. Dale et al. (2008) reviewed governance arrangements in 
North Queensland regions, but without an explicit focus on the outcomes achieved. A 
similar study by Vogel (2013) evaluated governance within the Queensland regional 
model and focused on business excellence performance, rather than the achievement 
of natural resource outcomes. 
This study assumes that governance is an important variable that underpins attempts 
to improve the health of natural resources, alongside technical and scientific 
approaches. This view is shared by the UN, which argued that water planning and 
management is a problem of governance: ‘the water crisis is largely a crisis of 
governance’ (UN 2006, p. 49). Evans (2012) supported this view by arguing that 
environmental issues are the consequence of a crisis of governance — a failure to 
organise societies and economies in a manner that does not harm the environment. 
Governance then becomes essential for re-organising society to achieve better 
environmental outcomes. In addition, Pahl-Wostl (2009) described the inability to 
achieve sustainable NRM as a failure of governance, reflected in over-regulation by rigid 
bureaucracies, sectoral fragmentation and prevailing dominance of economic over 
environmental considerations. Finally, Taylor (2010) stated that managing diffuse water 
quality pollution from agriculture is recognised as a critical governance challenge in the 
United States, Europe and Australia.  
1.2 Research aim and questions 
The main objective of this research is to explore the impact of collaborative governance 
on environmental outcomes obtained by natural resource planning and management. It 
seeks to determine how governance contributes to improving the condition or health of 
natural resources such as water, biodiversity and land. The examination of the impact 
of governance on natural resource conditions refers to the degree of effectiveness of 
certain governance arrangements. Hence, this research explores the effectiveness of 
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the collaborative governance arrangements in delivering NRM. Effectiveness is viewed 
as the degree of achievement of plan objectives. As highlighted above, there is little 
research that evaluates the impact of governance on environmental outcomes. This 
study aims to address that research gap. For this study, the planning and management 
of natural resources is embedded within environmental policy and planning. For 
example, NRM and planning constitute a type of planning and policymaking for the 
environment. Using Christensen’s (2015) definition of outcomes — namely the results 
or consequences of completing and implementing the planning process — this research 
analyses the potential impact of collaborative governance on environmental conditions 
after the implementation of a plan. Examining the outcomes (compared to the objectives 
of a policy or plan) is a way to assess the effectiveness of governance arrangements at 
delivering improved environmental conditions. Appendix A offers more detail about the 
objectives of the research aim. 
By the ‘impact upon the achievement of environmental outcomes’, I mean investigating 
if collaborative governance has facilitated the achievement of these outcomes, or has 
been neutral, or has become a barrier in their procurement. There is a relationship 
between governance (e.g. human institutions) and environmental outcomes, in which 
the latter are indirectly driven and shaped by governance institutions. Moreover, 
previous research states that, without effective governance arrangements, natural 
resources and the environment are subject to increased human consumption and 
depletion over time (Dietz, Ostrom and Stern, 2003).  
Another view of the relationship between governance and outcomes focuses on the 
values that are privileged by governance arrangements, such as development-driven 
values that give preference to industry concerns. These values are reflected on the 
environmental outcomes: “a change in environmental outcomes, in terms of revising 
whose values are privileged by environmental decisions, often requires institutional 
changes at different levels” (Adger et al., 2003, p. 1100). Introducing and managing 
institutional changes is, in the view of this study, a matter of governance. To explore the 
relationship between governance and environmental outcomes, this thesis takes a 
multidisciplinary approach and draws on theories from planning, political science, public 
policy and environmental management. Governance and the implementation of natural 
resource planning and management are the main research subjects. 
“While implementation research consumes the activities of a good number of scholars from 
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the fields of political science, public administration, and management science, there has 
been a curious lack of parallel inquiry into the implementation process involved in the 
planning field.” (Talen, 1996, p. 248). 
It is important to note that this research is not an evaluation per se of plan 
implementation. Instead, it is an examination of the impact of governance on natural 
resource conditions by focusing on actions and outcomes at the implementation phase.  
For this purpose, I focus on the implementation process within natural resource planning 
to find out how outcomes, such as changes to the condition of natural resources, are 
produced. For practical purposes, I focus on water resources and their outcomes, such 
as improvements in water quality. In this sense, I seek to assess the impact of 
collaborative implementation upon water quality outcomes to identify how it operates as 
well as its challenges. It is important to note that the collaborative governance 
arrangements are considered to have an indirect impact, one that contributes to facilitate 
or obstruct implementation, which leads to the achievement of outcomes. However, to 
fully address environmental issues, other variables need to be taken into account, such 
as the socio-economic context, the political situation or the ecological and geographical 
conditions.  
 
1.2.1 Research questions 
This thesis poses the following research question: 
How has collaborative governance impacted on environmental outcomes in Australian 
natural resource planning and management?  
Addressing this question sheds light on the results achieved by collaborative forms of 
governance in the Australian context, and the complex relationship that exists between 
collaborative governance and environmental outcomes. To answer this main research 
question, I address four research sub-questions based on the case study analysis of the 
GBR: 
1. What was the role of collaboration in implementing the 2009 Reef Plan? — 
Chapter 6 
2. How did regional collaborative governance approaches impact on environmental 
outcomes achieved by the NRM regions of the GBR? — Chapter 6 
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3. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the collaborative governance 
approach? — Chapter 7 
4. What are the implications of collaborative governance in Queensland’s natural 
resource planning and management? — Chapter 8 
In the first research sub-question, I identify and explain the role of collaborative 
governance in a water policy: the 2009 Reef Plan devised to improve the condition of 
water quality in the GBR, and Reef Rescue, the main implementation strategy of the 
plan. In this research, the analysis of collaborative governance is framed by the 
definition of the concept established by Ansell and Gash (2008). Briefly, collaborative 
governance refers to the formal, deliberative and consensus-oriented engagement 
between state and non-state actors to make and implement public policy or manage 
public programs. In this respect, the role of collaborative governance explained in the 
first research sub-question focuses on the formal collaborative ties supporting the 
implementation of the water quality plan. As a consequence, it also focuses on the Reef 
Rescue program. The findings on the examination of collaborative governance is based 
on official reports and evaluations as well as the perceptions of key stakeholders that 
participated in this research. 
The second research sub-question examines the impact of regional collaborative 
governance on the environmental outcomes achieved by the NRM regional bodies, the 
main actors implementing the 2009 Reef Plan. The analysis focuses on the regional 
scale of governance, which is the main focus of implementation for the water quality 
plan. Focusing on the scale at which the policy or plan was implemented also helps to 
improve understanding of the impact of governance on environmental outcomes (Newig 
and Fritsch, 2009). The regional governance scale of this case study relates to the 
operational or action level of collaborative efforts, where on-ground activities are located 
(Margerum, 2008). To examine this research question, I develop a proxy variable for 
collaboration with the purpose of differentiating between the collaborative approaches 
adopted by the GBR’s NRM regions. The variable is represented by the existence of 
coordinators in each NRM body (the organisations responsible of managing the NRM 
regions and delivering the Reef Plan). Coordinators of each NRM body had the role of 
engaging with the local agricultural producers to promote changes in land management 
practices.  
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This question then explores the impact of regional collaborative governance on water 
quality outcomes. As each NRM region achieved different water quality outcomes, the 
analysis of the second sub-question explains the potential impact of the collaborative 
approach of each NRM body in achieving those outcomes. The main purpose is to clarify 
the indirect relationship between collaborative governance and environmental 
outcomes. This relationship is characterised by uncertainty regarding the likely impact 
of collaboration (as if the collaborative process is a ‘black box’ process). In addition, it 
explains the impact of context and external factors to the regional collaborative process, 
by examining why NRM regions with less funding for on-ground delivery achieved better 
water quality outcomes. The analysis is based on official data on water quality outcomes 
and document analysis, and is complemented by the perceptions of key stakeholders. 
The third research sub-question returns the focus to the multiple scales of governance 
involved in the Reef Plan’s collaborative governance arrangements (national, state, 
regional and local) to undertake the evaluation of collaborative governance based on 
the Process-Outcomes governance evaluation framework developed by Rauschmayer 
et al. (2009). This evaluation focuses on the collaborative processes and their impact 
on the water quality outcomes achieved. The collaborative processes and the 
governance evaluation framework are based on a review of previous research, 
presented in Chapter 4.  
The answer to this question explains how collaborative processes had a mixed impact, 
which contributed to facilitate or block the achievement of water quality outcomes. The 
elements that facilitated the achievement represent the strengths of the collaborative 
approach, while the elements perceived as blocking the achievement of outcomes 
represent the weaknesses. The explanation also highlights the tensions found in the 
collaborative approach, such as the use of contrasting implementation instruments (e.g. 
regulations and incentives), and the promotion of competition while relying on 
collaborative arrangements. In other words, the impact of collaborative governance on 
environmental outcomes cannot be viewed as a cause-effect relationship, but rather as 
a relationship where governance contributes to achieving the outcomes. Governance, 
on the other hand, represents only one variable among the multiple variables involved 
in environmental issues. In this regard, the analysis argues that governance impacts 
only partially explain the achievement of environmental outcomes.  
The fourth research sub-question presents the inferences from the analysis and offers 
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a set of recommendations for policy-makers and planners. This addresses the ‘so what’ 
question of this research. It also highlights the importance of collaborative governance 
based on its impact on the environmental outcomes examined in the case study, and 
the necessity to use metagovernance to improve the collaborative approach and 
contribute potentially to improved environmental outcomes.   
The answers to the four research sub-questions help to construct the answer to the 
main research question, in which I argue that collaborative governance, in general, has 
had a positive but limited impact on environmental outcomes. To have a positive 
contribution on achieving environmental outcomes, collaborative governance requires 
modifications.  
1.3 Research significance 
This evaluation of governance contributes to a better understanding of the impact of 
collaborative governance on the environmental outcome of a plan or policy by clarifying 
the relationship between governance arrangements and environmental outcomes. 
Moreover, this helps to identify the significance of the role of collaborative governance 
(in terms of what and cannot be expected from this approach) within environmental 
policy and planning. It does this by explaining the extent to which collaboration has led 
to improved environmental outcomes.  
Earlier, I argued that funding alone would not achieve the expected results of a policy 
or plan; proper governance arrangements are needed. By examining the impact of the 
collaborative approach on environmental outcomes, this research provides information 
to improve governance arrangements and achieve better environmental outcomes. 
Furthermore, the thesis contributes to the research on planning and policy 
implementation by providing a better understanding of implementation within a 
collaborative setting. 
Finally, the thesis provides clarity to the uncertainty regarding the contribution of 
governance to the environmental outcomes achieved through environmental policy and 
planning. These research findings contribute to promote learning between NRM 
practitioners (policymakers, planners and managers, among others) by disseminating 
information about strengths and weaknesses of the collaborative approach. 
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1.4 Thesis structure 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 
presents a literature review to theoretically ground the research problem and the 
conceptual framework of the thesis. This literature review revisits governance concepts 
and frameworks. In this review, I define collaborative governance to frame the analysis 
and present a conceptual framework that explains the connection between the key 
concepts involved in this study: governance; policy and planning; implementation; and 
outcomes. In this chapter, I also review governance frameworks involved in governance 
evaluations, and select the most appropriate one for this study following the outcomes-
focus of the research. Additionally, I present the concept of metagovernance and the 
meaning of effective governance and, finally, I provide a general account of the 
Australian approach to environmental governance. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology used in the research, which consists of a case 
study analysis that combines quantitative and qualitative methods of data analysis. I 
explain the pragmatic and post-positivist views adopted in this research (Creswell, 
2014).  I also explain case study analysis — the research strategy adopted in the study 
— and the relevance of this method for the examination of the collaborative governance 
approach. Finally, this chapter justifies the selection of the chosen case study and the 
governance evaluation framework. It offers details on the research methods employed 
for data collection and analysis, how the research participants were chosen and 
contacted, as well as the software that supported the analysis.  
The critical review of research on the impact of collaborative governance on 
environmental outcomes is presented in Chapter 4. This chapter shows the results 
obtained by previous analyses regarding the impact of collaboration on different 
environmental outcomes, such as land, water and biodiversity. The review addresses 
the research sub-question on the contribution of collaborative governance in improving 
the condition of natural resources. Apart from the results (classified as positive, neutral 
and negative impact of collaboration), I develop collaborative governance criteria based 
on a set of common elements examined by the reviewed studies. The criteria are 
incorporated into the governance evaluation framework explained in Chapter 3 and the 
results of the review serve to offer a research background to this study, highlighting the 
lack of similar research in Australia. 
13  
In Chapter 5, I present the background to the case study, describing the conditions and 
characteristics of the six NRM regions in the GBR, which were the main vehicle to 
implement the Reef Plan. Additional to this context, I provide a historical background of 
water quality planning in the GBR, from 2003, when the first Reef Plan was 
implemented, until the current plan in 2015. The purpose here is to present an overall 
view of the water quality planning efforts and their achievements. Within this historical 
depiction, I describe the Reef Plan and Reef Rescue policies, outlining its goals and 
strategies as well as its official governance arrangements. I conclude this chapter with 
a brief account of previous official evaluations of the Reef Plans.  
The answers to the first and second research sub-questions are presented in Chapter 
6. In this chapter, I offer the findings of this first part of the case study analysis. First, I 
explain the role of collaborative governance in the implementation of the Reef Plan. This 
role differs from the one presented by the official documents. I describe how the 
governance arrangements worked in practice, based on the stakeholders’ account of 
them. Then, I present the analysis of the impact that regional collaboration had in 
achieving water quality outcomes. I focus on the regional governance scale to analyse 
the different water quality outcomes achieved by the NRM regions within the GBR. In 
this analysis, I use a proxy variable for collaboration to distinguish about each region’s 
collaborative approach.  
The objective of using this proxy variable is to attribute a tangible element to regional 
collaborative governance (in this case, the role of coordinators of each NRM body) and 
examine its impact on water quality outcomes. The use of this proxy variable also 
provides a potential explanation to why some regions with less funding achieved better 
water quality outcomes. The analysis of regional collaboration, and its impact on water 
quality outcomes, is complemented by an analysis of the NRM region’s context as well 
as the identification of external factors to the collaborative governance approach. 
Context and external factors complement the explanation about the impact of regional 
collaboration on water quality outcomes. 
Chapter 7 answers the third research sub-question, and represents the second and final 
part of the case study analysis. In this chapter, I evaluate collaborative governance 
using the governance evaluation framework along with the collaborative governance 
criteria. In this evaluation, I include other levels of governance (not only the regional 
level) involved in the implementation of the Reef Plan, to present the findings on the 
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overall impact of collaborative governance on water quality outcomes. The evaluation 
is based on stakeholder perceptions as well as data on water quality outcomes. I 
complement it with other evaluations of the Reef Plan as well as related literature. Within 
this evaluation, I identify the strengths and weaknesses of the collaborative approach, 
classifying them as positive, neutral and negative impacts on water quality outcomes. 
The classification of the impacts of collaboration uses a similar approach to the results 
presented in Chapter 4.  
The discussion of the findings and implications of this study is presented in Chapter 8. 
The discussion is led by the argument that, ultimately, a better understanding of 
governance contributes to improved quality of the environment and, in consequence, 
quality of life. This final chapter of the thesis also includes the conclusion as well as 
identifies limitations and further research areas. In this part, I answer the fourth and final 
research sub-question, discussing the key findings and contrasting them with the 
literature (national and international studies). This chapter concludes with a brief 
summary of how collaborative governance impacts environmental outcomes, 
highlighting the importance of this research in providing governance information to 
future environmental policy and planning efforts.  
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CHAPTER 2: COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE, GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORKS AND THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNANCE MODEL 
2.1 Introduction 
This literature review is organised around three elements — governance, policy and 
planning and implementation — and the interaction between them and how they 
contribute to achieving environmental outcomes. To conceptualise the interaction 
between planning-governance-implementation, I review governance frameworks. These 
three elements comprise the theoretical framework used to analyse governance impacts 
on environmental outcomes. Finally, an overview of Australian environmental 
governance is presented.  
2.2 Governance 
To analyse the impact of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes, it is 
necessary to define governance. However, this concept is an elusive term with varied 
definitions and different foci: hence, there is no agreed definition amongst scholars. 
Overall, governance is about governing, and governing means shaping, regulating or 
attempting to control human behaviour to achieve collective ends (Bell and Hindmoor, 
2009). The concept of governance has extended to economic, political, corporate, 
environmental or information technology areas. One advantage of the vague meaning 
of governance is the flexibility of the term, which allows its adoption by different fields 
and in different contexts. However, the negative aspect of this flexibility is the risk of it 
becoming an overused term that embodies generalities resumed in the goal of aspiring 
to a better world (Bevir, 2009). Given the range of definitions, I developed a classification 
system of four categories that capture the main conceptualisations of governance: such 
a classification system will help to better understand and operationalise the concept 
(see Table 2.1 below for more detail). Each category is complemented by a set of 
underlying theories provided by Bevir (2009):  
1. Network-based: this emphasises interactions between different actors (not only 
from the state) in a context of interdependence with self-governance as the main 
outcome (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998; Kooiman, 2003; Hufty, 2011).  
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2. Performance-oriented: this focuses on the ability to deliver public goods, either 
by the government itself or in conjunction with other actors, e.g. private or 
community sectors (Peters et al., 1995; Rhodes, 1996; Parker and Braithwaite, 
2003; Fukuyama, 2013; Rotberg, 2014).  
3. Institution-based: this defines a system or a process of organisation based mainly 
on institutions that shape the decision-making process and the management of 
public affairs. Institutions and rules are the main outcome (UNDP, 2000; Healey, 
2003; Bevir, 2009; IOG, 2015).  
4. Coordination-oriented: this highlights the coordination of different interests and 
objectives from the actors involved in a given public issue. This coordinating role 
is undertaken by the government through the use of its power or authority (Pierre, 
2000; Bell, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; World 
Bank, 2014).  
As it can be seen by the multiple definitions presented, the concept of governance lacks 
an agreed definition and, as a consequence, multiple perspectives and 
conceptualisations have been provided by scholars. As this research focuses on the 
impact of a given form of governance (i.e. collaboration) on environmental outcomes, it 
adopts a performance-oriented perspective. In this perspective, as shown by the 
definitions in Table 2.1, governance is oriented at the delivery of public services and, 
ultimately, at the well-being and quality of life of citizens. Using this lens of performance 
orientation, governance is aimed at problem-solving, rather than at how institutions 
operate and interact (i.e. institution-based lens) or how networks between actors foster 
self-governing processes (i.e. network-based lens). This performance-oriented 
perspective frames the definition of collaborative governance presented in the next 
section. In this respect, the view of governance refers to the governing performance in 
delivering plans and policies and the results they achieve after implementation (e.g. 
environmental outcomes). In this sense, governance in this study does not focus on 
corporate governance aspects, such as financial accountability, or normative aspects, 
such as ‘good governance’ principles or guidelines. However, it is important to clarify 
that this research does not examine the processes of governance per se but rather, their 
impact upon environmental outcomes. 
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Table 2.1 Governance definitions. 
 
Type Definition 
Network-based 1. Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors (Stoker, 
1998). 
2. Inter-organisational and self-organised networks that are characterised by 
interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game, and significant 
autonomy from the state (Rhodes, 1997). 
3. A coordination process that occurs within networks (Kooiman, 2003). 
4. The interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine 
how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken, and 
how citizens or other stakeholders participate (Graham et al, 2003). 
5. The pattern or structure that emerges in a socio-political system as a result of 
the interacting intervention efforts of all involved actors. This pattern cannot be 
reduced to one actor or group of actors in particular (Kooiman, 1993). 
6. “The processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors involved 
in a collective problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction 
of social norms and institutions” (Hufty, 2011, p. 405). 
Performance-
oriented  
1. Performance of governments in the delivery of political goods, following the sum 
of needs, desires and expectations of citizens (Rotberg, 2014). 
2. “Government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, 
regardless of whether that government is democratic or not” (Fukuyama, 2013, 
p. 350). 
3. Intentional shaping of the flow of events in order to deliver desired public 
goods (Parker and Braitwaite, 2003). 
4. The joint role of government, semi-government, nongovernment, and private 
institutions in providing for citizens’ well-being. (Peters and Savoie, 1995) 
5. New method by which society is governed, synonym with steering (more 
governance) and less rowing (less government) of service delivery, which is 
devolved or contracted-out to private actors (Rhodes, 1996) 
6. “Totality of interactions, in which government, other public bodies, private 
sector and civil society participate, aiming at solving societal problems” 
(Meuleman, 2008, p. 11) 
Institution-
based  
1. A system of values, policies, and institutions by which society manages its 
economic and social affairs (UNDP, 2000). 
2. Arrangements and qualities of a set of institutions and rules by which decisions 
are made and authority exercised (Bevir, 2009). 
3. Determines who has power, who makes decisions, how other players make 
their voice heard and how account is rendered. Exists anytime a group of 
people come together to accomplish an end (IOG, 2015).  
4. The processes by which societies, and social groups, manage their collective 
affairs (Healey, 2003). 
5. “A system of rules that shapes the actions of social actors” (Treib et al., 2007, p. 
3). 
Coordination-
oriented 
1. “Exercise of authority by governments on behalf of citizens” (Rotberg, 2014, p. 
4). 
2. A style of governing that refers to sustaining co-ordination and coherence 
among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives (Pierre, 
2000). 
3. The use of institutions, structures of authority and even collaboration to allocate 
resources and coordinate or control activity in society or the economy (Bell, 
2002). 
4. Traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised (World 
Bank, 2014). 
5. A binding decision making in the public sphere (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). 
6. The tools, strategies and relationships that governments use to assist governing 
(Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).  
7. “The structures and practices involved in coordinating social relations that are 
marked by complex, reciprocal interdependence” (Jessop, 2011, p. 4). 
\ 
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Ontologically, the study of governance is approached through a realist philosophy which 
assumes that conflicts and struggles are inherent in the interactions between actors 
framed by institutional structures (Biesbroek et al., 2014). This philosophy differs from 
the optimist perspective, which views governance as essentially an effort to solve 
societal problems where an adequate design of the implementation process would 
guarantee the achievement of the expected outcomes (Biesbroek et al., 2014). This 
research fits more with the optimistic philosophy, as it focuses on the strengths and 
weaknesses of a governance approach (e.g. what worked and what failed) in the 
solution of an environmental problem. The result of this analysis involves suggesting 
improvements to governance that would contribute to achieving the expected outcomes. 
This research, however, acknowledges the realist philosophy in the sense that conflict 
is unavoidable in human interactions. However, the impact of conflicts and struggles in 
the interactions between actors, such as politics, is beyond the scope of this study. 
2.2.1 Collaborative governance 
Collaborative governance is a mode of governance or governance style. Modes of 
governance represent the outcome of social processes but, more importantly, they also 
provide “the medium through which actors interpret and act to shape their reality” 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998, p. 318). Meuleman (2008) refers to modes of governance 
as governance styles, which he defines as “the processes of decision-making and 
implementation, including the manner in which the organisations involved relate to each 
other” (Meuleman, 2008, p. 12). Broadly, three governance styles have been used by 
Western democracies in attempts to deal with policy and planning issues throughout the 
20th and 21st centuries: hierarchical (top-down), market and network governance 
(bottom-up) (Meuleman, 2008). These three governance styles represent forms of social 
coordination in the attempt to manage social affairs. In this respect, it is important to 
differentiate between governance and coordination. Here, ‘governance’ refers to the 
regulation of elements in a system, while ‘coordination’ refers to the alignment of 
elements in a system (Thompson, 2003). Hence, governance regulates and guides 
coordination through three main approaches: hierarchy, markets and networks. 
Combining the definitions of governance styles and modes, this study uses the term 
governance approaches, which I re-define by combining the styles and modes 
definitions as: 
19  
Processes of decision-making and implementation in which actors shape their reality 
through their relationships, reflecting also their interpretations of reality. 
In other words, the governance approach indicates the manner in which decisions are 
made and implemented to deal with certain policy and planning issues, while showing 
the view of reality (based on values, norms and ideologies) of the actors involved in that 
governance approach.  
This study adopts the definition provided by Ansell and Gash (2008) to frame the 
analysis: 
“A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state 
stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, 
and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public 
programs or assets” (p. 544). 
The authors highlight the formal, consensus-based and deliberative nature of 
collaborative governance in making or implementing public policies (in which natural 
resource planning fits). The definition leaves aside informal forms of collaboration and 
emphasises shared understanding between the actors, particularly in agreeing to 
problem definition. Ansell and Gash (2008) warn that collaborating might not be the best 
alternative if there is a history of antagonism amongst the stakeholders. In this situation, 
they argue that collaboration will only succeed if two conditions are met: 1) there is a 
high level of interdependence between the stakeholders; and 2) there are strategies in 
place to increase trust and social capital among the participants in the collaboration. 
Ansell (2012) explains that collaboration is not a consultation process. Collaboration 
implies that participants have a well-defined decision-making role, and are not merely 
being consulted about their views in a tokenistic way. 
Following this definition of collaborative governance, this approach fits within the third 
type governance approach, network governance. Collaborative governance is then a 
type of network governance. Ansell (2012) explains that collaboration occurs in specific 
forums, while network governance is a structured relationship of coordination. However, 
he adds that both concepts tend to overlap in practice. Hence, for practical matters, I 
view collaboration as a governance approach within the main network approach. 
Another established and highly cited definition of collaborative governance was 
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developed by Emerson et al. (2012):  
“The processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that 
engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of 
government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public 
purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (p. 2). 
This definition is broader than that provided by Ansell and Gash (2008) as it includes 
more actors, partnerships and a broader scope (i.e. it considers informal collaborative 
arrangements). Nonetheless, both definitions adopt a performance-based perspective, 
which outlines that the purpose of collaborating is to carry out or implement public 
policies. As this research focuses on formal collaborative arrangements between state 
and non-state actors in the public sector, Ansell and Gash’s (2008) definition fits better 
with the governance analysis undertaken. The definition of Emerson et al. (2012) is 
more appropriate for analysis of collaboration that focus on informal processes as well 
as for private and civic domains. 
According to Bingham (2011), collaborative governance is differentiated from 
governance by its focus on the partnership processes between public and private 
stakeholders to achieve policy goals. Collaborative governance is distinguished by four 
aspects: 
1. Collaboration with partners within and outside the government, such as the 
general public, national, state, regional and local government agencies; tribes, 
NGOs, civil society, business and other non-governmental stakeholders.  
2. Collaboration may occur at any stage of the policy process, from defining and 
setting an issue to developing and implementing a policy, and evaluating its 
impacts. Collaboration also expands to the enforcement of rules and regulations 
through agency adjudication or litigation. 
3. Collaboration occurs within any method, model or process that is deliberative and 
consensual, including dialogue, public deliberation, public consultation, multi-
stakeholder collaboration, consensus-building, negotiation and dispute 
resolution.  
4. Collaboration includes both in person and online methods for collaborating.  
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2.2.2 Research gap and contribution to Literature 
The contribution of this study is through advancing the understanding of collaborative 
governance by examining its impact in the implementation phase of the policy process, 
where the environmental outcomes are produced. Bingham (2011) observes that there 
is a lack of research on the institutional design (e.g. governance arrangements) of 
collaboration as well as their impacts. Moreover, she argues that there is no common 
frame of analysis to examine the varied collaborative processes and structures. The 
Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD) would be the closest one to do 
this, but it still lacks general validity. In other words, there is no frame of analysis with 
general validity. Finally, Bingham (2011) argues that understanding collaborative 
governance is advanced by examining its relationships with different phases of the 
policy process. She explains the link between governance and the policy process 
through the metaphor of a “flowing stream”: In this metaphor: 
 ‘Upstream’ describes policymaking through legislative or quasi-legislative 
activity, usually with limited public participation. Inclusiveness, deliberativeness, 
and influence are offered as the three criteria to evaluate the quality of the 
upstream process. 
 ‘Midstream’ (which is where this study fits) describes as implementing, managing, 
and evaluating policy, more focused consultation with targeted stakeholder 
groups. Involves participatory governance, collaborative public management and 
consensus-building processes. A this stage, there is a shift from deliberation that 
occurred upstream to agreement-seeking processes. Collaborating midstream 
does not nullify competition between shared and different goals and, sometimes, 
it may lead to conflict. Criteria for successful outcomes includes: cost-effective 
implementation; financial feasibility; fair distribution of costs among parties; 
improved problem-solving capacity; enhanced social capital; reduction in conflict 
and hostility. 
 ‘Downstream’ describes enforcing policy through quasi-judicial or judicial action. 
The main goal of this stage is to determine rights and responsibilities among a 
defined set of actors, e.g. alternative dispute resolution. 
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2.2.3 Metagovernance  
As stated in the previous section, there are three main approaches to governance: 
hierarchical, market and network (Rhodes, 1996 and Jessop, 2011). These are the 
approaches most commonly adopted in policy. As public issues (e.g. environmental 
problems) become more complex in societies, Jessop (2011) argues that the three 
modes inevitably fail at dealing with issues such as these environmental problems. In 
order to overcome these inevitable and expected failures, the concept of 
metagovernance was created. Briefly, metagovernance is defined as the “governance 
of governance” (Jessop, 2011, p. 106). Meuleman (2008) expands this definition by 
stating that metagovernance is a “means by which to produce some degree of 
coordinated governance” (p. 68). He adds that coordination occurs through sound 
combinations of hierarchical, market and network governance to achieve the best 
possible outcomes.  
Thus, metagovernance emerged as the instrument to cope with the unavoidable failure 
of governance approaches. It can also be viewed as the hierarchical supervision of 
networks and markets. It is involved in designating and managing mixtures of 
hierarchies, networks and markets. ‘Mixture’ is a key word because it recognises that 
the three governance modes are usually mixed, producing hybrid governance 
compositions that include markets, networks and hierarchy. Jessop (2011) argues that 
governance fails due to the problem of ‘governability’: “the question of whether a socially 
and discursively constituted object of governance could ever be manageable given the 
complexity and turbulence of the material, social, and spatiotemporal conditions in which 
it is embedded” (p. 9). And to specific issues of ‘governability’ that relate with the policy 
issue and the particular modes of coordination involved.   
Following the performance-based perspective of governance adopted by this study, the 
role of metagovernance is to improve the effectiveness of governance, such as 
achieving better environmental outcomes. Jessop (2011) defines effective governance 
as the capacity (by the actors involved in the governance arrangements) to reflect on, 
and rebalance, the mix among the governance modes in response to the challenges 
and opportunities that occur in market, state and civil society realms. In other words, 
effective governance is the capacity to modify and readjust the mix of governance 
modes according to changes in the issue at hand, e.g. population growth, climate 
change or financial resources. Therefore adaptive governance is the best example of 
23  
effective governance.  
However, Jessop (2011) warns that that achieving an ideal mix may be an impossible 
task. So far, there are no examples of how this mixture might be obtained. Jessop goes 
on to state “any impression of effective governance and metagovernance to date has 
depended on displacing certain governance problems elsewhere and/or on deferring 
them into a more or less remote future” (p. 12). Meuleman (2008), is more optimistic 
and argues that the right combinations between the three governance approaches can 
be achieved. This could be done by highly trained and skilful public managers or 
‘metagovernors’. One of the main tools of metagovernance is monitoring. Jessop’s 
(2011) view is that this tool underpins flexibility, and provides essential information to 
modify the mix of the governance approach, e.g. more use of markets rather than 
hierarchy, supported by networks; or more use of hierarchy to steer the network. 
2.3 Conceptual framework: Governance, policy & planning and implementation  
The relationship between governance and policy and planning can be conceptualised 
as 1) governance as a policy and planning activity; 2) the role of the government in 
policy and planning, which involves steering and coordination; or 3) the 
actions/institutions that structure the policy process where planning is embedded.  
These three conceptualisations occur within a collaborative set where state and non-
state actors participate in policy development and implementation. In the three 
conceptualisations, policy and planning are combined in one term, as planning is 
embedded into policy in the sense that it can be analysed through the policy cycle 
(Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). Moreover, this study characterises planning as a type of 
policy-making, and it analyses the impact of a governance approach (collaboration) 
through the environmental outcomes achieved by a water quality plan, which is a key 
element of a water quality policy (see Figure 2.1 for more detail). These three 
conceptualisations occur within a collaborative setting, where state and non-state actors 
participate in plan formulation and implementation. These three conceptualisations are 
described below. 
1. Governance is considered to be a policy and planning activity, where governance 
is viewed as a strategy adopted by policy and planning to achieve its objectives. 
Planning is defined as “a systematic, integrative and iterative process that is 
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comprised of a number of steps executed over a specified time schedule” 
(European Commission, 2003 cited by Newig and Koontz, 2013, p. 252). In this 
respect, collaborative planning is defined as an “interactive process of consensus 
building and implementation using stakeholder and public involvement” 
(Margerum, 2002, p. 237). This conceptualisation of planning coincides with the 
notion of collaborative governance, defined by Ansell and Gash (2008) as “a 
governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-
state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, 
consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public 
policy or manage public programs or assets” (p. 544). Moreover, Ansell (2012) 
implicitly conceptualises planning as a form of governance activity as he divides 
collaborative governance in three types: collaborative planning, watershed 
partnerships and regulatory negotiation. This view is also shared by Healey 
(2006) which views “planning as a policy-driven approach to the practice of 
governance which is both knowledge-rich and inclusionary” (p. 241). 
2. Role of government is considered within policy and planning, where governance 
can be viewed as the steering of policy and planning by government through the 
development and implementation phases, while policy and planning become 
forms of rowing service delivery. Adopting the neoliberal focus that views 
governance as a new mode of governing that reduces the state’s role in 
formulating and implementing policies, where instead of ‘rowing’, it ‘steers’ 
service delivery (Rhodes, 1996), planning then becomes a collaborative activity 
that ‘rows’ the delivery of public goods. Governance, in this scheme, is the 
attempt to coordinate (‘steer’) vertically and horizontally the interactions that 
occur within collaborative planning (Newig and Koontz, 2013), which is 
considered part of the institutional capacity of a governance system that 
contributes to its effectiveness (Lockwood, 2010). 
3. Governance is considered as a system comprised of institutions that structure 
the policy process in which planning is embedded. Planning can be seen as a 
public policy activity framed by the policy cycle (Newig and Koontz, 2013). In this 
view, governance becomes the system where policy processes such as planning 
take place. A governance system is understood as the government and other 
organisations that manage a resource; the specific rules related to the use of that 
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resource; and how these rules are made (Ostrom, 2009). This system structures 
the policy-making process by regulating, controlling, monitoring or coordinating 
through actions or institutions. Frameworks of analysis such as the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom, 2005) or the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) fit with 
this view of the governance and planning relation. 
 
Figure 2.1  Visual representation of the interaction between the research topics: 
governance-policy&planning-implementation-outcomes).  
The relationship between governance-policy and planning is complemented by 
implementation, which is the third element this research considers for the analysis of 
environmental outcomes (see Figure 2.2 for more detail). Implementation is defined as 
“the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually made in a statute” (Sabatier and 
Mazmanian, 1980, p. 540). The policy decision identifies the problems to be addressed, 
the objectives to be pursued and structures the implementation process. Studies of 
implementation have remained marginal in the social sciences since the 1990s due to 
the rise of New Public Management (NPM) reforms (Barrett, 2004), leaving a wide 
research gap (O’Toole, 2000). As a consequence, there is still no robust implementation 
theory, which is also the result of a persistent debate between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-
up’ schools of implementation research (deLeon and deLeon, 2002; Pulzl and Treib, 
2007). Top-down focuses on the gap between policy definition and its execution, while 
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bottom-up studies the networks of actors involved directly in the implementation process 
(e.g. street-level bureaucrats). O’Toole (2000) and Pulzl and Treib (2007), on the other 
hand, argue that implementation research has continued under other labels, such as 
studies of policy change. Within these studies, ‘hybrid’ theories (i.e. attempts to 
reconcile top-down and bottom-up approaches) have been developed, such as the IAD 
or the ACF frameworks. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Graphic representation of the relationship between governance-policy 
and planning- implementation. 
According to O’Toole (2000), implementation is included in the broader theme of 
analysing how governance systems deliver policy outcomes. The link between 
governance and implementation is also implicit in the elements that, according to 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), structures the implementation process. The ability to 
structure includes key governance components such as institutions, rules and resources 
as well as the ability to steer the implementation process and regulate public 
participation. Hill and Hupe (2003) argue that this analysis needs to consider the 
characteristics of the actors involved as well as their ‘structured’ relationships. Within 
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policy and planning, implementation is the phase that delivers the program through 
actions ‘on the ground’ directed to achieve the planning objectives: “implementation as 
a sub-process of the overall process in which policies are being made. It can be viewed 
as distinguished from the policy formation part of the policy process. The difference 
between the two parts is that implementation deals with policy goals that are given, 
being the result of the policy formation in which those goals were set” (Hill and Hupe, 
2003, p. 485).  
 
Plan and policy implementation can be approached as either ‘conformance’ to the 
actions contained in a plan or ‘performance’ according to how outcomes are affected by 
decisions (Berke et al., 2006). The assumption is that planning generates outcomes by 
implementing a set of objectives usually contained in a plan. The implementation occurs 
within a governance system that presumably relies on a mode (or modes) of governance 
to deliver the plan. Moreover, implementation questions were found to be the key aspect 
to understand the relationship between governance and planning outcomes. And 
O’Toole (2000) points out that this relationship remains a research gap. In a recent study 
of a collaborative effort (watershed partnerships), Koontz and Newig (2013) found that 
neither top-down or bottom-up approaches had a decisive influence in plan and policy 
implementation: other elements such as funds, leadership and networks were more 
important. 
2.4 Governance frameworks  
The frameworks reviewed in this study are used to guide and structure the analysis of 
how governance systems function in collaborative schemes and the outcomes they 
produce. Governance frameworks are defined as “the totality of instruments, 
procedures, processes and role division among actors designed to tackle a group of 
societal problems” (Meuleman and Niestroy, 2015, p. 7). They are a tool for 
understanding governance systems and their interaction between multiple variables and 
levels of analysis, highlighting the inherent complexity of the system: “purposive 
governance interventions that are developed and delivered by multiple actors at multiple 
scales in pursuit of a broad goal (i.e. the protection of biodiversity)” (Dale et al., 2013b, 
p. 164).  
 
This thesis considered analytical frameworks suited to the analysis of multi-level and 
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polycentric governance systems. Multi-level describes the different levels of government 
involved in decision-making processes such as local, regional, state, national and 
international (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). ‘Polycentric’ refers to the multiplicity of centres 
of authority, in contrast with the traditional conception that views the state as the only 
centre. Polycentricism also implies that interactions are done vertically as well as 
horizontally across more than one jurisdiction, often overlapping or duplicating functions 
(Ostrom et al., 1961). Even though power is dispersed across many centres, the state 
remains the most powerful actor as it has the capacity to change the rules of the game 
and establish policy priorities (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).  
 
The frameworks reviewed are briefly presented according to their main purpose (for 
more details see the Appendix B): 
 Explain policy change: IAD Framework (Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom, 2005; Imperial, 
1999; Pahl Wostl et al., 2010); ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Kubler, 
2001; Weible et al., 2011); Transition Management Framework (Loorbach, 2010); 
and the Management and Transition Framework which is based on elements of 
the IAD (Pahl Wostl et al., 2010). 
 Offer diagnosis or model approaches: Governance and Systems Analysis (GSA) 
(Dale et al., 2013b); General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-
Ecological Systems (Ostrom, 2009); and Integrative Framework for Collaborative 
Governance (Emerson et al., 2012). 
 Analyse appropriateness or suitability: Governance strategies that effectively 
support ecosystem services, resource sustainability, and biodiversity (Kenward 
et al., 2011); and Fit-for-purpose Governance (Rijke et al., 2012). 
 Analyse outcomes: Goal specificity (Biddle and Koontz, 2014); Framework for 
monitoring social process and outcomes (Chapman, 2014); and Framework for 
evaluating and designing collaborative planning (Faehnle and Tyrvainen, 2013). 
 Examine the impact of governance on programs or policies: Governance 
Analytical Framework (GAF) (Hufty, 2011). 
Most of the frameworks reviewed include general interdisciplinary criteria that can be 
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applied to any field or policy area. The majority assess processes or governance 
outcomes, focusing on the overall performance of the governance system. Few, 
however, concentrate on the final results or outcomes of the plan or policy such as 
environmental and social outcomes. By governance outcomes and processes, I refer to 
aspects such as inclusiveness, transparency, fairness, accountability, legitimacy or 
knowledge use (Dale et al., 2013b; and Vella et al., 2015) as well as ‘good governance’ 
principles (Lockwood et al., 2010), which overlap with the governance outcomes and 
processes enlisted above. On the other hand, environmental outcomes refer to results 
such as the improvement in the quality of water (percentage against target) or the 
reduction in land degradation. Examples of social outcomes could be levels of social 
learning or value of ecosystem services (Chapman, 2014). 
The focus of this research is on environmental policy and planning and seeks to address 
the research gap of how governance in its collaborative approach impacts on 
environmental outcomes. This leaves aside analysis regarding the quality of governance 
processes and how they ought to operate according to a set of ‘good governance’ 
principles. It also does not consider explaining policy change or analysing the suitability 
or appropriateness of governance strategies. Also out of scope of this study is the 
analysis of the impact of governance on other type of outcomes, such as social benefits, 
and informing reforms to the overall governance system. The research represents the 
analysis of the impact of collaborative governance processes on only one category of 
outcomes, the environmental outcomes.  
Two governance frameworks were considered to be suitable for this type of study: the 
GAF (Figure 2.3) and the Process-Outcomes governance framework (Figure 2.4). The 
GAF is designed to analyse the impact that governance has upon a selected dependent 
variable, e.g. equity. It assumes a cause-effect relationship between governance and 
the dependent variable selected. The relationship, nonetheless, is preceded by 
contextual conditions, identified by Hufty (2011) as independent variables. Governance 
then adopts more a mediating role, conducting (and altering) the causes of the context 
on the effects of the dependent variable examined. The Process-Outcomes framework 
also evaluates the impact of governance on outcomes (designed as consequences in 
the framework’s perspective), and assumes a mediating role for governance as well. 
While both are suitable for the analysis of this study, the GAF seems more appropriate 
for an analysis that focuses on social outcomes (e.g. trust and relationship building) as 
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it involves network analysis of collaborations. The Process-Outcomes governance 
framework, on the other hand, has the advantage of synthesising both a process and 
outcome-oriented evaluation of governance in the environmental context. In this project, 
I examine both as I assess aspects and elements of the collaborative governance 
process and link them to their impact on the environmental outcomes achieved by a 
water policy. Hence, the Process-Outcomes governance framework was found more 
suitable and, consequently, was selected for this study. More details about this 
framework are provided in the Research Methodology section of this thesis (Chapter 3).  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Governance Analytical Framework by Hufty (2011). 
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Figure 2.4 Process-Outcomes governance evaluation framework by 
Rauschmayer et al. (2009). 
2.5 Australian model of environmental governance 
In Australia, collaborative governance approaches to policy and planning emerged from 
rural land and water management approaches. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
states of New South Wales and Queensland initiated integrated catchment 
management efforts to improve the sustainability of land and water resources 
(Margerum, 2002). These integrated management efforts evolved into the current 
regional NRM model for improving the management of natural resources. The regional 
environmental governance model was introduced in 2002 by the Australian government 
in conjunction with the State and Territory governments through the National Action Plan 
for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP) (Curtis et al., 2014). Operating this model involved 
the creation of 56 NRM regions in the country, which were administered and managed 
by the same number of community-based NRM bodies. In Queensland, the location of 
the study area, the governments established 14 NRM regions. One purpose of the NRM 
bodies was to develop and implement NRM plans as well as well as water quality plans 
in collaboration with community groups and governments (Lockwood et al., 2009). The 
key stakeholders included in the collaborative form of governance were the three levels 
of government (federal, state and local); industry groups (e.g. agriculture, dairy farming 
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or mining); community-based groups, including indigenous representation; research 
institutions; and Regional Development Australia (RDA) committees (Cox et al., 2013). 
NRM based on regions was considered the best way to achieve integrated outcomes 
(Vella et al., 2015). 
 
The regional model, nonetheless, has received some criticisms. For instance, Curtis et 
al. (2014) argue that the government favours the neoliberal approach (on the grounds 
of efficiency) of purchasing outcomes from the landholders — viewing them and the 
NRM groups as instruments of implementation (delivery of services) — instead of 
building human and social capital that would generate better results. This view is shared 
by Marshall (2007). It has also been criticised in terms of its legitimacy, democracy and 
accountability; however, it is perceived by most of the stakeholders (including 
Indigenous communities) as the preferred approach to NRM delivery (Robins and 
Kanowski, 2011). The regional model was initially created as a bottom-up governance 
approach to NRM and planning but in practice it has been instrumented through a top-
down model controlled by federal and state governments (Robins and Dovers, 2007a). 
See Table 2.2 for more detail about the evolution of Australian environmental 
governance. This review has identified that solving the tension between regional 
approaches is one of the main governance challenges for the regional model.  
 
The NAP was included as part of the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) program which 
allocated A$392 million to the 56 regions (Robins and Dovers, 2007a). They were 
replaced in 2008 by the Caring for our Country (CfoC) program that marked a shift from 
the bi-partisan agreement between state and federal governments to a more centralised 
control from the federal level. The bi-partisan model was crucial for the appropriate 
operation of the regional model as it secured support and funds (Lockwood and 
Davidson, 2010 and Vella et al., 2015). CfoC undermined community engagement and 
widened the gap between local groups and regional bodies. Moreover, it reduced the 
trust of the regional participants towards the government and its commitment to NRM, 
which was followed by large cuts in state government expenditure (Curtis et al., 2014). 
One of the main policies of the CfoC, and the focus of this study, was the 2009 Reef 
Plan, along with its Reef Rescue implementation strategy. They were both 
representatives of this move to more hierarchical governance, as argued by Curtis et al. 
(2014). 
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Table 2.2 Paradigm shifts in NRM, adapted from Robins (2007). 
 
1. Landcare 
 
Created in 1990 by the Australian government after the strong lobby from the 
Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) and the National Farmers’ 
Federation (NFF). In four years, more than 2000 Landcare groups were 
formed throughout the country, representing one third of all the farming 
families. 
2. Integrated 
Catchment 
Management 
Described as a philosophy-organisational culture; a process-collaboration 
between government and community; and a product-making and 
implementing a plan. Catchments were the unit of water and land 
management in the mid-1990s (following the British approach). This 
paradigm emphasises community engagement in the decision-making 
process. 
3. Sustainable 
development 
The concept of ‘sustainable development’ found favour with the Australian 
Labour Party. It signified a greater interest and influence of the Australian 
government in NRM, which followed the ideas and guidelines expressed in 
the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 and Agenda 21. The negative aspect of this, 
which had consequences for the next paradigm, is the failure of Australia in 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. 
4. Neoliberalism Characterised by economic aims such as privatisation; public-private 
partnerships governance modes; and market-based instruments. Marked the 
rise of government business plans that prioritised monitoring performance 
and strict reporting arrangements. NHT was created in this paradigm, seen 
as a community-based funding program. 
5. Regionalism Signalled by the tension between two trends, ‘regionalisation’ and 
‘regionalism’. In the Australian experience, governments have been more 
willing to devolve responsibilities to regions for program management and 
delivery, than to provide the necessary power and resources. It is 
represented by the NHT2 and the NAP. 
 
 
The funding mechanism of the CfoC reduced the financial autonomy, and therefore the 
power of the regional NRM groups, leading to uncertainty and instability that has been 
ameliorated through alternative sources such as selling technical services (Robins and 
Kanowski, 2011). The shift to a more centralised model has been deepened by the 
current (introduced in 2013) Regional NRM Planning for Climate Change program which 
oversees the planning process of a new NRM plan by determining the priorities, 
assigning funds and endorsing the final document (Australian Government, 2014b). It is 
important to note that NRM issues have low priority in the federal government agenda. 
For instance, NHT2 and NAP which have been allocated the highest funding, 
represented just 0.1% of the federal budget. Hence, regional bodies have limited 
influence on high-level political and bureaucratic negotiations (Robins and Dovers, 
2007b). 
 
The thesis focuses on the state of Queensland, where the regional NRM model follows 
a collaborative and community-based mode of governance, which was introduced by 
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the Commonwealth in 2001 through the NAP (Lockwood et al., 2009; and Vella et al., 
2015). This plan complemented the second phase of the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT2) 
program. In Queensland, the NRM regional bodies are non-profit and have non-statutory 
or ‘community owned’ governance arrangements. This means that the bodies are 
owned by communities, which renders them a degree of flexibility to negotiate their 
priorities with governments, from local, state and federal levels. Non-statutory also 
means that these organizations have a degree of freedom to obtain funding. For 
instance, they can engage in profitable practices, such as offering consultancy services 
or negotiate funding sources from non-government actors. Aside from that, non-
statutory implies that the plans and policies of the regional NRM bodies in Queensland 
lack mandatory or enforceable actions (Ryan et al, 2013). The levels of freedom and 
flexibility offered by the non-statutory condition translate into a ‘loose’ nature of their 
governance arrangements. Queensland, though, is not the only state with this type of 
regional NRM model. Western Australia and the Northern Territory are the other 
Australian states with community owned or non-statutory regional NRM bodies.  
In New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia, the governance 
arrangements of the regional NRM bodies are ‘tighter’. In these states, the bodies are 
non-profit and statutory organizations. This means that these organizations are owned 
by the state governments, who define their nature as well as their plans and policies 
(Ryan et al, 2013). In this regard, they lack the level of flexibility to negotiate their 
priorities as they are usually defined by statue or government guidelines. They also lack 
the degree of freedom to obtain funding as it is provided by the state governments. On 
the other hand, the statutory nature of these organizations means that some (not all) of 
the actions in their plans and policies are mandatory. Table 2.3 below shows the nature 
of the governance arrangements and number of regional NRM bodies in Australia. It is 
worth noting that the statutory or non-statutory nature of the governance arrangements 
has not made any significant difference in terms of the outcomes (i.e. environmental 
outcomes) achieved by the regional NRM bodies (Ryan et al., 2013).  
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Table 2.3 Classification of the 54 regional NRM bodies in Australia (adapted from 
Ryan et al., 2013). 
State or Territory Regional NRM bodies Governance arrangements 
Australian Capital Territory 1 Non-statutory but government appointed 
New South Wales 11 Statutory 
Northern Territory 1 Non-statutory 
Queensland 14 Non-statutory 
Tasmania 3 Statutory 
South Australia 8 Statutory 
Victoria 10 Statutory 
Western Australia 6 Non-statutory 
 
 
 
In general, the role of the regional NRM groups in Queensland is to engage stakeholders 
and the wider public in the development of regional NRM plans that establish regional 
priorities to guide the investment of public resources (Curtis et al., 2014). The regional 
groups are embedded within a governance system which, according to Lane and 
McDonald (2005), has the following institutional arrangements: 
 decentralisation of government agencies and institutions 
 devolution of responsibility for development and implementation of policies to 
local communities and non-state organisations 
 enabling of local participation in planning as a more effective and context-
sensitive mode of planning. 
The collaborative mode is considered a more adequate approach to plan 
implementation as it is done through the participation of local communities: yet there is 
no strong evidence to confirm this assumption. Nonetheless, collaboration is crucial in 
this model as its main purpose is to confer legitimacy to plans and decisions (Lane and 
McDonald, 2005). The feature of these arrangements is  use of a ‘bottom-up’ approach 
for NRM planning, in which the community and local level determine the course of action 
that are followed by the other upper levels; however, the regional model is characterised 
by a ‘hybridisation’ of governance approaches. It combines ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ 
elements, where devolution of responsibility does not involve power sharing, in line with 
the neoliberal ideology towards the provision of public goods by private actors 
(Lockwood and Davidson, 2010). Currently, the approach has moved more towards the 
centralisation of decisions at the federal level (Australian Government, 2015a). The 
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main tension within the model is that this community-based collaborative governance is 
facilitated by the central level, which oversees the process and accredits its outcomes. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented the performance-oriented perspective on governance 
adopted in this study, where the aim of governance is to solve problems and improve 
well-being and life quality. In this view, governance is considered as a process that 
delivers solutions to public issues. I described how this study focuses on the 
collaborative approach of governance and offered the definition that frames my 
research. Collaborative governance is the approach followed by the case study. After 
outlining the concept of governance to its collaborative mode, I explained the conceptual 
framework of my research, integrated by four concepts that refer to environmental 
governance: 1) governance; 2) policy and planning; 3) implementation; and 3) 
outcomes. I showed how these concepts interact within my study, using the policy-
making cycle to state the focus of the study, which analyses governance at the 
implementation phase of policy-making, which is the phase where outcomes (i.e. 
environmental outcomes) are produced.  
Then, I presented the review of governance frameworks that I undertook in order to 
select the governance framework that is most appropriate to examine the research 
problem and use in the case study. I explained how the Process-Outcomes governance 
evaluation framework was the best fit for the purpose of this research. This framework 
is further described and explained in the Research Methodology section (next chapter).  
Finally, I briefly outlined the Australian environmental governance model, which is the 
area of focus for my study. The model is characterised by a regionalisation strategy that 
has become increasingly centralised over the years, despite the collaborative approach 
adopted. 
The next section presents the research methodology adopted in the research: it 
describes the steps followed to undertake the study of the impact of governance in its 
collaborative approach on environmental outcomes within a water quality plan. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction  
The methodology conforms the ways of obtaining knowledge about the real world 
(Biesbroek, 2014). Environmental problems are complex and, in consequence, 
researching them is also a complex task. For this reason, the methodology to analyse 
the impact of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes is based on an 
interdisciplinary mixed methods research approach that combines quantitative and 
qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. The research methodology of this 
study consists of two phases (Figure 3.1): firstly, the development of a modified 
Process-Outcomes governance evaluation framework, based on a critical literature 
review of previous studies that have examined the impact of collaboration on 
environmental outcomes; secondly, the case study analysis, which applies the 
framework to examine the impact of collaborative governance on environmental 
outcomes. The first phase provides the conceptual and theoretical tools to undertake 
the case study analysis. In the second phase, the Process-Outcomes governance 
framework is applied along with the collaborative governance criteria to evaluate 
collaboration based on environmental outcomes achieved. The framework 
implementation combined a regional evaluation undertaken at the regional scale of 
collaborative governance, and a general evaluation that included the other levels of 
governance involved in the water quality plan. 
This section proceeds by firstly presenting the research perspective adopted to 
investigate the research problem. Then, it offers the research design that consists in a 
set of objectives developed to address the research sub-questions. This section also 
explains the research approach followed as well as the process for case study selection. 
It also includes the explanation and justification behind the selection of the governance 
evaluation framework presented in Chapter 2. The chapter is complemented by a 
description of the data collection methods, as well as the steps followed for data 
processing and analysis, which served as the basis for the results chapters. It concludes 
with a summary of the research methodology.  
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Figure 3.1 The two phases of the research methodology. 
3.2 Research perspective (the ontological and epistemological approach) 
Ontologically, the research assumes that reality is objective and, therefore, can be 
knowable. In consequence, the study adopts a pragmatist research perspective or 
philosophical worldview. Worldview is defined as “a basic set of beliefs that guide action” 
(Guba, 1990, p. 17). These beliefs are represented by the epistemology of the 
pragmatist approach, which is problem-oriented and investigates the consequences or 
impacts of actions in solving a given problem. Epistemology refers to how we get to 
know about reality. Pragmatism is oriented to real world practice and performance 
(Creswell, 2014). This pragmatic view is exemplified in this research by the adoption of 
a performance-oriented perspective of governance to investigate how a collaborative 
governance approach impacted in solving a water quality problem. The investigation 
around the governance approach impact is based on the results (e.g. environmental 
outcomes) achieved by a policy.  
The pragmatist view is reinforced by the main concern of this study, which seeks to find 
out what works in the collaborative approach, and how it contributes to the solution of 
the environmental issue studied. This also explains why this research does not engage 
with making normative judgements about ‘good’ or ‘bad’ performance. For this reason, 
the study does not rely on ‘good governance’ principles. In addition, it evaluates how 
Methodology
Phase 1 –
Framework Development
•Theoretical framework
•Criteria development
Phase 2 -
Case Study Analysis
•Framework 
Implementation
•Regional Evaluation
•General Evaluation
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collaborative governance works in practice rather than discussing its theoretical merits. 
In this regard, the study emphasises, following Creswell (2014), the research problem 
instead of the methods. The examination of the impacts of a governance approach 
represents a way to better understand an environmental issue, in this case water quality. 
The pragmatist perspective also accounts for why the study adopted a mixed methods 
research approach. As pragmatists do not commit to one reality and do not see the 
world as an absolute unity, they adopt varied approaches to analyse and collect data in 
order to provide a better understanding of the research problem (Creswell, 2014).  
 
The pragmatist view is complemented by an epistemological post-positivist position that 
assumes that there is an objective reality that can be studied, while adopting a 
deterministic philosophy where certain causes determine or influence outcomes 
(Creswell, 2014). This post-positivist view is exemplified by the epistemological 
approach of this study, which investigates the impacts of an independent variable 
(collaborative governance) on a dependent variable (environmental outcomes). The 
post-positivist view guides the quantitative aspect of the study, involved in developing 
numeric measures to study the impact of collaborative governance. It uses the deductive 
method to specify important variables and makes comparisons among groups (Lincoln 
et al., 2011). This is, after all, the purpose of developing and using an evaluation 
framework to assess the impact of governance on environmental outcomes. However, 
the study does not adopt fully the post-positive stance as it does not seek to validate a 
theory or reduce the interpretation of the results to a cause-effect relationship, explained 
merely by numbers (Creswell, 2014). 
 
As this is essentially a social science research (e.g. study of human decisions and 
interactions), the researcher avoids assuming a reductionist position to explain the 
phenomena studied. In this regard, the study accepts the partial nature of the 
investigation, highlighting that governance does not explain completely the 
environmental outcomes achieved by a given policy or plan. Given its post-positivist 
stance, this study marginalises the mental processes or internal volition of individuals 
as a study subject (Neuman, 2011). Furthermore, this research does not rely on critical 
science approaches. Thus, it does not seek to empower a particular group from the 
findings of the governance analysis nor does it intend to serve as an instrument to 
reduce domination or power distinctions (Neuman, 2011).  
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3.3. Research design  
The plan to undertake the research was guided by the main research questions and the 
four research sub-questions. As stated in the Introduction chapter, the research sought 
to respond to the primary research question of how has collaborative governance 
impacted on environmental outcomes in Australian natural resource planning and 
management? Following this main research question, the research developed three 
objectives to organise the research sub-questions and structure the data collection and 
data analysis tasks to address the sub-questions. This provided a frame of reference to 
undertake the research activities. Among the research sub-questions, the research 
included the questions that guided the critical literature review (Chapter 4). 
Objective 1: Identify frameworks and criteria that underpin evaluation of collaborative 
governance approaches on environmental outcomes. 
1. Based on the environmental outcomes achieved, have collaborative forms of 
governance improved the condition of natural resources? 
Objective 2: Apply a case study analysis to evaluate the impact of collaborative 
governance on environmental outcomes within Australia. 
1. What was the role of collaboration in the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan?  
2. How have regional collaborative governance approaches impacted on 
environmental outcomes achieved by the NRM regions of the GBR? 
3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the collaborative governance 
approach?  
Objective 3: Develop a series of recommendations from the case study analysis. 
1. What are the implications of collaborative governance in Queensland’s natural 
resource planning and management? 
As I stated in the introduction of this chapter, environmental issues are complex and 
their investigation involves also complex methods. Hence, this research relies on a case 
study, which is used in social sciences to understand complex phenomena (Gilgun, 
1994). Moreover, this approach is recommended for research designed to ask the “how” 
of particular phenomena in real world contexts (Punch, 1998). The next section explains 
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the case study approach and highlights its pertinence for the research undertaken in 
this thesis.  
3.3.1 Research approach 
The study uses a mixed methods research approach that relies on a case study 
research strategy. The mixed methods approach was selected because combining 
quantitative and qualitative approaches provides a more complete understanding of a 
research problem (Creswell, 2014). The case study was selected as the research 
approach as this research seeks to answer “what” and “how” about governance and its 
impact on environmental outcomes within environmental planning and policy. As Yin 
(2014) argues, in his seminal work, the case study is the most appropriate research 
approach to answer “how” or “why” questions about contemporary events in which the 
researcher has little or no control. The case study also fits with the research 
perspectives (pragmatist and post-positivist) adopted in this study, as this research 
approach assumes the existence of an objective reality that is independent of the 
observer (Yin, 2014).  
Case study research has been criticised as being unable to provide general, context-
independent knowledge. Generalisable knowledge that does not depend on a given 
context tends to be considered more valuable than context-dependent knowledge. 
Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that this is a misunderstanding on the validity of case study as 
a scientific method. Case study research provides “concrete, practical and context-
dependent knowledge” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 224). Thus, it provides a more complete 
picture of the phenomenon under investigation. In this way, the case study strategy of 
investigating a governance approach within environmental policy and planning provides 
practical and concrete knowledge of its impacts on the solution of an environmental 
issue. In addition, the case study has the advantage of including the context that tends 
to be disregarded by other research strategies, particularly those that are quantitative-
oriented. As governance occurs in human decisions and actions, it is essential to take 
into account the context in which these actions and decisions occur. 
In the application of case study research — to provide a wider picture of a phenomenon 
— the researcher acts in a similar fashion to a detective. Yin (2014) argues that 
analysing past events is analogous to arriving on a scene after a crime. It is important 
to note that generally case study research involves examining past events. Yin (2014) 
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adds that case study research does not imply studying the ‘dead past’. On the contrary, 
it is the study of “a contemporary phenomenon in its real-world context” (Yin, 2014, p. 
78). Flyvbjerg (2006) adds that case study research is pertinent when past events under 
investigation are critical to understand a general problem. The task of the detective-
researcher is to make inferences about what has happened.  
In the case of this research, the task is to find out and infer on the impacts of a 
collaborative governance approach on the environmental outcomes achieved by an 
environmental policy. Important to note is that the inferences do not depend on the 
researcher’s judgements, but rather on the evidence gathered from the witnesses (i.e. 
interviewees) and from the physical elements of the scene (i.e. documents, plans and 
policies). In addition, and this is the most difficult element, the inferences also depend 
on some “unspecifiable element of common sense” (Yin, 2014, p. 76). The “common 
sense” in this study is guided by the pragmatist and post-positivist research perspective, 
where the researcher offers an account of what occurred and what can be improved to 
solve the water quality problem investigated.  
3.3.2 Case study selection criteria 
The selection of the single case study was based on four criteria. First, the selection 
focused on an environmental issue that was significant in scale and magnitude, but also 
that remained unsolved. The scale referred to the geographic area covered by the 
environmental issue as well as the multiplicity of actors involved. The magnitude 
referred to the level of impact of the environmental issue on nature as well as on the 
stakeholders. The water quality issue in the GBR fit with this first criterion, as its scale 
covered more than one area (i.e. six NRM regions within the same state jurisdiction) 
and involved multiple actors from government, community and industry sectors. In terms 
of magnitude, water quality impacted on one of the largest and most biodiverse reef 
ecosystems in the world, affecting multiple stakeholders with different interests and 
aims. In addition, the water quality issue remains a pressing issue despite varied efforts 
to solve it (Chapter 1).  
The six NRM regions within the GBR also serves to explain why a single case study 
was selected instead of two or more. In this regard, this is a unique single case study 
because it integrates six different small cases: the six regions involved in the GBR’s 
water quality issue. This unique single case study attempts to offer a more complete 
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picture of the phenomena under investigation. Particularly, by offering a deeper 
discussion through the six sub-cases, in an example of what Geertz (1983) describes 
as a ‘thick description’ of the phenomena investigated. 
The third criterion was to select an environmental policy that relied on a collaborative 
governance approach within Australia. The main objective of this policy would be to 
improve the condition of a natural resource, given the focus of this study on 
environmental outcomes. The policy context had to be located in Australia as this 
research was funded by an Australian Research Council grant, and so this case study 
could focus on analysing the impact of governance on natural resource management 
and planning. The GBR water quality policies fit with this criterion, as they relied on 
collaborative governance approaches to improve water quality.  
Finally, the fourth criterion was to select a water quality policy that had information on 
water quality outcomes and had a time-frame determined. The 2009 Reef Plan was the 
policy that fit this criterion as its water quality outcomes were reported every year until 
it concluded in 2013. The data on these water quality outcomes was based on a 
monitoring and modelling program (the Paddock to Reef program) established to 
monitor the implementation progress of the water quality plan. These water quality 
outcomes would allow the examination of the impact of collaborative governance on 
them. They represented a benchmark in which to base the analysis of the impact of 
collaborative governance in the implementation of the Reef Plan.  
The selection of this water quality plan was preceded by the identification of a monitoring 
gap based on a review of policies suitable for the purpose of this study. During this 
review, it was identified that other NRM plans in significant ecosystems lacked 
information about environmental outcomes, and did not include specific time-frames in 
their objectives and targets. In addition, previous water quality plans for the GBR lacked 
data on water quality outcomes, while more current ones did not fit this criterion as they 
were still being implemented and, therefore, their time-frame had not concluded.  
Therefore, as the GBR water quality issue represented by the 2009 Reef Plan fitted with 
these three criteria, it became then the single-case study for this research.  
3.3.3 Process-Outcome governance evaluation framework 
This study represents an ex-post evaluation of the impact of collaborative governance 
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arrangements and processes on environmental outcomes. Evaluations are defined as 
the “assessment of the merit, worth and value of administration, output and outcome of 
government interventions, which is intended to play a role in future, practical action 
situations” (Mickwitz, 2003, p. 420). By focusing on past natural resource planning and 
management events, this study seeks to determine to what extent collaboration efforts 
contributed to improve the condition of natural resources. Ex-post evaluations fit with 
one of the two types of evaluations –ex-ante and ex-post− required by environmental 
policy, as highlighted by Mickwitz (2003). My project represents an ex-post evaluation 
of the effectiveness of collaborative governance arrangements in improving 
environmental outcomes. 
The analytical framework to evaluate governance was selected from a review of 
governance frameworks (Chapter 2). The Process-Outcomes governance framework 
(Rauschmayer et al, 2009) was considered the most appropriate analytical tool for the 
purpose of this study. Firstly, it was the only framework from the review that combined 
governance processes and the outcomes generated by the governance interventions, 
such as environmental outcomes. (See the Appendix B for more detail on the review of 
governance frameworks.) In this regard, it has the elements to analyse the setting of the 
2009 Reef Plan implementation, i.e. governance processes; outputs; consequences; 
and contextual conditions such as external factors. (See Chapter 2. Figure 2.4 for more 
detail on the elements of the framework.) Secondly, processes and outcomes to 
evaluate governance interventions allow learning about the obstacles to implementation 
that emerge from the governance processes (Rauschmayer et al., 2009). This 
contributes to address a knowledge gap of what occurs between the governance 
processes and the subsequent outcomes, thus reducing the uncertainty that pervades 
the relationship between governance efforts in policy and planning and the resultant 
outcomes. As this study focuses on the implementation of a water quality plan, the 
Process-Outcomes governance framework allows identifying the obstacles faced by its 
implementation. This also enables informing policy about improvements required to 
address the implementation obstacles.  
Finally, the process-outcomes combined orientation to evaluation contributes to 
assessing the effectiveness of a governance intervention, based on the outcomes 
achieved. Effectiveness can be assessed by the ecological state achieved after the 
governance intervention (Rauschmayer et al., 2009), which can be viewed by comparing 
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the original targets of a policy or plan with the environmental outcomes achieved. In the 
case of this study, effectiveness is given by the water quality condition achieved after 
the collaborative governance intervention of the Reef Plan (contrasted between water 
quality targets and outcomes). Hence, the Process-Outcomes governance framework 
allows tracking the impact of the governance processes on the environmental outcomes 
achieved. This enables to identify obstacles generated by the processes and offers a 
picture on the effectiveness of the governance approach evaluated.   
The Process-Outcomes governance framework is modified to fit this study. As a 
consequence, the environmental outcomes represent the water quality outcomes 
achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan, the output is the water quality plan itself, and the 
governance processes examined are obtained through a review of other studies that 
have focused on collaborative governance and its impact on environmental outcomes. 
These are the collaborative governance processes criteria on which to base the 
evaluation of the 2009 Reef Plan (Chapter 4). It is important to state that the Process-
Outcomes governance framework is used to guide data collection and analysis of one 
part of the case study. The other represents, as stated previously, a quantitative analysis 
about the impacts of collaboration at the regional level. This other part of the case study, 
nonetheless, is framed by the Process-Outcomes governance framework. It is important 
to note that this modified framework would not constitute a model of collaboration, or an 
ideal type of what collaborative approaches should be. Rather it represents a diagnostic 
tool to support adjustments in governance arrangements, as well as inform future 
planning policies. 
3.3.4 Data collection 
Primary and secondary data were the two types of data collected to answer the research 
sub-questions. The primary data was based on semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders as well as an evaluation instrument responded to by the same. Secondary 
data was based on official water quality data reported, other government reports, 
documents from the NRM bodies (e.g. annual reports and newsletters), official and 
independent audits or evaluations as well as related literature (e.g. journal articles or 
books). Table 3.1 below shows in detail the type of data collected in this study, based 
on the six main sources of data for case study research (Yin, 2014).  
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Table 3.1 Data sources for the case study, based on main data sources of data 
(Yin 2014) 
 
Source Used Not used 
Documentation 
(Secondary data) 
Official documents and reports from 
government agencies and regional NRM 
bodies (plans and policies, reports, report 
cards, brochures); evaluations or audits of 
plans; journal articles; books; research 
reports. 
 
Archival records 
(Secondary data) 
NRM bodies annual reports (2008-2013). 
NRM bodies newsletters (2008-2013). 
Maps and charts of geographic 
characteristics of the place. 
 
Interviews / evaluation 
instrument (Primary 
data) 
22 key stakeholders.  
Direct observations  X 
 
Participant 
observation 
 X 
 
Physical artefacts 
 
 X 
 
The data collected was based on the four principles for data collection developed by Yin 
(2014). These principles increase validity and reliability of the study: 
1. Use multiple sources of evidence: Yin (2014) recommends triangulating 
information sources, in order to develop “converging lines of inquiry” (p. 120) to 
corroborate the findings. Triangulation means that the case study findings have 
been supported by more than one source of data (known as convergent 
evidence). This is shown by the multiple sources of data outlined in Table 3.1 
covered by primary and secondary data sources. This is also supported by 
Mickwitz (2003). 
2. Create a case study database: the database contains four components: 
a. Notes: from interviews, document analysis and observations. The 
researcher included notes from interviews and document analysis using 
Word and NVivo software. 
b. Documents: collected during the case study (e.g. official reports). The 
researcher developed an annotated bibliography of these documents 
using EndNote software.  
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c. Tabular materials: surveys or quantitative data. In this study, they refer to 
the data on water quality outcomes as well as the evaluation instrument 
designed to be responded by the interviewees.  
d. Narratives: answers to the research questions using the multiple sources 
of data. This creates a narrative that becomes the structure of the thesis 
3. Maintain a chain of evidence: this chain provides the logical evidence to trace the 
steps followed by the researcher form the research questions to the conclusions 
or from the latter to the questions. Following the detective analogy, this is similar 
to the chain in criminological evidence. The chain of evidence in this study is 
given by the three objectives and the steps followed to address them. These 
steps comprised four elements with their respective activities: 1) tasks; 2) data 
collection; 3) data analysis; and 4) expected outcomes. (See Appendix A for more 
detail on this chart of objectives.)  
4. Exercise care when using data from electronic sources: the researcher set limits 
to its use, relying only on information provided by official websites, avoiding 
newspaper sources or other sources such as blogs.  
3.3.4.1 Data gathering methods 
As mentioned previously, this study is based on a mixed methods research approach 
that combines quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. The fieldwork was 
done from November 2016 to April 2017, and was preceded by a scoping analysis to 
identify the key stakeholders. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to 
collect the data sources presented in Table 3.1. The following subsections present in 
more detail each data gathering method, identifying the quantitative and qualitative 
methods. 
Document review 
This was a qualitative method of collecting data that was done through desktop analysis 
(not fieldwork). It involved first the literature review (Chapter 4) to develop the 
collaborative governance processes criteria added to the Process-Outcomes 
governance framework. The document review then focused on collating information 
from the official 2009 Reef Plan (objectives, goals, water quality targets, governance 
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arrangements and main stakeholders involved); the report cards on water quality 
outcomes achieved year by year from 2008 to 2013; and previous evaluation reports on 
the plan (official and independent). This allowed identifying the role attributed to 
collaborative governance, understanding the water quality outcomes achieved as well 
as the collaborative implementation arrangements that took place during the 
implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan. At this point, the regional level of governance 
was identified as the most important for the implementation of the water quality plan. 
Afterwards, the review focused on the NRM bodies which were the organisations that 
administered the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan in the NRM regions of the GBR. 
This review focused on the characteristics of each NRM body and region in order to 
understand their specific governance structures and arrangements as well as the nature 
of the water quality problem in each NRM region. The review collated information from 
the NRM bodies’ annual reports, newsletters and other reports on their websites such 
as the achievements reported to the 2009 Reef Plan within the Reef Rescue scheme. 
While most of the information was available on websites, in some cases the organisation 
contacted by email to obtain this type of information.  
This review also helped the researcher to understand the background of the case study 
as well as providing guidance on how to address the research questions. For instance, 
by identifying the importance of the regional level, the researcher decided to explore this 
level in more detail by focusing on the impact of the regional NRM bodies’ collaborative 
approaches on water quarter quality outcomes achieved.  
Interviews 
Interviews were the other qualitative method of data collection. Interviews served to 
complement the information obtained from the document review. The perceptions 
gathered via interview were important to explain, clarify and expand on aspects of 
collaboration in the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan. The interview was an 
essential instrument to contrast different views as well as strengthen the evidence for 
the case study analysis. The participants were divided into six groups, according to the 
formal stakeholders that participated in the Reef Plan: 1) federal government officials; 
2) state government officials; 3) NRM body managers; 4) agriculture industry 
representatives; 5) conservation leaders; and 6) academics.  
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The researcher used a purposive approach to sampling as well as the snowball 
technique to select the participants for the interviews. Purposive sampling uses samples 
in a deliberate manner (Yin, 2014). This approach was fused because it permitted 
selecting the people with more experience and knowledge about the 2009 Reef Plan in 
each of the six stakeholder groups. The different affiliation of the participants given by 
their stakeholder groups would also guarantee avoiding biases (or the appearance of 
them) in the evidence (Yin, 2014). Moreover, their different backgrounds would provide 
contrasting evidence that would not be obtained if the research focused only on one or 
two stakeholder groups.  
Purposive sampling was complemented by the snowball technique. Snowball is the 
analogy used to illustrate the method of selecting participants who were nominated by 
other participants based on their social networks and potential knowledge contribution 
for the study (Morgan, 2008). Occasionally participants’ acquaintances were selected, 
when the participants suggested interviewees from other stakeholder groups. This was 
done in order to avoid biases, such as interviewing people from the same cluster. Also, 
given the nature of the policy under scrutiny — the 2009 Reef Plan, which was a public 
and formal policy — a snowball process was not essential to locate potential 
participants: unlike case studies that involve criminal or clandestine activities, where 
participants are difficult to identify and locate. 
Briefly, the selection of interviewees relied on a key informant from the state government 
with direct experience in implementing the 2009 Reef Plan. This key informant provided 
the researcher with general knowledge of the policy, complementing the information 
obtained from the document review. The informant also provided the first initial contacts 
for the interviews. Then, the researcher selected the people most appropriate to respond 
based on two criteria: 1) direct experience in implementing the 2009 Reef Plan, 
preferably involved during the five years of the program; or 2) indirect experience, but 
with enough knowledge based on their position and role. The purposive sampling was 
done by contacting directly the organisations involved (e.g. governments, NRM bodies 
or agricultural representative organisations) and asking to locate the person who met 
the criteria mentioned above.  
The emphasis was on inviting participants with experience and knowledge with the 
water quality plan, leaving aside other considerations, such as gender inclusion. Then, 
snowball was followed when these participants suggested contacts from other 
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stakeholder groups. Given the time-frame of the program (focused on events from 2008 
to 2013) and its specialised scope (knowledge on governance matters), few people met 
the criteria. In the end, there were 22 participants (excluding the key informant) from 
managerial and executive positions. The interviews were done face-to-face and by 
telephone, in the cases where the participants were not available to meet in person. 
Each interview lasted about one hour. The open-ended questions were based on the 
document review as well as the Process-Outcome governance framework (See 
Appendix C for more detail). Interviews were recorded and transcribed in English by the 
researcher using an online transcribing tool. The interviews followed a semi-structured 
format in order to allow more in-depth responses from the participants. Table 3.2 below 
shows the distribution of participants interviewed by sector and gender.  
Table 3.2 Research participants by sector and gender. 
 
Research 
participants 
Federal 
gov’t 
State 
gov’t 
Regional 
NRM 
bodies 
Agriculture 
industry  
Conservation Academic Total 
Male 1 3 7 3 1 1 16 
Female   5 1   6 
 
Interviews represented the fieldwork of this study. In some cases, the researcher 
travelled to the NRM regions to interview participants from the NRM bodies, while in 
other cases the interviews were done by telephone using facilities at the University of 
Queensland. Finally, the interviews followed the ethical protocol of the University of 
Queensland for research involving human participants. For each participant, the 
researcher sent an email that included a participation sheet (see Appendix D for more 
details) that explained the research project and the interview, and the list of questions 
along with the evaluation instrument. Then, a meeting was agreed to be either face-to-
face or by telephone. 
Evaluation instrument 
The evaluation instrument represented the first quantitative method of data collection. 
This instrument was based on the collaborative governance processes criteria from the 
Process-Outcome governance evaluation framework. The researcher developed a 
series of statements based on this governance processes criteria, which were designed 
to be ranked by the 22 participants based on a five-ranking scale of Strongly Disagree; 
Disagree; Neutral; Agree; and Strongly Agree. (See Appendix E for more detail.) The 
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instrument was designed to rank the governance processes and identify how they 
contributed in the achievement of environmental outcomes. This quantitative method of 
collecting data was based on the perceptions of the participants. Apart from the ranking 
and identification of processes, the evaluation instrument would also allow finding points 
of convergence and divergence among the different stakeholder groups. The 
participants were also asked to provide details on their answers, which were considered 
for the case study analysis. The evaluation instrument was designed to evaluate in more 
detail the collaborative governance processes in their relation with the environmental 
outcomes achieved.  
Water quality data 
From 2008 to 2013, the federal and state governments had in place a reporting program 
to inform about the implementation progress of the 2009 Reef Plan. This was called the 
Paddock to Reef program and it provided information about the achievements on water 
quality outcomes through annual Report Cards. The water quality outcomes reported 
were based on a modelling program that built on the water quality data provided by each 
NRM region. The water quality outcomes represented estimates of the water quality 
outcomes, not actual results. However, this information was useful to obtain an 
approximate picture of the impact of the water quality plan. For this study, this was a 
second quantitative method of data collection. The information on the Report Cards was 
used to understand the results achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan overall and also at the 
regional level.  
To provide context to the water quality outcomes of the 2009 Reef Plan, information was 
collected on the context of the NRM regions (e.g. socioeconomic characteristics and 
water quality impacts) to understand the nature of the water quality program in each 
region. Information was also collected regarding the governance structures of the NRM 
bodies to gain understanding, and develop explanations, about the impact of their 
collaborative approaches on water quality outcomes. This information underpinned 
basic statistical analysis to examine the relationship between collaborative governance 
and water quality outcomes. Amongst the data collected, information was gathered on 
the existence and number of coordinator positions. Coordinators were a specific 
collaborative role appointed by the NRM bodies: the coordinator (or sometimes called 
an extension officer) had the role of engaging with the landholders (e.g. farmers) to 
promote changes in land management practices. This information was obtained by 
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contacting (by email or phone) the participants of the NRM bodies, who specified the 
number of coordinators and their role in their regions.  
3.3.5 Data analysis  
The data analysis combined limited quantitative and more extensive qualitative 
methods. Quantitative methods, such as basic statistical analysis, were used to answer 
the second and part of the third research sub-questions of Objective 2 (discussed in 
Section 3.3 Research Design). Qualitative methods, such as literature and document 
reviews or coding, were used to answer the sub-question in Objective 1; the first sub-
question of Objective 2; and complement the answer to Sub-question 3. Qualitative 
analysis was also used to answer the sub-question of Objective 3.  
Overall, both qualitative and quantitative analysis contributed in answering the primary 
research question of this study: how has collaborative governance impacted on 
environmental outcomes in Australian natural resource planning and management? The 
different data collection methods used in this study, such as interviews, water quality 
data, evaluation instrument and document review, represented a triangulation strategy, 
recommended by Yin (2014) to corroborate information and provide robust evidence to 
the research question’s findings.  
It is important to note that, for this study, there are two aspects to the unit of analysis 
(i.e. organisation or agency according to Yin, 2014). First, the 2009 Reef Plan and the 
organisations and government agencies of the stakeholders involved in the plan. The 
second unit is represented by the regional NRM bodies, who were the central actors in 
the implementation of the plan. The analysis first considered the role of collaboration; 
then it ‘zoomed in’ to the regional level, focusing on the different impacts of the NRM 
regions’ collaborative approaches and context. Later the focus ‘zoomed out’ again to 
consider the first unit of analysis and examine the overall impact of collaboration on the 
environmental outcomes of the case study. This meant that the single case study of the 
GBR had embedded six sub case studies represented by the six NRM regions of the 
GBR. Figure 3.1 shows the phases of the research methodology. Figure 3.3 shows in 
more detail the three stages followed in the analysis based on the objectives of the 
research design and also illustrates how the stages complemented each other to 
validate the data. 
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Figure 3.3 Data gathering process and analysis. 
Stage 1 undertook a literature review that provided the basis from which to adapt the 
Process-Outcome governance evaluation framework selected for the study. The 
framework also served as the basis for the development of the evaluation instrument 
and interview questions. These questions were also based on document review about 
the implementation and results of the 2009 Reef Plan.  
Stage 2 involved the application of the adapted framework to the GBR case study. First, 
interviews and document review served to corroborate the role of collaboration. This led 
the analysis to a ‘zoom in’ into the regional level at Stage 3, in which the impact of 
collaboration on water quality outcomes was analysed through water quality data and 
interviews. In this ‘zoom in’, the quantitative analysis undertook basic statistical analysis 
using visual tools (e.g. charts and pies) to visually compare values across a few 
categories. This analysis was complemented by interviews with the participants from 
the NRM bodies.  
For Stage 3, the analysis adopted a ‘zoom out’ phase, and the analysis included the 
federal and state levels and the participants from those levels. The quantitative analysis 
in this phase focused on the results provided by the evaluation instrument. It relied on 
visual tools to compare values across few categories as well as simple correlations. The 
analysis was also complemented by analysis of interviews. The two parts of Stage 3 
(‘zoom in’ and ‘zoom out’) contributed to verify and validate the impact of collaboration. 
54  
The findings obtained through these three stages provided the basis to address the 
fourth research question contained in Objective 3 of the research design. They also 
enabled implications to be inferred and recommendations to be developed as a result 
of this study. 
3.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I presented the research methodology followed by the study. First, the 
research perspective (ontological and epistemological approach) was offered, which 
combined a pragmatist and post-positivist stance. Then, the research design was 
discussed, including the three objectives that guided the research. Case study, the main 
research strategy, was also explained, along with the mixed methods research 
approach and the adapted governance framework that guided the study. Finally, the 
data collection and data analysis processes were described and explained. Overall, the 
research methodology, and its elements, involve a complexity that is required by the 
complex research problem being investigated. As previously mentioned, environmental 
problems are complex and, in consequence, researching them is also a complex task. 
The next section presents the results of the first objective of this study (Stage 1), and 
focuses on the collaborative governance processes criteria developed. 
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CHAPTER 4: IMPACT OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES: A REVIEW FROM ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY AND PLANNING PERSPECTIVES  
4.1 Introduction 
Collaborative forms of governance have been widely adopted in planning for the 
management of natural resources, mainly water, land, forests and biodiversity. 
However, it is unclear what impact this has had in improving the condition of these 
resources. There is increasing interest in examining approaches of natural resource 
planning in order to identify how, and if, they have contributed to improving resource 
conditions. Moreover, the degradation of natural resources is a lingering issue that has 
been aggravated in recent years by the pressures imposed from development policies 
as well as climate change. 
Collaborative approaches were offered as an alternative due to the unsuccessful 
attempts of centralised forms of governance at coping with the complexity of 
environmental issues (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000), which involve multiple 
stakeholders and government levels. Thus, governments began a process of 
decentralisation, where planning responsibilities were devolved to local and private 
actors. The main purpose was to reverse the environmental degradation while improving 
the health of the environment. Collaboration is a type of governance arrangement within 
planning in which public and private actors engage in collective decision-making 
processes to develop and implement policies or programs (Ansell and Gash, 2008).  
In a pragmatic sense, collaboration is designed as an instrument for solving conflict and 
promoting cooperation between public agencies, interest groups and citizens (Ansell, 
2012). Actors develop partnerships for problem-solving, and emphasise consensus-
building on goals and actions (Margerum, 2008). Within the planning discipline, the 
different forms of planning are viewed as governance activities (Healy, 2003). Hence, 
collaboration is a type of governance arrangement through which forms of planning 
occur, such as resource management or environmental planning.  
Once collaborative programs were implemented, studies began to investigate questions 
such as “does collaboration improve natural resource management (NRM)?” (Scott, 
2015); “Is collaboration living up to its expectations?” (Conley and Moote, 2003); “What 
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makes partnerships work?” (Leach and Pelkey, 2001); and “are collaborations more 
effective in managing resources than centralised approaches?” (Koontz and Newig, 
2014). Different forms of evaluation were adopted to assess the actual impact of 
collaborative governance. Most of them focused on analysing how this approach was 
operating by examining the planning processes (Koontz and Thomas, 2006) such as 
degrees of stakeholder engagement or participation (Brody, 2003); levels of trust and 
consensus (Bulkeley and Mol, 2003; Stern and Coleman, 2015); legitimacy and 
transparency of planning decisions (Wittmer et al., 2006; and Wallington et al., 2007); 
or comparisons between processes (Weible and Sabatier, 2009). Others have 
evaluated the quality of outputs such as plans or projects obtained through collaboration 
(Berke, 1994; Berke et al., 1997; Berke et al., 1999; McDonald et al., 2004; and Stevens, 
2013). These studies contributed to identifying strengths and weaknesses of 
collaborations in plan development and decision-making processes. Nonetheless, the 
essential question about whether collaboration led to a healthier environment remained 
unanswered.  
As a consequence, more recent studies have focussed on the results obtained by 
planning interventions by examining the implementation process. For this reason, they 
have shifted the attention from processes to outcomes, such as the environmental or 
social conditions achieved. These studies — examined in this review— assume that 
assessing the results is the most appropriate method to determine if collaborations are 
actually effective. The study of environmental outcomes however, remains marginal in 
the environmental planning field (Koontz and Thomas, 2006). 
The aim of this review is to present the results obtained from international research 
regarding the impact of collaborative governance upon environmental outcomes (e.g. 
the condition of a natural resource after the planning intervention). It also presents the 
methodologies adopted and the barriers encountered by researchers in their attempt to 
evaluate collaborations. The question that guided this review was:  
Based on the environmental outcomes achieved, have collaborative forms of governance 
improved the condition of natural resources?  
This review highlights the lack of any comprehensive research about environmental 
outcomes in collaborative environmental planning efforts. Nonetheless, the findings 
allowed identifying a set of criteria that could be used as an evaluation framework for 
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further cases that have adopted this governance approach. 
This review shows that collaborations have mixed impacts — sometimes positive and 
sometimes negative — in improving natural resource conditions. Hence, it is not 
possible to conclude if collaboration leads to better or worse environmental outcomes. 
The majority of them, however, are able to identify elements of collaborative governance 
that had an impact when pursuing resource goals, such as stakeholder engagement, 
public participation, coordination or learning. As a consequence, the review found that 
collaborations are not the only thing contributing to achievement of results. Other 
variables, such as context, organisational culture, funding levels and politics need to be 
taken into account when analysing evaluation results. However, the literature reviewed 
did not consider these variables in their evaluation frameworks.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I provide definitions of some key terms used in this 
review, such as governance and outcomes. Then, I present the methodology used to 
conduct the review, followed by the results of the evaluations of collaborative 
governance. These evaluations are divided into three categories — positive, negative 
or neutral — based on their impact on environmental conditions. The final section of this 
chapter contains a discussion of the results, conclusions and suggestions for further 
areas of research.  
4.1.1 Definitions 
Outcomes and environmental outcomes. Outcomes are defined by Christensen 
(2015) as the results of the planning process once it has been completed and 
implemented. The same author adds that outcome-oriented approaches have been less 
explored than process-oriented ones (e.g. following a series of rational steps) in the 
planning literature. One of the main reasons for this lack of outcome-focused analysis 
is that evaluating the impact of a governance intervention (through a plan or policy) 
based on the outcomes produced is more complicated. The outcomes are affected by 
many variables, apart from the governance intervention, such as context, time-frames 
or data availability. Moreover, there are no linear or simple cause-effect relationships 
between governance interventions and outcomes (Ferraro, 2009). Hence, evaluations 
of governance that focus on outcomes are scarce in the literature. The type of results 
considered in this review are environmental outcomes, which refer to the condition or 
state of natural resources after the collaborative natural resource planning intervention, 
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such as water quality, soil erosion or biodiversity (Thomas and Koontz, 2011). 
Outcomes are classified between immediate, intermediate and ultimate (Mickwitz, 
2003). The environmental outcomes included in this review refer to the intermediate 
impacts of planning interventions, which usually relate to the achievement of natural 
resource targets developed by a program. In this case, the environmental outcomes 
analysed focused on improvements in water quality or land erosion, without considering 
the ultimate impact of these improvements on the geographical areas managed.  
Apart from environmental outcomes, the resulting social conditions are often considered 
within environmental planning initiatives. Social capital, trust or increased life quality are 
examples of social outcomes, and usually they are considered in conjunction with 
environmental outcomes as the two main results that environmental planning produces. 
However, Mandarano (2008) argues that environmental outcomes are the product of 
social outcomes, which in turn, are the product of collaboration outputs or processes, 
such as plans or inclusion of stakeholders. For example, social capital that results from 
plan development would result in improved water quality. Whatever the relationship 
between environmental and social outcomes — as either separate results from the 
planning effort or linked through a cause-effect relation — most of the studies reviewed 
consider these outcomes as dependent variables produced by collaborative natural 
resource planning efforts. Moreover, they are used as key criteria (Conley and Moote, 
2003) for evaluating the impact of collaborative governance arrangements in a specific 
social ecological system. In this review, environmental outcomes are viewed as the key 
dependent variable in the evaluation of collaborative approaches. By focusing on 
outcomes rather than processes to evaluate collaboration, is expected to reduce the 
uncertainty that characterises environmental problems. 
Governance. Most of the studies in this review see governance as the collaborative 
institutional arrangements behind environmental planning or policy efforts to solve a 
given issue. I considered those studies that evaluated formal collaboration approaches 
between state and non-state actors in the implementation of plans or policies. I was 
guided in my analysis by Ansell and Gash’s (2008) definition of collaborative 
governance. Collaborative governance arrangements though, are not created without a 
link to hierarchical or ‘top-down’ governance arrangements in the development and 
implementation of plans or programs. Usually, hierarchical arrangements control the 
funds and planning priorities. Governance is not a synonym of government, but rather 
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an activity where different actors (e.g. governments, business, NGOs or communities) 
arrange a set of social affairs. In this case, the environmental matters that are arranged 
by natural resource management or environmental planning (Paavola, 2007). Hence, in 
practice, environmental planning becomes an exercise of environmental governance. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that planning and political science — the main disciplines 
behind this review — do not have a consensual approach to governance, which even 
though it has been widely explored, remains open to many definitions. From the political 
science view, governance is about steering and coordinating decisions and actions 
(Rhodes, 1997; and Bevir, 2009). For planning, governance is an activity inherent in the 
act of planning (Healy, 2003), which also steers the processes in order to achieve an 
expected outcome or goal. See Figure 4.1 for a graphic representation. 
 
Figure 4.1 Outcome-oriented view of natural resource governance. 
Natural resource planning is represented by the planning cycle within the steering wheel, which 
represents governance. The directions of the ‘governance wheel’ guide to (but not produce) different 
social and environmental outcomes. 
The focus of this review is on environmental outcomes and the impact that governance 
has upon them; therefore, the majority of the studies, implicitly or explicitly, view the role 
of governance as delivering public goods or services. Rotberg (2014), for instance, 
defines governance as the performance of governments (and other actors) in the 
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delivery of political goods, following the sum of needs, desires and expectations of 
citizens. He argues that given this definition, governance should be measured by its 
results. In other words, by the services it delivers. In this sense, governance becomes 
something tangible and visible, rather than a vague abstract conceptualisation. 
Consequently, the evaluation of governance and its impact upon outcomes adopts a 
performance-oriented view of governance, which has the benefit of allowing its 
measurement through the quality of public service delivered (e.g. environmental 
outcomes).  
Natural resource planning and management. There is no definition for natural 
resource planning. The term has been marginally explored in the literature and, in many 
instances, is not used explicitly. Lachapelle et al. (2003), and Lachapelle and McCool 
(2005) are the only authors that refer directly to natural resource planning; though, they 
do not provide a definition. Natural resource planning is primarily a term used in Australia 
and is often employed as a synonym of NRM. The latter is also a term with no clear 
definition in the literature. Government and other organisations refer to NRM as the 
sustainable management of natural resources, such as land, water or biodiversity. It 
links landscapes and people, who are responsible for sustaining the needs and values 
of communities within the biophysical limits of natural systems (NSW Government, 
2012).  
However, NRM should not be confused with natural resource planning, which is linked 
closely with environmental planning. Environmental planning is another term without 
clear definitions in the literature; however, it refers to the decision-making processes 
underlying land development that seeks to achieve sustainable outcomes through the 
consideration of environmental, social, political and economic factors (Conacher and 
Conacher, 2000). It is about managing and protecting environments that are modified 
by human activities (Byrne et al., 2014). In this sense, natural resource planning is an 
activity of environmental planning that deals with the decision-making processes 
involved with the management of natural resources. Conceptually, natural resource 
planning facilitates and plans NRM initiatives (NRM, in this case, is contained within 
planning). Furthermore, planning for natural resources occurs through a set of 
institutional arrangements involving a number of rules, actors and norms which enable 
its operation. These arrangements are commonly referred to as the main elements that 
comprise governance. Summarising, natural resource planning sets the frame of NRM 
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activities through decision-making processes, while governing them through a set of 
institutional arrangements as shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Relationship between NRM, natural resource planning and 
environmental planning. 
4.2 Methods  
The review was based on a search of publications related to the impact of governance 
upon outcomes, from an environmental planning or policy perspective. A keyword 
search was made from July 2014 to November 2015 for journal articles on the impact 
of collaboration on environmental outcomes. I prioritised articles published on the 
second half of the 2000s decade; however, due to the fact that little research has been 
done on this topic, any date before the period mentioned above was considered, as long 
as it related to the topic.  
Three major databases were used for the search: Google Scholar, ScienceDirect and 
ISI Web of Science. The search was done using 30 keyword combinations, including 
collaborative governance or collaboration, natural resources, planning, environmental 
outcomes, implementation, results and evaluation as key terms. More than 100 articles 
were found in the first phase. Additional searches did not uncover further relevant 
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articles. After two iterations for refining the selection were done by examining the 
abstracts and introduction sections, 36 publications were selected for this review. These 
publications include mostly peer-reviewed articles from planning and political science, 
but also, in some cases, from environmental management and related disciplines. The 
selection was complemented by book chapters that addressed the review’s research 
question. Conferences papers and theses were not included, for manageability and 
focus, as argued by Leach and Pelkey (2001). It is worth noting that very few papers 
studied the impact of governance upon the condition of a given natural resource (an 
example of a result that makes governance something tangible).  
For this reason, the selection offered by the review includes publications that proposed 
forms of evaluating collaborative approaches within environmental planning, or that 
offered insights on the limits and opportunities of collaboration in natural resource 
planning. According to percentages, 46% of the publications related directly with 
examining the impact of collaboration upon a given natural resource; 29% presented 
evaluation approaches to assess collaborative NRM initiatives, without testing them on 
the condition of a given natural resource (most of them focused on assessing planning 
implementation, suggesting improved outcomes); and 25% provide insights on the limits 
and opportunities of the collaborative approach in natural resource governance.  
The majority of the research contained in these 36 publications was undertaken in 
developed countries, mainly Australia, Germany, United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States (US). Only two were from the developing world, both in Africa. Microsoft Excel 
was used to classify the findings, methods and limits identified by each of the 36 studies. 
The next section presents this content, which highlights the fact that little research has 
been devoted to governance and outcomes in natural resource planning. 
4.3 Results  
4.3.1 Collaborative governance and environmental outcomes: a mixed-impact 
The results presented in this section focus on those studies that examined the impact 
of collaborative governance upon a specific environmental outcome. However, only 
three evaluated the impact of collaborative governance as a whole on environmental 
outcomes. All of the others analysed particular elements within collaborations. For 
instance, how the levels of stakeholder engagement or coordination impacted upon 
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environmental conditions; or how regulations and public participation affected natural 
resource conditions. The studies considered addressed the difficulty of undertaking 
outcome-oriented evaluations by taking into account the long time lag between the 
intervention and the resulting environmental outcomes. The studies also relied on 
regression or multiple case-studies to add robustness to their findings (see Table 4.1). 
However, in their analysis they omitted the consideration of contextual factors such as 
geographic or socio-economic conditions that could have influenced the resulting 
outcomes. 
Table 4.1 Studies related to the effect of collaborative governance on 
environmental outcomes. 
 
Author(s) Year Quantitative method Qualitative method Country 
Ananda and Proctor 2013  Case study Australia 
Berke et al. 2006 Permits review Case study New Zealand 
Biddle and Koontz 2014 Regression Case study US 
Carter et al. 2015 Regression   US 
Daley 2007 Treatment effects regression  US 
Kim J.H., et al. 2015 Regression   US 
Koontz and Newig 2014  Case study Germany and 
US 
Laurian et al. 2010  Case study  New Zealand 
Mandarano 2008  Case study  US 
Meyer and Konisky 2007 Regression   US 
Mitchell et al. 2016  Scenario planning Australia 
Mohammed and Inoue 2014  Case study  Africa 
Muñoz-Erickson et al. 2010  Case study  US 
Newig and Fritsch 2009 
 
Regression Case study 
 
US and Europe 
 
Rogers and Weber 2010  Case study US 
Scott 2015 Linear regression modeling   US 
Wild River 2006  Case study  Australia 
 
As shown in Table 4.2, the results were classified according to a positive, negative or 
neutral impact of collaborative governance upon natural resources. Additionally, they 
were categorised following the main independent variables assessed by the studies — 
either the collaboration itself or the elements that compose this form of governance and 
the methodologies used in the analysis. Overall, the section shows mixed results 
between the impacts of collaborations, with a clear tendency towards a positive effect. 
With regards to the collaborations category, Biddle and Koontz (2014) and Scott (2015) 
found a positive impact in improving water quality. Biddle and Koontz (2014) highlight 
the strong correlation between following clear goals through collaboration and pollution 
reductions; while Scott (2015) concluded that collaboration improved water quality 
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(without recognising how), but more importantly, collaborating did not worsen the quality 
of the resource examined. Scott’s (2015) findings contradict those of Biddle and Koontz 
(2014) by stating that groups with specific goals perform worse than those who lack 
them. On the other hand, Muñoz-Erickson et al. (2010) were neutral about the impact, 
as they did not find strong evidence suggesting that collaborative efforts (compared to 
hierarchical ones) led to better ecological outcomes. It was also unclear in their study if 
collaborative decisions were implemented. 
In the stakeholder engagement category, Carter et al. (2015) found that collaborating 
was key to implementing effective land conservation. They added that having clear 
targets and goals has a positive effect as it helps organisations to know what they want 
to achieve. This supports the main argument of Biddle and Koontz (2014). In contrast, 
Scott (2015) found that stakeholder involvement made no difference in planning 
implementation for water resources. Stakeholder engagement is related to the input of 
key state and non-state actors in the decision-making and implementation processes 
within natural resource planning. Collaboration, usually through the form of partnerships, 
is required in the engagement strategies.  
Another positive impact was found in the coordination category, which refers to the 
levels of coordination between the actors involved in planning implementation (for a 
further discussion of this governance concept see Morrison et al., 2004).  
Three studies argued that high levels of coordination between stakeholders contributed 
to successful NRM. Koontz and Newig (2014) highlighted the role of networks in 
coordinating effective implementation of watershed management; while Rogers and 
Weber (2010) viewed coordination as key in promoting information exchange, which 
contributed to effective management of forests and watersheds. This is also supported 
by the findings of Kim, J. H., et al. (2015), who showed that low coordination (understood 
as high degrees of fragmentation between institutions) impacted negatively upon water 
quality, as it led to more pollution of the resource.  
 
 
 
65  
Table 4.2 Impact of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes. 
 
Category Positive impact Negative impact Neutral impact Natural 
resource 
examined 
Collaborations Biddle and Koontz 
(2014); and Scott 
(2015) 
 Muñoz-
Erickson et al. 
(2010) 
Water 
Stakeholder 
engagement 
Carter et al. (2015)   Scott (2015) Water and land 
Coordination Koontz and Newig 
(2014); Kim J.H., et 
al. (2015); and 
Rogers and Weber 
(2010)  
  Water 
Regulations Berke et al. (2006);  
Laurian et al. (2010); 
and Mitchell et al. 
(2016) 
Ananda and 
Proctor (2013) 
Koontz and 
Newig (2014) 
Water, land and 
biodiversity 
Subsidiarity 
/Decentralisation 
Wild River (2006) Mohammed and 
Inoue (2014) 
Meyer and 
Konisky (2007); 
and Newig and 
Fritsch (2009) 
Forest and water 
Participation Daley (2007); Newig 
and Fritsch (2009); 
and Biddle and 
Koontz (2014)   
  Waste and water 
Learning  Mandarano (2008)   Biodiversity 
 
With regards to regulations, which relate with governments’ enforcement through control 
or sanctions, four analyses (Berke et al., 2006; Laurian et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 2016) 
stated that they were a positive factor in enhancing the condition of the natural resources 
examined. Including regulations as an element of collaboration is a recognition that 
collaborative governance arrangements do not include only collaborative mechanisms. 
Within natural resource planning, collaboration is usually supported by hierarchical or 
vertical arrangements established by the government. This reflects the hybrid nature of 
governance experiments that are common in the environmental planning area, as 
identified by Lemos and Agrawal (2006). In addition, this suggests that relying on 
sanctions, rather than voluntary compliance, is not necessarily ineffective or 
counterproductive, as it could be perceived in collaborative natural resource planning.  
On the other hand, regulations underline a tension between official promotion of 
collaboration, and the attempts to retain public control of the planning process. Ananda 
and Proctor (2013), argued that ‘top-down’ regulations limit the capacity of collaboration, 
which impacted negatively in watersheds management. Koontz and Newig (2014) 
remained neutral about regulations as government control had no decisive impact on 
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watersheds. While their study showed that other elements, such as funds or leadership, 
were more important in enhancing watersheds’ ecological condition.  
The tension between collaboration and regulations is reinforced by the findings in the 
subsidiarity category. Subsidiarity involves decentralisation, which occurs by devolving 
natural resource planning responsibilities to the local level. It is considered to be the 
most appropriate approach due to its proximity to the environmental issues. In 
collaborative approaches, local state and non-state actors are given a key role that 
differs from the secondary part they play in centralised governance. Wild River (2006) 
suggests that local governments obtain more beneficial environmental outcomes due to 
their ability to work beyond statutory requirements; however, Mohammed and Inoue 
(2014) found that devolution of responsibility to local actors did not result in positive 
outcomes for forests. Moreover, such arrangements generated more forest harvesting 
due to the discretionary power that decentralisation rendered to local actors. On the 
other hand, in their comparison between local and higher level institutions, Newig and 
Fritsch (2009) and Meyer and Konisky (2007) indicate a neutral impact as they had no 
strong evidence to sustain that local collaborative institutions achieved better ecological 
conditions for wetlands than state or federal ones. Hence, these results show the 
contradictory impacts between regulations and devolving authority through subsidiarity. 
Finally, two other elements, participation and learning, were identified to have a positive 
impact upon environmental outcomes. Participation refers to citizen input in 
implementing environmental planning initiatives. In this case, Daley (2007) showed that 
participation through organised community groups improved the environmental health 
of hazardous waste sites in rural and urban areas. In addition, Biddle and Koontz (2014) 
argued that sustained participation was essential for setting specific goals, which in turn 
contributed to improve water quality. Finally, Newig and Fritsch (2009) found that 
participation of non-state actors led to improved implementation of water quality 
standards. In their view, participation increases the legitimacy of public decisions, which 
is a “major precondition for compliance and a swifter implementation” (p. 206). With 
regards to learning, which deals with information sharing (e.g. best practices in habitat 
management) among the actors involved, Mandarano (2008) concluded that learning 
between stakeholders led to improved habitat protection and restoration. In line with his 
argument that social outcomes produce environmental ones, he considered that 
learning generated better habitat conservation.  
67  
In summary, the results of these studies show that collaborative governance has a 
varied impact on environmental outcomes, which do not allow absolute conclusions. 
However, they suggest that collaborating is positive as the majority of the studies 
reviewed identified a positive impact from each of the elements enlisted within 
collaborative governance. In addition, despite the different contexts involved in each 
study, similar governance elements were shared by the planning collaborations 
examined (e.g. stakeholder engagement, public participation, coordination, learning or 
the principle of subsidiarity). This implies that collaborative governance was evaluated 
following the elements shared, but generated different results according to the context; 
hence, it is not ‘a-one-size-fits-all’ model.  
4.3.2 Evaluation approaches 
This section presents the approaches used to evaluate collaborative governance within 
environmental planning. It is framed by prior reviews — offered by Conley and Moote 
(2003), and Thomas and Koontz (2011) — about the approaches and methods for 
evaluating collaborative natural resource planning initiatives. In contrast with the 
previous section, and as Table 4.3 shows, these studies do not focus on assessing the 
impact of collaborations upon a specific natural resource, but rather they present 
research designs to examine them. Evaluation criteria, according to Conley and Moote 
(2003), are commonly divided between processes or environmental and social-
economic outcomes.  
In this case, the reviewed approaches stand as proposals that cover both processes 
and outcomes; however, they did not test degrees of achievement of environmental 
outcomes. On the contrary, they were used to: 1) present proposals of how to evaluate 
the implementation process (the previous step behind the production of outcomes); 2) 
actual assessments of this process; or 3) provide a set of criteria to evaluate NRM 
initiatives. The main thing to highlight is their diversity. While all of them included 
elements of governance within their frameworks, they differ in their logic and purpose. 
They were also designed for a specific context (e.g. country or area examined) even 
though they were presented as general frameworks that can be translated to 
international contexts. Most of the frameworks were developed and applied to specific 
case studies, while others focused on reviewing research designs in the evaluation of 
collaborations. The frameworks’ classification was based on Conley and Moote (2003) 
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and Thomas and Koontz (2011) categories of approaches and their methods used when 
evaluating collaborative NRM initiatives.  
The majority of the approaches reviewed were used to evaluate the implementation 
process within environmental planning policies. Based on the governance definition I 
provided in the Introduction of this chapter, implementation is the key governance 
activity that delivers the public services — the tangible outcomes. The analysis of 
implementation (either in plans or policies) has been marginal in environmental studies 
(Newig and Koontz, 2014). By assessing this process, some of the literature provides 
suggestions for improving outcomes.  
Table 4.3 Evaluation approaches and methodologies. 
 
Author (s) Year Type of 
Evaluation 
(Conley and 
Moote, 2003) 
Criteria  
(Conley and Moote, 
2003) 
Evaluation methods 
(Conley and Moote, and 
Thomas and Koontz, 
2011) 
Venue 
Bellamy et al. 2001 Comparison* Process Case study/Qualitative Australia 
Chapman 2014 Goal directed** Environmental and 
socio-economic 
outcomes  
Case study/Qualitative Africa  
Emerson et 
al. 
2012 Goal directed Process + Impacts/ 
Adaptation 
Case study/Qualitative US 
Faehnle and 
Tyrvainen 
2013 Comparison Process + 
environmental and 
social outcomes 
Case study/Qualitative Finland 
Koontz and 
Newig 
2014 Goal directed Environmental and 
socio-economic 
outcomes 
Case study/Qualitative Germany 
Laurian et 
al.A 
2004 Goal directed Process + 
environmental 
outcomes 
Case study/Quantitative New 
Zealand 
Laurian et 
al.B 
2004 Goal directed Process + 
environmental 
outcomes 
Case study/Quantitative New 
Zealand 
Lockwood 2010 Comparison Process Case study/Qualitative Australia 
Margerum 2008 Comparison Process + 
environmental 
outcomes 
Case study/Qualitative Australia 
and US 
Newig and 
Koontz 
2014 Goal directed Process + 
environmental 
outcomes 
Document 
analysis/Qualitative 
European 
Union 
Vacik et al. 2014 Comparison Process Document 
analysis/Qualitative 
European 
Union 
* Refers to comparisons between cases in order to determine best practices.  
** Refers to whether and how collaborations meet their objectives or goals. 
 
For instance, Koontz and Newig (2014) rely on the Institutional Analysis Development 
Framework (IAD) to analyses the impact of collaboration on water planning 
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implementation. Following the IAD’s Framework three levels of analysis, they found that 
the plans and directives developed at constitutional and collective choice levels had little 
influence on the actions at the operational level. Implementation is rather discrete and 
immediate, without consulting plan directions. They suggest that through a better 
coordination of levels, the implementation process can be improved and, hence, its 
results. The IAD’s Framework levels of analysis are also used to explain multilayer 
implementation of water policy within multi-level governance systems (Newig and 
Koontz, 2014). For these authors, the operational level of implementation is usually 
done at lower levels of government (local or state). In this case, collaborative 
governance refers to a ‘bottom-up’ implementation approach, from lower to higher levels 
of government.  
The qualitative evaluation approach of the IAD Framework links with Margerum’s (2008) 
typology of collaborations, which used three levels of analysis to differentiate between 
implementation approaches: 1) operational or action level (‘on-ground’ activities); 2) 
organisational (plan development and implementation); and 3) policy (rules and 
guidelines). Most of the actual implementation in the typology, again, occurs at the 
operational level, in which local governments are delegated this responsibility by central 
authorities. Within this model, the most important evaluation measures are 
environmental outcomes.   
In an attempt to evaluate implementation within a collaborative setting, Laurian et al. 
(2004a) and Laurian et al. (2004b) developed and tested the Plan Implementation 
Evaluation (PIE) framework. Its main purpose is to assess quantitatively the degree of 
conformance between plan objectives and its outcomes. It has two indicators, depth and 
breadth of implementation. The first estimates the proportion of actions implemented by 
each plan objective, while the latter calculates the proportion of actions implemented at 
least once. The PIE framework is comprised by four factors: 1) plan quality; 2) capacity 
and commitment of planning agency; 3) commitment of target stakeholders (e.g. 
farmers) and their interactions with the agency; and 4) project scale. The PIE was 
assessed on local-land use plans. 
Emerson et al (2012) developed a diagnostic model for collaborative governance, based 
on two key elements within collaborative governance regimes: 1) collaborative 
dynamics; and 2) collaborative actions. Both include a series of governance processes, 
where the collaborative dynamics lead to collaborative actions that could also refer to 
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governance outcomes (e.g. securing endorsements, deploying staff or enforcing 
compliance). Collaborative dynamics and actions lead to impacts, such as social, 
political, environmental or economic outcomes. These impacts lead to adaptation, which 
is the ultimate function of collaborative governance regimes. By adapting, the regime 
improves its operation. Faehnle and Tryvainen (2013) link processes and outcomes in 
their framework to assess both the quality of the collaboration process, and the 
outcomes of the socio-ecological system studied. They do not focus, however, on a 
specific natural resource. Outcomes, in their view, refer generally to an improved quality 
of the natural environment. The collaborative framework is designed for qualitative 
assessments. It includes four perspectives: 1) knowledge integration (learning); 2) 
meaningful involvement of stakeholders (stakeholder engagement); 3) functioning 
governance (coordination and regulations); and 4) sustainable use of the area 
(outcomes). These perspectives are a benchmark to qualify the level of effectiveness of 
the collaboration. Similarly, Chapman (2014) offers a framework that integrates 
processes and outcomes, emphasising the social benefits that collaborative NRM 
initiatives should accomplish (e.g. community well-being). It follows a linear sequence 
between needs, processes — divided between programs and mediating programs — 
and outcomes. She argues that a mediating program, such as environmental 
governance capacity, is necessary to achieve environmental outcomes. This argument 
supports Mandarano’s (2008) view of social outcomes, such as learning, either 
producing or preceding environmental ones.  
Lastly, Lockwood (2010) offered an evaluation approach that combines the assessment 
of governance effectiveness and governance quality. Within his model, outcomes are a 
measure of effectiveness; however, he focuses mainly on governance outcomes, rather 
than social or environmental. For this purpose, he developed seven principles of ‘good 
governance’ to guide assessments of biodiversity protection. Bellamy et al. (2001), for 
their part, also developed a set of principles as guidelines for evaluation. Contrary to 
Lockwood’s focus on ‘good governance’, their emphasis is upon the implementation 
process.  A similar approach was used by Vacik et al. (2014), who offer criteria for 
assessing implementation based on learning, stakeholder engagement and 
transparency, emphasising the importance of producing clear results.  
The review of these approaches shows that, while they did not directly assess the 
condition of a natural resource, they stand as theoretical frameworks that serve to guide 
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the evaluation of implementation: the phase that produces the environmental outcomes. 
The frameworks and their benchmarks become pathways for the improvement of 
implementation within collaborations, but it is not possible to conclude that they would 
necessarily lead to improved environmental outcomes. They leave a gap that was 
covered, to some extent, by the studies presented in the previous Results section (4.3). 
4.3.3 Opportunities and barriers of collaboration 
This section extends the previous results by presenting some insights and 
recommendations from evaluations that were not designed to assess outcomes (either 
environmental or socio-economic). Nonetheless, they provide suggestions to improve 
the implementation process towards the achievement of better outcomes. In addition, 
this section provides the key barriers to the assessment of outcomes through 
collaborative governance approaches.   
Regarding the opportunities, Morrison et al. (2004) argued that integration (viewed, for 
example, as coordinating the implementation effort between the actors involved) 
translates into improved environmental outcomes, but it requires institutional change. It 
is worth noting, as O’Toole (2000) remarked, that implementation has a multi-actor 
character, in which multiple institutional actors are required to coordinate for successful 
implementation. Better integration to obtain improved outcomes within the collaboration 
approach was also supported by Peterson et al. (2010). Another way to view integration 
is through the effective coordination between the IAD’s levels of analysis: operational, 
collective choice and constitutional. For Paavola (2007), these levels are the essential 
institutional functions of governance arrangements. In his view, though, institutional 
rules such as who is entitled to use a resource are what most likely determine 
environmental outcomes.  
Dale et al. (2008), on the other hand, provided a list of improvements that would lead to 
better natural resource condition outcomes. Apart from governance elements — such 
as better integration of plans, alignment of implementation efforts or improved program 
delivery — the authors recommended long-term continuity of funding and commitment. 
Leach and Pelkey (2001), identified factors of improved effectiveness not directly related 
to governance categories previously mentioned, such as stakeholder engagement and 
coordination. Factors highlighted were leadership, funds, trust, limited scope of activities 
and effective communication between stakeholders. The authors added that 
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effectiveness was measured by the environmental and social outcomes achieved. Aside 
from assessing factors that impact upon the condition of natural resources, Christensen 
(2015) stated that outcome-oriented studies (such as the ones included in this review) 
are about seeking equitable results and democratic processes. 
There are two main barriers in evaluating effectiveness of collaborations: 1) monitoring; 
and 2) research designs. In the first, Hajkowicz (2009) concluded there needs to be 
effective monitoring and evaluation of expenditures. Without this, it is impossible to 
determine the achievement of environmental outcomes as there are no data about 
progress. Poor monitoring and targeting is an issue shared by most Organization for 
Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD) countries. In the case of research 
designs, Koontz and Thomas (2006) argued that innovative methodologies are 
necessary to demonstrate that collaboration achieves better environmental conditions 
than non-collaborative processes. However, they did not identify any methodologies 
different to the ones presented above. Research designs could be improved by 
complementing the analysis with counterfactual methods (e.g. experimental and quasi-
experimental approaches) — as suggested by Ferraro (2009); and Prowse and 
Snilstveit (2010) — to compare if the same outcomes would have been achieved without 
the collaborative intervention. Both barriers are difficult to overcome due to the lack of 
data about environmental outcomes. Moreover, they are interrelated as data are 
obtained through effective monitoring and stronger research designs can only be 
developed through improved data availability.  
4.4 Discussion  
The evaluations reviewed about the impact of collaborative governance upon 
environmental outcomes show great diversity and a lack of standardised methodologies 
and evaluation criteria. However, they all revolve around key characteristics of 
collaborative arrangements and their influence on achieving natural resource 
conditions. In this review, I considered those common characteristics as governance 
categories within the collaborative approach. For example, levels of coordination, 
stakeholder engagement, participation or learning within the implementation of plans or 
policies had a positive influence. The beneficial impact was complemented by 
incorporating elements related with hierarchical arrangements, such as regulations and 
decentralising implementation to local levels (see Table 4.4 for the selection criteria). It 
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could be inferred that a collaboration that includes all these elements should be effective 
in achieving environmental outcomes. However, the effectiveness at achieving 
environmental outcomes depends also on the context in which the collaborative 
approach is adopted and implemented. There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model. Therefore, 
this review does not offer a prescribed model of ‘good’ collaborative governance.  
Table 4.4 Evaluation criteria for governance of implementation within a 
collaborative approach to natural resource planning. 
 
Collaborative governance criteria 
(no specific measures) 
Stakeholder engagement 
Coordination 
Participation 
Learning 
Regulations 
Decentralisation 
Environmental outcomes 
(condition of resources before and 
after the planning intervention) 
Water 
Land 
Forests 
Biodiversity 
 
In general, the studies reviewed focused on assessing a specific feature of 
collaborations such as stakeholder engagement, coordination or participation and its 
impact upon attaining environmental outcomes. Only three studies evaluated the impact 
of collaborations as a whole, combining the influence of the different elements that 
encompass the collaborative approach.  A contribution of this review, hence, was to 
identify and classify a series of elements that comprise the collaborative approach. I 
suggest that they could be used to inform an evaluation framework. Overall, there has 
been very limited research done about collaborations and its results. However, as the 
majority of the analyses were done from 2010 onwards, attention on them is increasing.  
The limited research also indicates the difficulty in determining the relationship between 
collaborative governance and environmental outcomes. Implementation, is the process 
that directly links them, driving the achievement of outcomes but, as Koontz and Newig 
(2014) argue, their interrelation requires further exploration. Further research should 
examine, particularly, cause-effect and more indirect relationships between processes 
(collaboration) and outcomes (natural resource conditions) within natural resource 
planning, taking into account contextual factors in their evaluation frameworks.  
Regarding the characteristics of the research reviewed, most were done in developed 
countries, such as the US and Australia. Half of the studies relied on qualitative case-
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study analysis, such as interviews or surveys. The other half used quantitative methods 
of analysis. Overall, our analysis is consistent with the two common methods for 
evaluating collaborations, measuring tangible outcomes or participants’ perceptions 
(Conley and Moote, 2003). Water was the resource mostly examined; indicating that 
this may be the issue of highest priority. The two key barriers identified in this review 
were: 1) data availability, which is partially explained by the lack of monitoring, but also 
by the long time-frames required to detect changes in environmental conditions; and 2) 
evaluation methodologies, which in the majority of the cases did not have a clear set of 
criteria or access to data about natural resource outcomes.  
Among the results presented, only six studies relied on numeric data about the 
ecological condition of the natural resource examined (Biddle and Koontz, 2014; Carter 
et al. 2015; Daley, 2007; Kim et al., 2015; Meyer and Konisky, 2007; and Scott, 2015). 
The other quantitative analysis reviewed documents (e.g. plans) to produce their results. 
Quantitative methods of data collection tend to be more robust as they are more 
objective measures than actors’ perceptions (Rotberg, 2014), particularly when related 
to environmental conditions. However, due to a widespread lack of quantitative data, 
most of the studies rely on stakeholder experiences to evaluate the performance of 
collaborations. Measures based on participants’ perceptions dominate the research in 
this area.  
Limitations in the field include the need to develop different research designs, identified 
by Koontz and Thomas (2006), and also the lack of a shared conceptualisation of 
collaborative governance and its characteristics. The concept of governance, moreover, 
does not have a shared definition within the research field. Hence, few studies offered 
definitions of what they understood about collaboration approaches and their elements. 
Albert Einstein (cited in Heisenberg, 1971) argued that theories determine what is 
measured. The problem with governance evaluations is that there is no consistent 
theory. Hence, measures cannot lead to conclusive results. This may explain why most 
of the assessments focused only on an aspect of collaborations. This poor 
conceptualisation is coupled by the difficulty in identifying clear links (e.g. cause-effect 
relationships) between collaborative governance and the environmental outcomes it 
produces.    
Even though it was found that collaborative governance has a generally positive impact 
on environmental outcomes, this review did not find any arguments supporting the 
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importance of one collaborative element (e.g. coordination) over others in achieving 
environmental outcomes. Hence, there is no hierarchy between the elements that 
comprise our collaborative governance criteria. It seems, based on some 
recommendations (Morrison et al., 2004; O’Toole, 2000; and Peterson et al., 2010), that 
coordination is more decisive than other governance tasks in the implementation 
process. However, with such insufficient evidence, I cannot conclude that this is the 
case. The same applies to the other elements. Overall, it is not possible to argue that 
collaborative governance is always good as, in some studies, it proved to be negative 
or inconsequential at improving environmental outcomes. While I found that there are 
more positive than negative influences, more evidence is required before firm 
conclusions can be drawn.   
Comparisons are also required with other governance approaches, such as 
centralised/hierarchical or networked as well as with absent governance. By contrasting 
governance approaches it may be possible to identify the key factors behind effective 
governance or, at least, elucidate if improved environmental outcomes are a cause or 
effect behind the effectiveness of governance arrangements. An additional research 
area is to improve the analysis of the links between governance arrangements and their 
influence upon implementation to find out which conditions of implementation lead to 
better environmental outcomes. The importance of this research lies in understanding 
the significance of governance approaches within planning for improving environmental 
conditions. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this review, I focused on the impact that collaborative governance has on 
achievement of environmental outcomes. For this purpose, I reviewed the literature 
within the environmental planning and policy fields, which evaluated studies with an 
outcome-oriented perspective. The question that guided our review was: “Does 
collaborative governance lead to improved environmental planning of resources, based 
on the environmental outcomes obtained?” The key finding is that the collaborative 
approach has a clear beneficial tendency in improving natural resource conditions; 
however, it also leads to negative or neutral impacts. The review highlighted, in addition, 
the lack of a shared understanding about how to conceptualise collaborative 
governance evaluations and their characteristics.  
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Furthermore, the focus on environmental outcomes of collaborative interventions within 
natural resource planning is suggested as the key measure to determine their degree 
of effectiveness. Effectiveness, on the other hand, is an indicator of success; 
nonetheless, the studies reviewed avoid making judgements about failures or success 
of the collaborations they evaluated. I also found that assessing the impact of this 
governance approach on environmental outcomes is challenging due to the lack of 
objective data about outcomes available and the methodologies used, which usually 
present results based on perceptions. The challenges imply that any conclusions are 
provisional. Moreover, they also complicate the purpose of clarifying the links between 
collaborations and outcomes. In this case, more research is required in order to 
determine the type of relationship between governance arrangements and 
environmental outcomes. This task has the added challenge of dealing with no 
consistent theory yet about governance evaluations.  
The main conclusion is that collaborative governance arrangements are a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for improving environmental outcomes. Other variables need 
to be considered, mainly funding, leadership and the political context. The focus on 
governance arrangements as the independent variable does not, by itself, offer a 
complete explanation about the effectiveness at improving environmental conditions. 
However, the significance of its evaluation lies in providing guidance in policy 
development about which types of governance arrangements are better suited for 
dealing with natural resource planning problems. Developing innovative research 
designs that take into account other contextual variables remains a great challenge.  
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CHAPTER 5. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDY:  A ‘RESCUE’ 
POLICY FOR THE GREAT BARRIER REEF 
5.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I presented the critical review of studies that focused on the 
impact of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes. The review led to 
identify and develop a collaborative governance processes criteria which I adapt to the 
Process-Outcomes governance evaluation framework for analysing the case study. As 
I indicated in the previous chapter, the collaborative governance processes criteria 
serves to inform the evaluation framework used to examine the case study. The adapted 
framework addresses a research gap identified in the review. The other research gap 
that I address through the case study is to explore the type of relationship between the 
collaborative approach and environmental outcomes, such as cause-effect or more 
indirect relationships.  
However, before I undertake the case study analysis, it is important to provide 
background on the GBR, the issue of water quality in this ecosystem and the water 
quality planning approaches that have been implemented to solve the environmental 
problem. The purpose of the background section is to provide context to the case study, 
such as its environmental and socio-economic conditions. In this chapter, I also provide 
a brief account of the six NRM regions that run along the GBR catchment, from South 
to North Queensland. It should be noted that part of the case study analysis focuses at 
the regional scale (Figure 3.3), in which the NRM regions were the main governance 
arena in which the 2009 Reef Plan was implemented.  
In the following section, I present an overview of the GBR, highlighting its significance 
for Australia as well as its major issues. Then, I offer a brief history of the water quality 
planning efforts since 2003, when the water quality issue was first addressed through 
these policies. The history emphasises the characteristics of the 2009 Reef Plan, which 
is the focus of this study, including also an overview of the current efforts. Thirdly, I 
present a brief profile of the NRM regions, focusing on its agriculture land uses and their 
role in natural resource governance. Finally, I summarise the main characteristics of the 
case study in the conclusion. 
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5.2 An ecosystem at a crossroad 
In 2014, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA), a federal entity 
responsible of protecting the health and values of the Reef, developed its second 
outlook report on the condition of the GBR. In the first line of its Executive Summary, 
the report judged that the ecosystem was at a crossroad, and highlighted the need to 
implement management decisions to improve its condition. This section adopts that line 
as its title, illustrating in the following paragraphs, how the GBR is still at a crossroads 
despite the decisions and actions adopted to solve its environmental issues. The content 
of this section is based on the Outlook reports developed by GBRMPA in 2009 and 
2014, which provided a comprehensive account of the GBR status in 2009 as well 
progress that occurred in five years until 2014 to improve that status (GBRMPA, 2009; 
GBRMPA, 2014),. 
The GBR is one of the most important ecosystems of Australia, representing also one 
of largest and more biodiverse coral reef systems in the world (see Figure 5.1). The 
GBR is located in the state of Queensland and extends along 2,300 km of coast. 
Economically, the GBR contributes around A$5.4 billion annually to the Australian 
economy (Queensland Government, 2009). The Reef became a federal marine 
protected area in the 1970s through the establishment of the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park Act 1975 and creation of the GBRMPA, a federal entity responsible of protecting 
the health and values of the Reef (GBRMPA, 2009). In 1981, the GBR was listed as a 
World Heritage Area by the UN. It was the first coral reef ecosystem in the world included 
in the World Heritage List. This distinction showed the international relevance of the 
ecosystem, representing an outstanding example of natural beauty and biodiversity. 
However, being considered as a World Heritage Area also placed international pressure 
on the Australian government regarding its conservation and preservation for future 
generations. The pressure mounted during the 2000s when the efforts to improve the 
GBR’s condition became part of the federal and Queensland government agendas. 
79  
 
Figure 5.1 The GBR Catchment (GBRMPA, 2014).  
The map includes the boundaries of the World Heritage Area and GBRMPA as well as the Region 
boundary (red line along the coast), where the impacts of water quality are located. The yellow line within 
the land are indicates the catchment boundary, where the agriculture activities produce land-based 
runoff. 
In 2003, the first water quality protection plan (or Reef Plan) was developed to manage 
the decline of water quality entering the GBR Catchment (GBRMPA, 2009). Afterwards, 
other policies were adopted to preserve the Reef from development impacts, such as 
policies to manage coastal development, fisheries or protect from threatened species. 
The efforts culminated with the first Outlook Report of GBRMPA, released in 2009 
(GBRMPA, 2009). This was also the same year in which the second Reef Plan was 
established. 
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Water quality was considered a major issue in the 2009 Outlook Report. The decline of 
this natural resource that occurred over the 1990s and beginning of 2000s was largely 
caused by land-based runoff.3 Runoff was considered one of the three major factors 
influencing the ecosystem values of the GBR. The others were climate change and 
coastal development (e.g. mining and urban development). In 2014, direct use was 
added as the fourth factor (GBRMPA, 2014). Direct use referred to activities with an 
immediate impact on the GBR ecosystem, such as tourism, shipping and defence 
activities.  
Additional to the four factors, the 2014 Outlook report identified four drivers of change 
that influenced the factors: 1) economic growth; 2) population growth; 3) technological 
development; and 4) societal attitudes. Drivers of change were defined as the 
“underlying causes of change in the environment” (GBRMPA, 2014, p. 152). 
Surprisingly, governance was not included among these drivers, although it was as part 
of the ‘societal attitudes’ driver. For the report, governance arrangements were a 
reflection of societal attitudes. Figure 5.2 below shows the drivers and factors, in which 
I added governance, an aspect not considered by the Outlook Report and addressed in 
this study. 
 
Figure 5.2 Drivers of change and factors impacting the GBR’s environmental 
condition and values, adapted from GBRMPA (2014) 
                                                          
3 The 2009 Outlook report referred to this factor as “catchment runoff” (GBRMPA, 2009). When the 2014 
Outlook report was released, it shifted the name to “land-based runoff” (GBRMPA, 2014). In both cases, 
runoff was caused by agriculture.  
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Land based runoff is the factor of focus in this study as it impacts directly on water 
quality. Runoff is caused by agriculture activities. Grazing, sugarcane and horticulture 
represent the main agriculture industries, contributing around A$3.7 billion per year in 
gross value of production, while supporting significant regional employment 
(Queensland Government, 2009). These activities occur at the NRM regions of the GBR 
catchment. Over the years, they have introduced three diffused or non-point sources of 
pollution to the GBR waters: sediments, nutrients and pesticides. Aside from its impacts 
on water quality, agriculture represents one of the principal economic activities of the 
Reef: it, along with mining, is the basis of Queensland’s exports. Additionally, it is one 
of the main economic activities (with construction, tourism and mining) contributing to 
the economic growth of Queensland. In this regard, the state had an economic growth 
rate of 4.2% on average from 2004 to 2014 (GBRMPA, 2014). 
The 2009 Outlook Report identified pollution from land-based run-off as a major threat 
and urged for action to improve water quality. This study focuses on the 2009 Reef Plan 
introduced to address that demand. Surprisingly, the 2014 Outlook report also noted 
land-based runoff as a major threat, identifying sediment runoff and nutrient runoff to be 
‘very high’ risk in its assessment of threats (GBRMPA, 2014). Moreover, community 
groups surveyed, such as residents of GBR catchment or marine tourism operators, 
recognised agricultural runoff as one of the major threats to the GBR. This meant that 
the 2009 Reef Plan did not have a significant impact. Although it recognised the positive 
results of the 2009 Reef Plan, along with its management investment, the 2014 Outlook 
report stated that:  
“Notwithstanding positive actions since 2009, the greatest risks to the Great Barrier Reef 
have not changed. Climate change, poor water quality from land based runoff, impacts from 
coastal development, and some remaining impacts of fishing remain the major threats to 
the future vitality of the Great Barrier Reef.” (p. V). 
Thus, the actions designed to improve the condition of the GBR, such as water quality 
planning, have not reversed the trends and issues highlighted by the Outlook Report. 
As a consequence, the GBR is still at a crossroads. This case study focuses on what 
occurred in terms of governance of water quality in 2009 that led to similar threatened 
water quality conditions in 2014. As already described, governance was not considered 
in the Outlook reports. This case study addresses that gap by focusing on governance 
of the water quality issue, specifically concerning land-based runoff. 
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5.3 Water quality in the GBR: the 2009 Reef Plan and brief history of ten years in 
governance and planning 
The water quality planning efforts to improve the water conditions of the GBR catchment 
include three water quality plans (2003, 2009 and 2013) and a long-term sustainability 
plan (2015) to improve the overall condition of the GBR, not only water quality. This 
long-term plan is based on the findings from the most recent Outlook Report of 2014 
(Australian Government, 2015b). These planning efforts were an initiative by the 
Australian and Queensland governments. This section presents an overview of the 2009 
Reef Plan, including its objectives, goals and governance arrangements. The overview 
is preceded by a brief account of the 2003 Reef Plan, and followed by the most recent 
water quality planning efforts in the GBR. Table 5.1 below shows a timeline of the Reef 
Plans, including their goals, targets and governance approaches. 
5.3.1 2003 Reef Plan 
The first GBR quality plan (2003 Reef Plan) had the overall goal of halting and reversing 
the decline of water quality entering the GBR within the next 10 years (Australian and 
Queensland Governments, 2003). It represented the first overarching plan involving the 
federal and state governments to manage the issue of water quality. Agriculture 
activities were recognised to produce land-based runoff that acted as diffuse sources of 
pollution. Sugarcane was considered the main agriculture activity in the GBR catchment, 
generating around A$803 million annually (Australian and Queensland Governments, 
2003). This plan, however, did not develop specific targets of water quality to be met in 
the 10 year time-frame of the plan. The strategy was to reduce the pollutant loads from 
diffuse pollution, while also rehabilitate areas of the GBR catchment that were able to 
remove water borne pollutants (Brodie et al., 2012). 
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Table 5.1 Timeline of the Reef plans developed to manage the water quality issue. 
 
Plan Time period Goal Targets Governance 
approach 
2003 Reef Plan 2003-2009 Halt and reverse 
decline of water 
quality entering 
the GBR in the 
next 10 years. 
No specific targets 
for water pollutant 
reductions were 
developed. 
Collaborative -
emphasised by a 
series of 
fragmented 
partnerships 
2009 Reef Plan 2009-2013 Halt and reverse 
the decline in 
water quality 
entering the Reef 
by 2013 
Five year targets 
were developed 
for nitrogen, 
sediments and 
pesticide 
reductions 
Collaborative - 
underpinned by an 
overall federal-
state collaborative 
framework that 
included the Reef 
Rescue program 
2013 Reef Plan 2013-2018 Ensure that by 
2020 the quality of 
water entering the 
GBR has no 
detrimental effect 
on the health of 
the ecosystem 
Five year revised 
targets (2013-
2018) for nitrogen, 
sediments and 
pesticide 
reductions 
Collaborative – 
modified federal-
state collaborative 
framework (no 
inclusion of 
another Reef 
Rescue program) 
2050 Reef Plan 
(draft) 
2017-2022 Still in draft.  No targets yet 
developed 
Still in draft.  
 
In terms of governance, the plan did not develop an overall collaborative strategy, 
although it began to adopt this approach through a series of partnerships to support its 
implementation. The key stakeholders were identified in this first planning effort, and 
included federal and state government agencies, agriculture industry groups, 
landholders, local governments, community groups, regional NRM bodies and 
indigenous groups (Australian and Queensland Governments, 2003). The regional NRM 
bodies were considered the “most critical partnerships” (Australian and Queensland 
Governments, 2003, p. 24), which laid the work for the collaborative approach adopted 
in the next water quality plan. However, the partnerships (according to the governance 
design of the plan) were only a single component of the strategy to govern the 
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implementation. Other strategies included self-management approaches; education and 
extension; regional NRM plans; and regulatory frameworks. In particular, the regional 
NRM plans were seen as key for the implementation of the plan. Therefore, each 
regional NRM body would develop a plan to manage water quality in its region.  
Governance strategies for the implementation of the plan presented a fragmented 
approach. This was recognised by the 2005 progress report on plan implementation 
(Australian and Queensland Governments, 2005). The report recommended developing 
more effective partnerships between key stakeholders to improve the delivery of the 
plan (Australian Government, 2015b). Before reaching its 10 year time-frame, the plan 
was revised and updated in 2009 to include better targets and actions (Brodie et al., 
2012). The next sub-section describes the 2009 Reef Plan, the focus of this study, to 
undertake the governance evaluation. 
5.3.2 2009 Reef Plan and Reef Rescue 
Updating the 2003 Reef Plan was agreed in 2008 in a summit between stakeholders. 
The updated version of 2008 was endorsed by the Australian and Queensland 
governments, and it recognised that the 2003 Reef Plan had not been effective at 
solving the declining water quality entering the Reef (Queensland Government, 2009). 
The plan was preceded in 2008 by the Reef Rescue program, which was a federal 
government initiative that offered incentives to landholders to improve land management 
practices. Reef Rescue belonged to the overall CfoC federal environmental initiative. 
The Reef Rescue program had a budget of A$200 million, the highest amount to date 
invested in water quality planning (Reef and Rainforest Research Centre, 2015).  
Once the 2009 Reef Plan was endorsed by the two levels of government, Reef Rescue 
was incorporated into the Reef Plan scheme to become the main implementation 
strategy of the plan (Queensland Government, 2009). However, during its 
implementation, the plan and the program created confusion among the stakeholders, 
highlighting, since its conception a governance issue of collaboration between the 
federal and state governments. For instance, an audit during plan implementation found 
that some stakeholders (particularly from the agriculture industry sector) considered that 
Reef Rescue was a separate policy from the 2009 Reef Plan. Moreover, it was never 
clear how the program worked under the Reef Plan umbrella (Lloyd Consulting, 2010). 
Reef Rescue was seen as a federal program, while Reef Plan was considered a state 
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level policy, even though Reef Plan was a joint policy from state and federal levels. The 
plan represented formally the framework in which Reef Rescue was included. 
Contrary to the 2003 Reef Plan, the 2009 plan included a set of water quality and land 
management practice targets with a five-year time frame of achievement (a change from 
the 10 year time-frame of the previous plan). These targets were conceived as the 
strategy to address one of the key objectives of the plan: reduce pollutant loads from 
land based runoff (non-point sources) in the water entering the Reef. The overall aim of 
the plan was to halt and reverse the decline in water quality entering the Reef by 2013 
(Queensland Government, 2009). The plan was informed by robust scientific evidence 
through a scientific consensus statement on water quality released on 2008, which 
stated that the management interventions undertaken so far were not effectively solving 
the water quality issue (Queensland Government, 2008).  
As a consequence, the plan emphasised stronger monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms to evaluate implementation progress. Progress was informed through 
annual report cards produced by the integrative Paddock to Reef monitoring and 
reporting program (Queensland Government, 2009). The information contained in the 
report cards provided data on the progress of water quality targets, during the five year 
time-frame of the plan. For this study, water quality targets achieved in five years 
represent the water quality outcomes of the plan. 
In terms of governance, the plan officially adopted the collaborative approach to improve 
water quality, shifting the use of ‘partnerships’ from the 2003 Reef Plan to ‘collaboration’ 
in this updated version. Collaborative governance was established in this planning effort, 
continuing as the governance approach in further plans. The collaborative approach is 
exemplified by this statement from the state government:  
The Reef Plan is a collaboration between the Australian and Queensland governments. 
Each has its own actions to deliver in conjunction with natural resource management (NRM) 
bodies, agricultural industries and landholders (Queensland Audit Office, 2015, p. 13). 
In this updated version, the key stakeholders were the same as those of the 2003 Reef 
Plan except the local governments, which were excluded from this plan. The regional 
NRM bodies were also the main actors in the implementation of the plan. In this effort, 
the Cape York region was added (having not been included in the previous plan), which 
meant there were now six NRM regions (rather than five) that were subject to the plan 
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objectives. Collaboration was motivated by the recognition that reducing impacts of land 
use on water quality was a shared responsibility between state and non-state actors: 
“reducing the impacts of land use on reef water quality is not solely the responsibility of 
governments” (Queensland Government, 2009, p. 25). Through the collaborative role of 
the NRM bodies, the plan expected to engage landholders of each region to adopt land 
management practices with less land-based runoff, which in turn, had less impact on 
water quality. For this purpose, the NRM regions received federal funding through Reef 
Rescue to offer water quality grants to landholders as an incentive to change land 
management practices.  
Formally, the governance arrangements included three key collaborative governance 
bodies: 1) partnership committee; 2) intergovernmental operational committee; and 3) 
Reef Plan heads of agencies. The first was designed to ensure a collaborative approach 
to implementation through the joint efforts of the key stakeholders, such as industry, 
NRM bodies and government officials. The operational committee was the key decision-
making body in operational matters, and had the role of overseeing the implementation 
of the plan at the operation level. It was integrated by senior officers from government 
agencies at the state and federal levels. The third body had the role of overseeing 
implementation at the strategic level and was integrated by chief executives at the 
federal and state governments.  
While the plan did not achieve the water quality targets, it was officially recognised that 
the collaborative approach to governance was a success as it allowed a partnership 
model of delivery between the stakeholders that was not achieved by the previous plan 
(Australian Government, 2014a). However, the official reports on the results of the plan 
did not detail how collaboration performed and operated, which is what this study 
intends to find out. A Senate report concluded that the plan had improved coordination 
between the stakeholders and regions but, nonetheless, delivery of the program 
remained fragmented (Australian Government, 2015c). More importantly, the 
collaborative approach was undermined by a business model of implementation 
(Australian Government, 2015b). This last observation is explored in the case study 
analysis in Chapter 6. 
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5.3.3 2013 Reef Plan and current water quality planning efforts 
The release of the 2013 Reef Plan marked the end of the first 10 years of water quality 
planning efforts (2003-2013). As the 2014 Outlook Report highlighted, despite the 
positive progress in managing the water quality issue (e.g. moderate reductions of 
pollutant loads), the GBR remained under threat and pollutant loads were still high risks 
to the GBR environmental condition (GBRMPA, 2014). The third update to the Reef 
Plan was based on the findings of the second Scientific Consensus Statement of 2013 
This Statement warned that water quality was still poor and was a major cause behind 
the declining trends of key ecosystems within the GBR (Queensland Government, 
2013). New targets for pesticides, sediments and nutrient pollutant loads were 
established for another five year time-frame, from 2013 to 2018 (Brodie and Pearson, 
2016). According to the latest report card, progress on the new water quality targets 
since 2013 has been moderate, but it has slightly improved from the previous plans, 
particularly on the reductions of pesticide loads (Queensland Government, 2017). 
In terms of governance, the 2013 Reef Plan maintains similar collaborative governance 
arrangements than the 2009 plan as well as the same key stakeholders. In this version 
though, the Reef Plan heads of agencies, a key collaborative body of the 2009 plan, 
was removed (Australian and Queensland Governments, 2013). The 2013 Reef Plan 
document, on the other hand, devotes a small section to governance, within the heading 
‘Implementing the Reef Plan.’ The official view of governance as central for 
implementing the plan fits with the focus of this study, which examines governance in 
the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan. Parallel to this latest version of water quality 
planning, the Australian and Queensland governments developed a 35 year action plan 
to improve the overall management of the GBR, Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability 
Plan. This plan includes water quality among its key themes and incorporates the goals 
and targets of the 2013 Reef Plan (Queensland Government, 2017).  
Currently, within the Reef 2050 planning scheme, a draft 2050 Reef Plan (2017-2022) 
is being developed to replace the 2013 version. The plan will seek to address runoff 
from urban and industrial sources, not only from agriculture activities (Queensland 
Government, 2017). This new strategy has been criticised by the scientific community. 
For instance, the Australian Academy of Science concluded that the long-term 
sustainability plan was inadequate to restore or even maintain the environmental values 
of the GBR. Moreover, the plan promotes the creation of the world’s largest export 
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industry for coal and coal seam gas (Hughes, et al. 2015). 
5.4 NRM regions of the GBR 
In 2001, the Australian government established 14 NRM regions in Queensland through 
the second phase of the NHT program, which sought to improve the management of 
resources such as land, water and biodiversity (Lockwood et al., 2009). A community-
based NRM group was established to govern each region. Its main role was to engage 
stakeholders and the wider public in the development and implementation of regional 
NRM plans (Curtis et al., 2014). The creation of NRM regions followed a regionalisation 
strategy, where the Australian government devolved responsibilities to regions for NRM 
delivery, while providing limited power and resources to these regions (Robins, 2007). 
In other words, the NRM regions represented an instrument for policy and planning 
delivery of natural resources, rather than autonomous entities from government.  
The basic governance structure of the NRM bodies is comprised of a board and a 
management branch. The board is the forum where key representatives adopt 
decisions, while the management branch is the sub-group that implements these 
decisions and manages other operations. In other words, the management branch 
executes the plans and objectives developed by the board. The board is led by a chair, 
while the management branch is led by a chief executive officer (CEO). The basic 
structure is complemented by the Regional Groups Collective (RGC), which acts as the 
representative body for NRM in Queensland. The RGC is designed as a forum of 
collaboration between the 14 NRM regional bodies (RGC, 2015). 
The GBR catchment includes six NRM regions; Burdekin; Burnett-Mary; Cape York; 
Fitzroy Basin; Mackay Whitsundays; and Wet Tropics. (See Figure 5.3 for more detail.) 
Each of them are administered and managed by an NRM body. The NRM bodies are 
non-for-profit and non-statutory organisations. This means that they are a public entity 
that has no power to enforce legislation. The regions, and their respective NRM bodies, 
represent the main actors in the delivery of natural resource planning and management, 
including water quality planning. Since 2003 (as shown in section 5.3), they epitomised 
the collaborative governance approach through their community-based composition and 
regional engagement role. For this reason, the NRM regions and their efforts at 
implementing the 2009 Reef Plan are a central focus of this study. They represent the 
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regional scale of governance covered by the first part of the case study.  
 
Figure 5.3 The NRM regions in the GBR with their respective land-uses (Brodie 
and Waterhouse, 2012). 
Figure 5.3 shows that each region has different land sizes and land uses. In terms of 
land size, Fitzroy and Burdekin are significantly larger than the other regions. 
Considering agricultural land uses, the dominant land-use across the six NRM regions 
is grazing. Sugarcane is extensive in Mackay Whitsundays and Wet Tropics, and a 
minor in land use in Burdekin and Burnett-Mary. Horticulture is the third agriculture land-
use included in the Reef plan, however the amount of this activity is too low to be in the 
map.   
This map illustrates the differences between NRM regions in terms of the geographic 
and economic conditions: this then translates into different impacts on water quality in 
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the GBR. Most of the implementation of Reef plans has been, and remain, at the NRM 
regions. However, it is worth noting that the regions were — and still are despite their 
contextual differences — held to the same water quality targets. I explore and analyse 
these differences in the next chapter, where I develop a typology of NRM regions to 
highlight the nature of the water quality problem. I also describe their impacts on water 
quality outcomes through their governance structures, including a proxy variable of 
collaboration to distinguish amongst their collaborative approaches.  
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented the background of the case study, highlighting that the GBR 
is still at a crossroads in terms of its environmental values and condition. In particular, 
regarding water quality affected by land-based runoff from agriculture. I focused on the 
water quality issue because it is where collaborative governance was adopted. In terms 
of water quality then, the GBR is still at a crossroad as the water quality conditions have 
not improved as expected, despite the water quality planning efforts to improve it. 
Moreover, water quality remains a major threat for the GBR catchment. 
Regarding the water quality planning efforts, in this chapter I give a ten year historical 
account of water quality planning efforts, from 2003 to 2013. As suggested for case 
study research by Yin (2014), rather than provide a comprehensive history and 
background conditions of the case study area, I describe the topic of the case study: 
water quality planning. The ten year account of water quality planning is represented by 
three main water quality plans, labelled as Reef Plans 2003, 2009 and 2013. I provided 
more detail on the 2009 Reef Plan, as the subject of the case study. I explain how, since 
the 2003 Reef Plan, collaborative approaches to governing water quality planning were 
adopted. The collaborative governance approach was formally adopted by the 2009 
Reef Plan and then consolidated in the 2013 version. The plans though, have not 
achieved the expected outcomes. Time-lags (especially sensitive in environmental 
issues) are the main official explanation for the moderate progress. But, again, there 
has been no research on how this collaborative governance approaches and its 
arrangements impacted on water quality outcomes.  
The chapter concluded with a brief profile of the NRM regions, mainly designed to 
identify their different agriculture land uses and role in the Reef plans. The next chapter 
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presents the first part of the case study analysis on how collaborative governance 
impacted on the water quality outcomes achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan. The chapter 
focuses on the role of collaborative governance in the plan, and the impact of 
collaborative governance on water quality outcomes at the regional scale. It also offers 
a more detailed account of the NRM regions context, which is relevant for the case study 
analysis.  
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CHAPTER 6: ROLE OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE AND 
IMPACT OF REGIONAL COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE 
APPROACHES ON WATER QUALITY OUTCOMES OF THE GBR 
6.1 Introduction 
Governing the planning and management of natural resources usually involves a 
multiplicity of government and non-government actors that interact at different levels of 
decision-making and implementation. To manage this inherent complexity, NRM and 
planning efforts have relied on collaboration. Through this collaboration, stakeholders 
from both state and non-state realms work together to agree upon policy problems and 
solutions. Collaboration has been considered as an appropriate strategy due to its 
emphasis on mutual gains and improved trust between the stakeholders as well as 
increased levels of knowledge-sharing and effective coordination (Ansell, 2012). In other 
words, bringing together the divergent interests of the stakeholders has the possibility 
of finding common-ground and action. Collaboration also has the potential to integrate 
local knowledge and science (Weible and Sabatier, 2009), which are regarded as vital 
for dealing with environmental problems (Taylor and de Loe, 2012). 
Despite this, collaboration is not recommended where there are fundamental value 
differences between the stakeholders (Wondoleck and Yaffee, 2000). By ‘fundamental’, 
the authors mean the existence of irreconcilable views among different actors regarding 
the central issue and the best means to approach it. In addition, it is not clear whether 
collaboration leads to better results than other forms of governance, such as markets or 
hierarchy (top-down). Few studies have focused on evaluating how collaboration differs 
from other governance modes as a policy strategy for NRM as well as the results it 
produces in the management of natural resource issues. One of the few studies that 
has focused on the environmental outcomes facilitated by governance approaches, is a 
study about water quality outcomes by Weible and Sabatier (2009): they show that, 
while collaboration tends to promote a convergence between the competing values of 
stakeholders, the actors involved do not rely more on scientific evidence compared to 
other governance approaches, such as hierarchical arrangements. In another study 
concerned with water quality, Koontz and Newig (2014) found, in a series of case 
studies, that the governance approach (collaborative or top-down) did not decide the 
results of the policy. Instead, other factors were more decisive such as funds, available 
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coordinators and networks. Newig and Fritsch (2009), did not find sufficient evidence to 
determine whether collaboration leads to better ecological outcomes than top-down 
governance approaches. Their review of more than 40 environmental policies in Europe 
and North America, revealed a mixed impact on improved compliance and 
implementation from collaborative and hierarchical modes. 
My study, rather than comparing governance modes, considers different approaches to 
collaboration and the impacts of these on environmental outcomes. For the analysis, 
environmental outcomes refer to the condition of a natural resource (e.g. land or water) 
after a planning or policy intervention (Christensen, 2015): more specifically, the 
“changes in environmental parameters appropriate to a specific resource” (Koontz and 
Thomas, 2006, p. 115). An environmental outcome would indicate, for example, if the 
water resource became healthier (or less polluted) as a consequence of a specific 
environmental plan or policy. There are three types of outcomes: 1) immediate; 2) 
intermediate; and 3) longer-term or end outcomes. The first refers to changes in the 
incidence of a natural resource problem or quality of an environmental public service. 
Intermediate outcomes are the measured changes in the natural resource conditions 
that increase the likelihood of future improvements in the resource. Longer-term 
outcomes are the measured reduced rates of recurrence of a natural resource issue, 
such as degradation or exploitation (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). In this study, I focus 
on the intermediate outcomes produced by a policy founded on collaborative 
governance. 
In order to present the analysis, the chapter is divided in three sections. First, I present 
the methods followed to collect and analyse the data to address the first and second 
research sub-questions of the thesis (which frame this results chapter). Then, I offer the 
answers to the research sub-questions (role of collaborative governance and impact of 
regional collaboration) based on the evidence provided by data and interviews. In this 
part, I explain the different impacts of collaborative governance at the regional scale, 
following regional context and governance structures as well as the proxy variable for 
collaboration. In the fourth and final part, I discuss the findings in the six NRM regions 
based on the regional evaluation of the impact of collaboration on water quality 
outcomes. I also offer the implications of this analysis, explaining the relationship 
between collaborative governance and environmental outcomes as well as implications 
for further research. 
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6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Governance and collaboration 
I view governance as the series of arrangements in place to structure and govern a 
policy and planning process. The arrangements are comprised of institutions and rules 
where decisions are made and implemented (Bevir, 2009). The distinctive quality of the 
governance arrangements in this case study is their emphasis on collaboration. As 
stated in Chapter 2, the case study analysis is guided by the definition of collaborative 
governance provided by Ansell and Gash (2008): 
“A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state 
stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, 
and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public 
programs or assets.” (p. 544). 
It is worth noting the emphasis in this definition on formal decision-making process as 
the focus of this study is on the formal processes of collaboration: I disregard any explicit 
exploration of informal governance, such as informal networks and relationships 
between stakeholders. However, Ansell (2012) points out that in practice there is an 
overlap between formal and informal collaboration; hence, along the analysis, I 
recognise the impact of informal relationships in the collaborative effort.  
I complement the definition of collaborative governance by emphasising that the 
adoption of collaborative governance has the objective of carrying out a public purpose, 
such as providing a public good (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). The focus on 
implementing a public goal links with this study’s focus on environmental outcomes:  or, 
in other words, the attempt to improve an environmental public good. My approach is to 
analyse governance through its impact upon outcomes rather than its processes, such 
as quality of the policy process, level of impartiality or bureaucratic autonomy, I coincide 
with Rotberg (2014), who argues for the importance of focusing  on  the  services  
delivered  (public  goods  or  outcomes)  to  better  understand  the performance of a 
governance approach. Analysing governance through the results it produces tends to 
minimise normative evaluations (e.g. the World Bank’s governance indicators) of 
governance arrangements (Rotberg, 2014). 
In my evaluation of organisations, I include funding and the existence of coordinators 
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as the key variables to differentiate between the collaborative governance approaches. 
By funding, I refer to the financial resources available for on-ground delivery (e.g. water 
quality projects on land to reduce or halt run-off). By coordinators, I refer to staff that led 
the engagement with the target groups (landholders, in this case) in order to promote 
behaviour change. The aim is to explore the simple assumption that more funding for 
on-ground delivery would lead to better environmental outcomes. In the cases 
presented here, the availability of more financial resources for on-ground delivery did 
not necessarily lead to better achievement of water quality outcomes. 
Therefore, I seek to explain why and how, in some cases, better outcomes were 
obtained with less funding. For this purpose, I test the assumption that perhaps the 
cases that achieved better water quality outcomes with less funding had stronger 
collaboration. I use the coordinators as a proxy variable that would indicate stronger 
collaboration in these cases. This tests that the existence of an important collaborative 
element —  i.e. coordinators for on-ground delivery of the water quality targets— 
contributed to achieving better water quality outcomes regardless of funding received. 
In other words, the existence of a coordinator or coordinators for on-ground delivery 
would allow suggesting a positive or negative association between collaborative 
governance and the achievement of environmental outcomes. 
6.2.2 Regional evaluation 
The case evaluated is located in the state of Queensland in the north of Australia. The 
policy evaluated in this study is a plan that aimed to improve water quality in the Great 
Barrier Reef, one of the most important Australian ecosystems. Water quality represents 
the environmental outcome that was delivered by six NRM regions established along 
the Reef catchment. In this study, I focus on these six regions that are located in the 
northern, central and southern areas of the GBR catchment. These were selected as 
they represent examples of different land uses, funding amounts and environmental 
outcomes. In this sense, they provide different contexts in which to examine potential 
different impacts of their collaborative approaches by using the existence of 
coordinators as the proxy variable for collaboration. 
Hence, this is a case-study analysis of the impact of collaborative governance on water 
quality outcomes within a natural resource planning endeavour. The data collected and 
analysed was based on a review of official documents that reported on the 
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environmental outcomes of the policy evaluated, which was complemented with semi-
structured interviews of 22 key stakeholders involved directly in the implementation of 
Reef Rescue or that had knowledge of the implementation process and its outcomes. 
The interviewees were involved in managerial roles. Table 6.1 shows the distribution of 
the stakeholders per group and interview code. The interviews were analysed and 
coded using NVivo software (guided by the research questions below). The findings are 
based on the data about water quality outcomes as well as the perspectives of the actors 
involved about those same outcomes.  Two research questions guided the study: 
1. What was the role of collaboration in the implementation of the policy? 
2. How regional collaborative governance approaches impacted on the different 
environmental outcomes achieved by the NRM regions of the GBR? 
Table 6.1 Distribution of stakeholders interviewed. 
 
Stakeholder group No. of Interviewees Interview code 
Federal government 1 FG1 
State government 4 SG1, SG2, SG3, SG4 
Regional NRM bodies 12 
RB1, RB2, RB3, RB4, RB5, RB6, RB7, RB8, 
RB9, RB10, RB11, RB12 
Agriculture industry 
representatives 
4 AI1, AI2, AI3, AI4 
Academic sector 1 AS1 
Total 22  
 
This study considers the six NRM regions to discuss about the different impacts of 
regional collaboration on the water quality outcomes achieved by Reef Rescue: 
Burdekin, Burnett Mary, Cape York, Fitzroy Basin, Mackay Whitsundays and Wet 
Tropics (referred to as the ‘zoom in’ phase of Figure 3.3, Chapter 3). The regions cover 
all the areas where land-based runoff occurs. See Figure 6.1 for more detail. Each of 
the regions is managed by a community-based and non-profit NRM body. The NQ Dry 
Tropics (NQDT) group administers the Burdekin region, while Burnett Mary is 
administered by Burnett-Mary Regional Group (BMRG). Cape York region was 
managed by Cape York Sustainable Futures (now Cape York NRM). Fitzroy Basin 
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Association (FBA) manages the Fitzroy region, and Reef Catchments (RC) manages 
Mackay Whitsundays. The Wet Tropics is identified as the Far North Queensland region 
in the map, which is managed by Terrain NRM (TNRM). I focus on the level of regional 
collaboration at each of the six NRM regions.  
 
Figure 6.1 NRM regions in the GBR (Queensland Government, 2008). 
The results are based on the official data on water quality outcomes, reported by the 
Paddock to Reef program, as well as interviews with the stakeholder groups previously 
identified (Table 6.1). Reef Rescue was selected for two key reasons: 1) given the focus 
on outcomes, I chose to study an implementation strategy as it is where outcomes are 
produced (in this case, the A$200 million for Reef Rescue represented the highest 
funded implementation component of the 2009 Reef Plan, while the other component 
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was the A$50 million invested by the state government in regulations); and 2) 2009 Reef 
Plan was selected as it was one of the very few programs within Queensland’s water 
quality planning that included factual information about environmental outcomes rather 
than merely outputs (e.g. plans developed or the activities that lead to the outcomes). 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Governance arrangements 
Since the first decade of the 2000s, collaborative governance approaches have been 
used in Australia to address the degradation of natural resources. The governance 
arrangements are characterised by the participation of state and non-state actors in a 
multi-level setting of governance domains: federal, state, regional and local. In the NRM 
context, the regional level of governance plays a central role as the federal level 
established NRM regions within each Australian state based on the ecosystem 
boundaries. Through the NRM regions, the federal level devolved management and 
planning responsibilities to the regional level. Each region is governed by an NRM 
community-based body. In the Great Barrier Reef catchment there are six NRM regions 
along the 2,300 km coastline. 
Due to the increasing levels of pollution and rising sea temperatures, the first Reef 
Plan was developed in 2003 to deal with water quality, which was mainly impacted 
by the intensive agriculture practices undertaken in the regions. Agriculture land use 
covers more than 82% of the GBR catchment. Of this agricultural land use, 75% is 
devoted to grazing, 1.3% to sugar cane and the rest to other smaller land-uses such as 
horticulture and dairy farming (Australian Government, 2014a). After the planning 
intervention of 2003, water quality had not improved significantly. Hence, in 2007 
stakeholders from the regional bodies, agriculture industry and conservation sectors 
joined together to lobby the federal government to develop a new proposal for dealing 
with water quality. In 2008, this proposal became the Reef Rescue program, which later 
became part of the investment strategies of the 2009 Reef Plan (Queensland 
Government, 2009). Reef Rescue was developed by the federal level, while the 2009 
Reef Plan was established by the state and federal governments. The 2009 Reef Plan 
represented the collaborative framework through which Reef Rescue was implemented. 
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The main purpose of the 2009 Reef Plan was to halt and reverse the decline in water 
quality entering the Reef by 2013 (Queensland Government, 2009). The plan 
introduced specific targets to reduce the ‘feeders’ of non-point source pollution: nitrogen, 
pesticides and sediments, which were caused by agricultural run-off. Land-based runoff 
is considered one of the main threats to the health and resilience of the GBR, along with 
climate change, coastal development and port activities (Queensland Government, 
2016). Reef Rescue represented an incentive-based and collaborative strategy 
directed towards agriculture producers to change their land management practices 
(Australian Government, 2011).  
The main stakeholders involved in this policy were the federal and state governments 
(three government agencies, respectively); six regional NRM bodies; agriculture 
industry (sugarcane, grazing, horticulture and other marginal land-uses); the 
conservation sector (represented by an international conservation NGO); and 
academic researchers, who contributed the scientific evidence of the declining health 
of the Reef that underpinned the 2009 Reef Plan (Queensland Government, 2008). The 
federal government invested $200AUSmillion dollars through the Reef Rescue 
program in the five-year period of 2008-2013 (Australian Government, 2011). It 
allocated the funding directly to the NRM bodies to deliver the policy. This was done in 
a top-down fashion as the funding criteria were developed solely by the federal level. 
The collaboration of the 2009 Reef Plan occurred mainly between the six regional NRM 
bodies and the agricultural organisations within those regions. They worked together 
to motivate the producers to change their behaviour towards more sustainable 
agriculture practices. Dealing with water quality became then a matter of promoting 
sustainable agriculture. However, collaboration also occurred between the regional 
NRM bodies and the federal and state governments. There were two collaborative 
arrangements taking place simultaneously in a multi-governance setting: a high 
collaborative domain and a regional one (Figure 6.2).  
Within these collaborative arrangements, the central actors were the regional NRM 
bodies, which canalised the funding received from the federal government. The funds 
were distributed to the landholders through a competitive grant process, in collaboration 
with the regional agriculture organisations. The collaborative arrangements were 
complemented by a top-down approach from the federal and state governments to the 
regional domain of collaboration. Both governments decided the objectives and 
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priorities of the policy. The federal level decided and allocated the funds for Reef 
Rescue, while the state level introduced regulations in 2009 to promote practice 
change during the implementation of the policy (Reef and Rainforest Research Centre, 
2015). 
 
Figure 6.2 Overview of collaborative governance arrangements during 
implementation of 2009 Reef Plan (developed by author).  
The arrows in both directions indicate collaboration between the stakeholders; whereas the arrows in one 
direction indicate a top-down directive. 
 
6.3.2 Role of collaboration 
The water quality outcomes achieved by the regions were based on an implementation 
strategy that relied on regional collaboration. This type of collaboration, according to 
the interviewees from the regional NRM bodies, consisted of the NRM groups working 
together with regional agriculture industry organisations to promote the voluntary 
adoption of more sustainable management practices among the landholders. The 
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instrument used to engage the landholders was grants that were awarded through a 
competitive process of project selection. Collaborative governance adopted the style of 
a formal working relationship between non-state actors that relied on a key policy 
instrument: incentives. The landholders also collaborated in achieving the 
environmental outcomes through their voluntary participation in exchange for grants. 
Nevertheless, there were landholders who did not participate at all in this collaborative 
scheme. 
Despite the limited scope of collaboration, all the stakeholders from the six regional 
NRM bodies interviewed argued that regional collaboration was essential for 
implementing the water quality policy and achieving its outcomes. This was also shared 
by around 80% of the stakeholders from the other stakeholder groups interviewed. In 
general, the stakeholder views were that the main benefit of collaboration is that it 
allowed sharing information as well as best practices. No water quality outcome would 
have been achieved without collaboration and, overall, all the stakeholders interviewed 
consider that the 2009 Reef Plan was an example of successful collaboration in the 
GBR water quality issue. This was also the conclusion of the final report on the 
achievements of the plan (Australian Government, 2014a). In this study, I avoid 
discussions about success or failure of the policy analysed: rather I focus on the 
outcomes achieved by each region, and contrast those outcomes with the original 
targets. 
For the interviewees from the regional NRM bodies, the relationships developed 
between the NRM groups and the regional agricultural bodies for sugarcane or grazing 
were essential for engaging the landholders in changing their practices. Collaboration 
with the state and federal levels was less important, and it occurred mainly through 
reporting and informing these levels about implementation progress. According to 
interviewee RB4, staff from the federal government met with the regions twice each year 
to oversee the coordination efforts. The state government, though, never met with them. 
Collaboration between the NRM regions was also rare: 
"A lot of times it was just learning, you know, sharing of information from government down, 
there wasn't a lot of sharing across (NRM regions), which I think that was what was meant 
to do” (RB8).  
More than 80% of the stakeholders from the regional NRM bodies (10 out of 12) did not 
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mention collaboration across the NRM regions as part of the collaborative governance 
arrangements, despite the existence of the Regional Groups Collective (RGC), which is 
the coordinating body of 13 regional NRM groups (including the six Reef NRM regions). 
Interviewee RB10, however, stated that the RGC allowed regular discussions between 
the NRM groups. On the other hand, around 15% of the interviewees (two out of 12) 
considered that, in practice, there was no collaboration in the governance 
arrangements to implement Reef Rescue: 
“What collaborative arrangements? There weren't any real collaborative arrangements in 
place during Reef Rescue (…) some had working relationships with other stakeholders, 
some didn't. This was based on how each NRM regional group works within their 
respective region” (RB7). 
This quote from interviewee RB7 suggests that informal collaboration might have been 
more important, as it depended on how each NRM group worked within their region, and 
not really on how they all followed the formal collaborative arrangements that framed 
the policy. As interviewee RB1 pointed out, the NRM bodies managing the regions are 
different organisations with different rules and styles of management. Hence, even 
though they have the same structure — comprised by a community-based board and an 
operational body led by a chief executive officer (CEO) — the regions have different 
rules (e.g. different constitutions) and ways of operating informally (more detail of the 
governance structures of the six regional NRM bodies are described in Table 6.8. 
Regarding collaboration at the higher levels of government — the ‘high collaboration’ 
dimension of Figure 6.2 — around 70% of interviewees (except from the federal and 
state governments) tend to view it more as a top- down strategy developed by the state 
and federal levels for the regional level. The stakeholders from the regional NRM bodies 
said that, sometimes, particularly the landholders did not even distinguish between the 
two levels of government. They viewed the government as one entity commanding the 
policy. For them, collaboration was merely a working relationship to ‘get things done’. 
In other words, the case study represents an example of limited collaborative 
governance between state and non-state actors. One that was limited to the pragmatic 
goal of delivering a water quality plan.   
Nonetheless, collaborative governance in the 2009 Reef Plan was mixed with 
regulations. The regulations were introduced by the Queensland government during the 
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implementation of the policy and their main purpose was to advance change in 
management practices between the reluctant landholders. Regulations represented 
the ‘stick’ of the 2009 Reef Plan, while the incentives administered through Reef 
Rescue represented the ‘carrot’. For this reason, interviewees from the regional NRM 
bodies and agriculture sector considered that the state government should not be 
included in the collaborative arrangements of the policy. The interviewees from the 
federal government as well as the conservation sector though did consider the state 
government in the collaborative framework of the 2009 Reef Plan. Interviewee RB5, for 
example, commented that due to the regulations, some landholders would collaborate 
out of fear of being wrong and being told by the state government that they could no 
longer farm: 
“It is an implied threat by them, I don't know if it's really real, I mean you've also got the 
state government with their Reef regulations saying 'you must do this this way or else, 
you are gonna get fined, you are gonna…this' you know. That is a fear-based process 
and growers are fearful" (RB5). 
The interviewees, however, did not mention examples of any penalties imposed, 
such as an agricultural business losing its operating license for not complying with the 
2009 Reef Plan. In addition, the official report on the achievements of Reef Rescue 
emphasises the collaborative component of the policy, with no mentions about the role 
of regulations (Australian Government, 2014a). Apart from being limited, collaborative 
governance was grounded by regulations in the attempt to establish a minimum 
standard among the land management practices. Thus, the collaborative approach was 
combined with more centralised approaches to governance, represented by regulations. 
Collaborative governance in the Reef catchment’s water quality policy might have been 
reinforced or contradicted by regulations. However, exploring that issue is out of the 
scope of this chapter. It is discussed in the next chapter of this thesis.  
Regional collaboration, according to the stakeholder perceptions, was decisive to 
implement the 2009 Reef Plan and, within this regional level, the different approaches 
to collaboration for each region were more important in determining the achievements 
(or lack of achievements) in terms of water quality outcomes. In order to explore the 
likely impact of collaboration per region, the next section focuses on the water quality 
outcomes achieved per region as well as on the coordinators proxy and how it 
interacted with the funding for on-ground delivery of the regional water quality 
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outcomes. 
6.3.3 Impact of regional collaboration on regional water quality outcomes 
6.3.3.1 Water quality outcomes: a typology of NRM regions 
The 2009 Reef Plan targeted intensive agriculture activities, such as grazing and 
sugarcane cropping to improve water quality. The policy followed the 2008 Scientific 
Consensus Statement on Water Quality in the GBR, which identified agriculture as the 
main contributor of non-point source pollution in the GBR catchment, generating mainly 
sediments, nitrogen and pesticides (Queensland Government, 2008). In terms of land-
use, the six regions are dominated by grazing. The Fitzroy and Burdekin regions have 
the highest proportion of grazing, 78% and 90% of their land uses, respectively. Mackay 
Whitsundays and the Wet Tropics have the biggest percentage of land devoted to sugar 
cane, 18% and 9%, respectively. The Fitzroy Basin is the only region within the GBR 
catchment that does not produce sugar cane. Horticulture and conservation represent 
the other land uses. Horticulture has a minor contribution though to the land uses in the 
six NRM regions, representing merely 1% in Burnett Mary and 0% in the rest of the 
regions. In the case of Cape York, the percentages of its proportion of land uses were 
not available. However, its effort at reducing water pollutants was focused only on 
grazing (Queensland Government, 2014). Figures 6.3 to 6.7 below illustrate the 
proportion of land uses per region (except for Cape York). Within each region, I include 
the land area devoted to conservation in order to provide a contrast between the 
agriculture land uses. However, I do no not consider the potential influence that 
conservation land uses might have on water quality. 
Regarding the general contribution of each land use on the GBR’s non-point source 
pollution, sugarcane is the major producer of nitrogen, contributing with 56% of the 
total impact, even though this agriculture activity accounts for only 1.3% of total 
agriculture land use in the GBR catchment (Australian Government, 2014b). Grazing 
covers 75% of total agriculture land use, and contributes mostly with sediments, which 
account for around 45% of total sediments in the GBR (Australian Government, 2014b). 
Pesticides are also produced mostly by sugar cane; however, there is no specific 
percentage reported on the industry’s impact. Pesticides are, rather, a combination 
of all the agriculture land-uses. I refer to the pollutant reductions in nitrogen, sediments 
and pesticides as the water quality outcomes of Reef Rescue, because they indicate 
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the extent to which the health of the water in the GBR catchment was improved. The 
water quality outcomes were mainly the result of engaging landholders to change their 
land management practices. However, in the official documents it is unclear if there 
was a cause-effect relationship between land management practices and water quality 
outcomes. 
 
Figure 6.3 Burdekin land uses (Alluvium, 2016). 
 
Figure 6.4 Burnett-Mary land uses (Alluvium, 2016). 
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Figure 6.5 Fitzroy Basin land uses (Alluvium, 2016). 
 
Figure 6.6 Mackay Whitsundays land uses (Alluvium, 2016). 
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Figure 6.7 Wet Tropics land uses (Alluvium, 2016).
 
 
The 2009 Reef Plan that informed Reef Rescue included three targets to reduce the 
impact of agriculture activities on the GBR’s water quality, based on three key pollutants 
from land run- off: nitrogen, sediment and pesticides. The targets were the same for all 
the six NRM regions and consisted in reducing by 50% nitrogen and pesticides by 2013 
(a five year time frame that began on 2008), as well as reducing sediments by 20% in 
2020 (a longer time frame of 12 years). In order to compare the NRM regions and their 
water quality outcomes achieved, it was necessary to classify them according to the 
nature of the water quality problem in each region. As the six of them have different 
contexts, a typology was developed to link the size of the water quality problem in each 
region and their results in terms of pollutant reductions in nitrogen, sediments and 
pesticides. The typology included three categories according to similarities in five 
variables: 1) land area; 2) climate; 3) population; 4) land use; and 5) pollutant loads. 
The first category is titled ‘Big/Dry/Graze’ (BDG). It includes the Burdekin and Fitzroy 
Basin regions, which have extensive land areas, dry climate, and land use dominated 
by grazing. The category also includes mild population sizes, i.e. below 250,000 
persons, and a high impact of sediments on land-based runoff due to the intensive 
grazing activities undertaken in these regions (grazing produces the highest amount of 
sediments). Table 6.2 below shows in more detail the BDG regions.] 
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Table 6.2 ‘Big/Dry/Graze’ regions in the GBR (Dougall et al., 2014a; Dougall et al., 
2014b). 
 
Region Land area 
(km2) 
Climate Population Problem nature  
(regarding land use) 
Impact on water quality 
(pollutant loads) 
Burdekin 141,000 Dry 240,000 Grazing (90%) Sediment – 46.5% 
Nitrogen – 27.5% 
Pesticides – 12.5% 
Fitzroy 
Basin 
156,000 Dry 230,000 Grazing (78%) Sediment – 22.8% 
Nitrogen – 11.6% 
Pesticides – 3.5% 
Totals 297,000  470,000  Sediment – 69.3% 
Nitrogen – 39.1% 
Pesticides – 16.0% 
 
Each of the regions within the BDG category achieved different water quality outcomes 
during the five year period of the Reef Rescue program, embedded in the 2009 Reef 
Plan scheme. Burdekin was managed by NQ Dry Tropics and Fitzroy by the FBA. Given 
their problem nature and impact on water quality, the most important outcome of this 
category is sediment. In this regard, Burdekin achieved three times the reduction in 
sediment of Fitzroy Basin: the Burdekin reduced its sediment load by 16%, while Fitzroy 
Basin reduced its sediment by 4%. (See Table 6.3 for more detail on the water quality 
outcomes achieved by region.) The impact of Burdekin on water quality in terms of 
sediments was more than double the impact of Fitzroy Basin, 46.5% versus 22.8%; 
while the land area of Fitzroy Basin is more extensive, 15,000 km2 bigger than Burdekin.  
In terms of nitrogen reductions, Burdekin achieved more than three times the reduction 
of Fitzroy Basin, 10% and 3% respectively. In this case, Fitzroy Basin nitrogen loads 
had 11.6% more impact on water quality than Burdekin. It accounted for 39.1% of 
nitrogen loads, whereas Burdekin’s contribution of nitrogen on the Reef’s water quality 
represented 27.5%. In the last water quality outcome, pesticide reductions, again 
Burdekin achieved a better outcome than Fitzroy, with more than double the reduction 
in pesticides, 13% and 5% respectively. The impact on water quality in terms of 
pesticides was 9% higher for Burdekin. In summary, the Burdekin region achieved better 
water quality outcomes than Fitzroy Basin in the three water quality targets of the 2009 
Reef plan. 
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Table 6.3 Water quality outcomes achieved by the ‘Big/Dry/Graze’ regions 
(Queensland Government, 2014). 
 
Region  NRM 
Group  
Reduce nitrogen by 
50% (by 2013) 
Reduce sediment by 
20% (by 2020) 
Reduce pesticides by 
50% (by 2013) 
Burdekin NQ Dry 
Tropics 
10% 16% 13% 
Fitzroy 
Basin 
FBA 3% 4% 5% 
 
The second category of the water quality typology is ‘Small/Tropical/Sugar’ (STS), which 
comprises the Mackay Whitsundays and Wet Tropics regions. This category includes 
regions with small land areas (below 25,000 km2) tropical climate and the highest 
sugarcane land uses. Even though grazing is the largest land use in these areas, their 
key difference with the other regions is that they represent the most extensive regions 
dedicated to sugar cane production, contributing with 40.8% of nitrogen loads to the 
GBR catchment. It is important to note though, that the BDG regions have a slightly 
lower contribution of nitrogen loads, 39.1%. Hence, the regions in this category also 
have an important impact in terms of nitrogen. The most significant difference is that the 
STS regions have the smallest land areas but the highest impact of nitrogen on water 
quality. The regions in this category also have the highest impact of pesticides on water 
quality, accounting for 75% of the total contribution of pesticide loads. On the other 
hand, while these regions have the smallest land areas, their population size is the 
biggest, both with half million people living in their regions. Table 6.4 shows the STS 
regions in more detail. 
Table 6.4 ‘Small/Tropical/Sugar’ regions in the GBR (Packett et al., 2014; Hateley 
et al., 2014). 
 
Region Land area 
(sqkm) 
Climate Population Problem nature  
(regarding land use) 
Impact on water quality 
(pollutant loads) 
Mackay 
Whitsundays 
9,000 Tropical 250,000 Sugarcane (18%) Sediment – 6.0% 
Nitrogen – 7.7% 
Pesticides – 23.6% 
Wet Tropics 22,000 Tropical 250,000 Sugarcane (9%) Sediment – 14.3% 
Nitrogen – 33.1% 
Pesticides – 51.4% 
Totals 31,000  500,000  Sediment – 20.3% 
Nitrogen – 40.8% 
Pesticides – 75.0% 
  
Regarding the water quality outcomes achieved by STS regions, nitrogen reductions 
were the most important due to the nature of the water quality problem in this category. 
Mackay Whitsundays, managed by Reef Catchments, achieved double the reductions 
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in nitrogen than were achieved by the Wet Tropics, managed by Terrain NRM. For 
nitrogen, a reduction of 17% was achieved by Mackay, whereas Wet Tropics obtained 
an 8% reduction. (See Table 6.5 for more detail.) It is important to note that, in terms of 
nitrogen loads, the Wet Tropics had an impact on water quality 25.4% higher than 
Mackay Whitsundays, 33.1% versus 7.7%. Additionally, the land area of Wet Tropics is 
greater, at 13,000 km2 larger than Mackay Whitsundays.  
In the case of sediments, Wet Tropics had a better water quality outcome, achieving a 
reduction in sediments of 13%, compared to 9% of the Mackay region. Wet Tropics 
managed to achieve this despite having a significantly higher impact of sediments on 
water quality, 8.3% more than Mackay (14.3% versus 6.0%). Looking at pesticides, 
Mackay Whitsundays had a better outcome, as it managed to reduce them by 42%, 
while Wet Tropics did by 26%. In terms of the contribution of pesticides on water quality, 
Wet Tropics had also a bigger impact, 27.8% higher than the Mackay region (51.4% 
against 23.6%). In general, Wet Tropics had a bigger impact on water quality in the three 
targeted pollutants, nitrogen, sediments and pesticides. However, Mackay Whitsundays 
achieved better water quality outcomes in two of them: nitrogen and pesticides.4  
Table 6.5 Water quality outcomes achieved by ‘Small/Tropical/Sugar’ regions 
(Queensland Government, 2014). 
 
Region  NRM Group  Reduce nitrogen by 
50% (by 2013) 
Reduce sediment by 
20% (by 2020) 
Reduce pesticides by 
50% (by 2013) 
Mackay 
Whitsundays 
Reef 
Catchments 
17% 9% 42% 
Wet Tropics Terrain NRM 8% 13% 26% 
 
 
The third and final category of the water quality typology is ‘Medium/Tropical/Mild’ 
(MTM). Two regions comprise this category, Burnett Mary and Cape York. The first is 
managed by the BMRG and the second was managed by Cape York Sustainable 
Futures. Cape York is now managed by Cape York NRM. The regions in this category 
have land areas of medium size, above 25,000 square kilometres, their climate is 
tropical as the STS category, and they relatively benign or ‘mild’ distribution of land uses, 
as none of them (grazing, sugar cane or horticulture) can be distinguished as having a 
                                                          
4 In general, there appears to be no linear relationship between each region’s impact on water quality (in 
terms of pollutant loads) and water quality outcomes achieved. For example, having a wider pollutant load 
impact does not necessarily translate in achieving a wider percentage or reduction in this pollutant.   
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predominant impact on water quality, unlike the other two categories.  
Moreover, the impact on water quality of their land uses is mild in terms of their nitrogen, 
sediment and pesticides pollutant loads. Compared to the other categories, their 
contribution loads in percentages to water quality is significantly lower (under 15% in 
the three pollutants). On the other hand, data on land use was not available for the Cape 
York region, but it is possible to infer that, as with Burnett Mary, grazing has the highest 
proportion of land use due to the fact that the efforts to change land management 
practices in this region were only directed towards grazing (Queensland Government, 
2014). In terms of their population, Burnett Mary has the highest number of people 
among the six NRM regions (more than half million), while Cape York has the lowest 
population with less than 10,000 persons living in the area. Table 6.6 provides details 
on the MTM category.  
Table 6.6 ‘Medium/Tropical/Mild’ regions in the Great Barrier Reef (Fentie, et al., 
2014; McCloskey, et al., 2014). 
 
Region Land area 
(km2) 
Climate Population Problem nature  
(regarding land use) 
Impact on water 
quality (pollutant 
loads) 
Burnett 
Mary 
53,000 Subtropical 300,000 Mixed  Sediment – 5.4% 
Nitrogen – 6.0% 
Pesticides – 9.1% 
Cape York 43,000 Tropical 7,490 Mixed  Sediment – 5.0% 
Nitrogen – 14.1% 
Pesticides – 0.0% 
Totals 96,000  307,490  Sediment – 10.4% 
Nitrogen – 20.1% 
Pesticides – 9.1% 
 
In the water quality outcomes achieved by the regions of the MTM category, Burnett 
Mary reduced by more than double than Cape York the nitrogen loads, 15% against a 
6% reduction of Cape York. This far north region, however, had a higher contribution of 
nitrogen loads (by 8.1% more) than Burnett Mary. Table 6.7 shows the water quality 
outcomes of this category. In sediments, the second water quality outcome, Cape York 
had a better result, reducing by more than double the sediment loads achieved by 
Burnett Mary, 8% and 3% respectively. The sediment loads of both regions had 
practically the same impact on water quality, with around 5% of sediments contribution. 
In the case of pesticides, Cape York did not achieve any reductions as the region had 
no pesticides impacting the water quality of the Reef. Burnett Mary achieved a 28% 
reduction of pesticide loads in the catchment, where it had an impact of 9.1% of total 
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regional pesticide loads.  
Overall, in the MTM category, neither region achieved better water quality outcomes 
overall. Burnett Mary, for instance, achieved better water quality outcomes in nitrogen, 
while Cape York did better on sediments. It is not possible to compare the pesticides 
outcome because Cape York did not have any contribution of pesticide loads on water 
quality. Hence, pesticides were not an issue in this region. Burnett Mary, on the other 
hand, achieved the second highest reduction of pesticides, (behind Mackay 
Whitsundays and above Wet Tropics), despite that their contribution of pesticide loads 
was minor compared to the regions in the STS category, which had a contribution above 
20% of the total pesticide loads on the Reef’s water quality.  
Table 6.7 Water quality outcomes achieved by ‘Medium/Tropical/Mild’ regions 
(Queensland Government, 2014). 
 
Region  NRM Group  Reduce nitrogen 
by 50% (by 2013) 
Reduce sediment 
by 20% (by 2020) 
Reduce pesticides 
by 50% (by 2013) 
Burnett 
Mary 
BMRG 15% 3% 28% 
Cape York Cape York Sustainable 
Futures (now Cape York 
NRM) 
6% 8% 0% 
 
A key consideration with these results is that the percentages for the water quality 
outcomes are based on estimates from a modelling program developed by the state and 
federal governments. Therefore, they do not represent actual reductions of pollutant 
loads; rather, they are projections based on the Paddock to Reef model program 
(Queensland Government, 2017). In addition, the figures reported by Paddock to Reef 
are based on data that each region provided to both government levels. They all had 
different methods of obtaining and reporting that data. Hence, it is uncertain to what 
extent they reflect the real achievements. 
It is possible to provide a general picture on the nature of the water quality problem by 
combining the land area and the impact on the GBR’s water quality (in terms of pollutant 
loads) of each category in the typology for each NRM region. This shows which regions 
have the highest impact in the water quality issue and how this, in turn, relates to the 
size of their land area. Figure 6.8 illustrates that the larger impacts of pollutant loads 
focus on the regions of the BDG and STS categories. The first comprises the largest 
land area (297,000 km2) and has, by far, the largest impact on sediments, accounting 
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for 69.3% of the total sediment loads, while the latter encompasses the smallest land 
area (merely 31,000 km2) but has the biggest impact on nitrogen and pesticide loads 
(40.8% and 75.0%, respectively of the total nitrogen and pesticide loads in the GBR 
catchment).  
Regarding nitrogen loads, the BDG category, at 40.8%, has almost the same impact as 
STS, with 39.1%, despite the land uses in this category being heavily focused on 
grazing, which is the major agricultural activity that contributes sediments. In contrast, 
the impacts of the MTM category are moderate, particularly in sediment and pesticide 
loads. Figure 6.8, also shows that the water quality problem concentrates in the larger 
and smaller categories (in terms of land area) of the typology, where two intensive 
agriculture land uses take place: sugarcane and grazing.  
 
Figure 6.8 Nature of the water quality problem per category of the typology on 
NRM regions. 
Given impacts on water quality of BDG and STS category, it is not surprising then that 
most of on-ground funding was allocated to the two regions of these categories. The 
regions in the BDG category received 42% of the total Reef Rescue incentive-based 
funding, whereas the STS category captured 44% of total funding. The MTM category 
received the rest, 14% of total funding, which is a significant reduction from the other 
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categories. However, the regions in this category achieved similar or even better water 
quality outcomes than the regions in the two better funded categories. Figure 6.9 shows 
the amounts in AUS dollars received by each category of the typology. Overall, this 
Figure suggests that the allocation of funds for the regions was mostly based on the 
impact on water quality that each region had in terms of nitrogen, sediment and 
pesticides loads. For example, the STS category had the biggest percentage impact of 
nitrogen and pesticides on water quality and, in consequence, received the highest 
amount of funding. The BDG category had the highest percentage impact of sediments 
on water quality and received the second highest amount of funds to implement the 
2000 Reef Plan objectives.  
 
Figure 6.9 Funds allocated by Reef Rescue per category for NRM regions (based 
on the figures in BMRG, n.d.; CY, n.d.; FBA, n.d.; NQDT, n.d.; RC, n.d.; and TNRM, 
n.d.) . 
The funding was allocated by the federal government based on multiple criteria analysis 
(MCA) developed by the stakeholders. The MCA suggested prioritising the regions with 
extensive grazing land uses as they delivered the largest pollutant loads to the 
catchment (Australian Government, 2014b). Fitzroy and Burdekin were the ones 
recommended by the MCA. However, the official document about the achievements 
of Reef Rescue does not specify how the federal government made the decisions to 
allocate the regional funds for on-ground delivery. For instance, as Figure 6.9 shows, 
despite the MCA advice and by a slight difference of A$2 million, the STS regions 
received more funding than the BDG one. The most important thing to highlight though 
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is that, taken individually (without reference to the typology categories) each region 
received different amounts of funding for on-ground delivery to achieve the same water 
quality targets.  
Figure 6.10 shows the amount of on-ground funds received by each region, which were 
administered by the respective regional NRM groups. Mackay Whitsundays did not 
receive the highest amount of funding, but it was the region that achieved the best water 
quality outcomes on nitrogen and pesticides reductions, 17% and 42% respectively (out 
of an original target of 50% reduction). Burdekin was the second region with the highest 
amount of funds available (behind the Wet Tropics), and it achieved the best water 
quality outcome on sediment reductions, with 16% (out of an original target of 20% 
reduction).  
 
Figure 6.10 On-ground Funding per NRM region during Reef Rescue  
(BMRG, n.d.; CY, n.d.; FBA, n.d.; NQDT, n.d.; RC, n.d.; and TNRM, n.d.). 
 
Considering each region’s water quality outcomes, what stands out is that some of the 
NRM regions that has less funding available for on-ground delivery achieved better 
water quality outcomes than regions that had more funding allocated. For example, the 
second best water quality outcomes in terms of nitrogen and pesticides reductions were 
achieved by Burnett Mary, despite having less than half the funds of Wet Tropics, the 
top-funded region in the GBR. In this regard, Wet Tropics did not achieve the best water 
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quality outcomes in any of the pollutants targeted by the 2009 Reef Plan. On the other 
hand, Cape York received the lowest amount of funds for on-ground delivery but 
achieved a reduction in sediments two times higher than Fitzroy Basin, a grazing region 
that received more than seven times the funding allocated to Cape York (A$30.6 million 
and A$4.1 million, respectively). As a consequence, it can be argued that more funding 
for regional on-ground delivery does not necessarily led to the achievement of better 
regional water quality outcomes.  
On the other hand, it is worth noting that, generally the water quality outcomes achieved 
by the six regions fell short of the original targets of the 2009 Reef Plan. As a 
consequence, the overall water quality condition of the GBR catchment within those 
regions remained poor (Queensland Government, 2014). Moreover, before Reef 
Rescue, the water quality condition of the GBR was considered poor and it remained the 
same after the policy intervention (Australian Government, 2014a). Despite the different 
contexts of each region, the GBR regions were subject to the same water quality targets 
established by the 2009 Reef Plan in terms of pollutant reductions. It seems, therefore, 
that the water policy considered the GBR as one region but, at the same time, delivered 
the policy through six different NRM regions created for the purpose of being more 
effective at the environmental service delivery.  
Furthermore, the state and federal governments recognised the relative ineffectiveness 
of the regional approach to deliver the 2009 Reef Plan by stating that “while there is 
considerable funding for the protection of the Great Barrier Reef, it is modest relative 
to the size of the water quality problem” (Australian Government, 2014b, p. 10). 
Interviewee AS1 commented, in this regard, that the prioritisation in the allocation of 
funds was inappropriate, and the distribution of the financial resources could have 
been better. Subsequently, new plans were developed to improve the water quality 
condition, the 2013 Reef Plan (Australian and Queensland Governments, 2013) and the 
Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan (Australian Government, 2015b). However, 
the role of collaborative governance in achieving the water quality outcomes of these 
planning efforts has not yet been explored. As previously stated, this study focuses on 
the 2009 Reef Plan and its main implementation strategy, Reef Rescue. The next 
subsection explores the impact of the collaborative approaches of each region on the 
water quality outcomes based on the proxy variable of the coordinators. This exploration 
is complemented with comments by the stakeholders interviewed. 
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6.3.3.2 Impact of regional collaborative governance  
In this section, I analyse in more detail the potential relationship between collaborative 
governance and environmental outcomes, based on the key coordinator variable to 
differentiate between the regional collaborative approaches. This analysis offers an 
explanation of how the different collaborative governance approaches in the NRM 
regions might have influenced the water quality outcomes achieved by each region. It 
is important to note that regions with more funding for on-ground delivery did not 
necessarily achieved the best water quality outcomes. The different water quality 
outcomes obtained may be explained through their regional collaborative approaches. 
The views from the interviewees complement the analysis of how the regions’ 
collaborative efforts impacted on the environmental outcomes. 
Each of the six NRM groups included in this study was responsible for the delivery of 
the 2009 Reef Plan in their NRM regions. They were devolved this responsibility by the 
federal government. The key factor that enabled their collaborative approaches was 
funding. Moreover, stakeholders from the NRM regions considered that without the 
incentives provided by Reef Rescue, collaboration would have been marginal. As shown 
in Figure 6.10, each NRM region received different amounts of funding through allocation 
decisions made solely by the federal government. It is important to note that the 
stakeholders did not participate (e.g. through deliberation) in the decisions about 
funding allocation in Reef Rescue.  
One of the key characteristics of the 2009 Reef Plan is that the policy represents an 
example of a collaborative governance approach that was informed by robust scientific 
evidence about the impacts of land based run-off on water quality. It was an evidence-
based policy that provided a strong argument about the importance of addressing the 
water quality problem (Queensland Government, 2008). However, the stakeholders 
from the regional NRM bodies and agriculture industry representatives questioned the 
data on the water quality outcomes. Particularly, the four interviewees from the 
agriculture sector (AI1, AI2, AI3, and AI4) argued that the modelling program behind 
that data does not provide fully accurate measures of their efforts at reducing land-
based runoff. 
These agricultural stakeholders considered that the scientific information is insufficient 
and only accounts for a general aspect of the issue. Moreover, they complained about 
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the lack of evidence on the impacts of water quality from individual farms. In their 
view, the policy problem of water quality is not a serious issue. It became significant 
due to politics and international pressure from international organisations such as the 
United Nations World Heritage Committee. Hence, the water quality outcomes are 
overshadowed by the uncertainty that surrounds the actual impacts. For these reasons, 
the agricultural stakeholders, as well as most of those from the regional NRM bodies, 
tend to disregard the data about the water quality outcomes shown in Tables 6.3, 6.5 and 
6.7. 
Stakeholders from the regional NRM bodies and agriculture industry representatives 
also tend to discount the reporting method followed by the state and federal 
governments regarding the overall water quality condition. They consider that the 
ratings between poor-moderate-good-very good water quality conditions from the 
modelling program (Queensland Government, 2014) represent a simplistic way of 
evaluating their regional efforts. However, each region had their own method of 
collecting and reporting on the data about pollutant reductions. The uncertainty, in this 
analysis, is also generated by the different regional reporting standards developed by 
the NRM bodies. It is worth noting that, overall, the effectiveness of collaboration 
seemed moderate as the achievements on water quality fell short of the original targets 
of the 2009 Reef Plan. In addition, as stated previously, the official view considered that 
the investment towards the policy issue was modest. 
To test the assumption that the regional collaborative approaches might explain why 
one NRM region achieved better water quality outcomes than the others (despite 
having less funding for on-ground delivery), the study focused on the governance 
structures of the regional NRM bodies, based on the typology of NRM regions. As 
mentioned before, in general the regional NRM bodies are non-statutory and non-profit 
organisations with similar governance structures, composed of two main elements: 1) 
community-based board of directors; and 2) a management branch led by a CEO. 
Nonetheless, between these elements there are differences amongst the regional NRM 
bodies. These include the composition of the board of directors as well as the number 
of directors; the number of staff that worked in the organisations during the period of 
Reef Rescue and the 2009 Reef Plan (2008-2013); the presence of a profit branch (e.g. 
commercial enterprises); and the funding received as part of Reef Rescue.  
This study added to these governance characteristics the ranking of NRM regions 
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developed by Robins and Dovers (2007a), which ranked the total 56 NRM regional 
bodies in Australia at the time of the NHT Extension program and NAP of 2001.The 
ranking was based on the capacity of the regional NRM bodies to meet planning and 
management responsibilities. This ranking allows identifying the initial overall capacity 
of the regional NRM groups in the GBR catchment. Table 6.8 shows in more detail the 
elements of the NRM bodies’ governance structures. 
Table 6.8 Governance structure elements of the regional NRM bodies of the GBR 
catchment. 
 
NRM group Board 
composition 
Board 
numbers 
(2008-
2013) 
Staff 
numbers 
(2008-
2013) 
Profit 
branch 
Capacity 
ranking  
(1=highest; 
10=lowest) 
Funding 
(AUS 
million) 
Big/Dry/Graze  
NQ Dry Tropics Skilled 9 20 No 3 32.4 
FBA Mixed 14 30 Yes 3 30.6 
Small/Tropical/Sugar  
Reef Catchments Mixed 7 30 No 8 32.0 
Terrain NRM Skilled 10 38 Yes 7 33.0 
Medium/Tropical/Mild  
BMRG Representative 10 30 No 4 16.3 
Cape York 
Sustainable 
Futures/ 
Cape York NRM 
Representative 10 15 No 9 4.1 
 
The board composition in Table 6.8 is classified as representative, skilled and mixed. 
Representative means that the members of the board are members of different sectors 
selected to be represented in the governance structure of the NRM bodies. They are 
either invited by other members of the NRM group or elected by the community. 
Examples of such sectors include the scientific community, traditional owners, local 
government, primary/secondary/tertiary industry sectors, community catchment and 
community conservation. Skilled refers to members selected according to their 
professional skills (e.g. financials, governance or community relationships) as in the 
style of a private company that hires people based on their acquired skills. Mixed refers 
to a combination of representative and skilled members of the board. A common 
criticism of the board’s composition is that the representative type of member makes it 
hard for those representatives of sectors to take off their ‘representative hats’ and have 
a real sense of belonging to the NRM body. The skilled type of members are 
disconnected from the community as they were not appointed by it. A mixed-composed 
board would deal with both issues. So far, there are no studies that explore the benefits 
or setbacks of each board type in the NRM bodies. This research gap is out of the scope 
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of this research project. 
Regarding the profit branch element of the governance structures in Table 6.8, only two 
of the NRM bodies have one; FBA and TNRM. Profit branches refer to commercial 
business created by the NRM organisations, additional to their activities as a non-profit 
organisation, designed to complement their income sources. Usually, they are 
environmental consultancy businesses, and they have been established to supplement 
the limited funds provided by federal and state governments. Engaging in business 
activities though, contradicts their non-profit nature. 
The total number of board directors as well as staff gives an idea of the size of the 
regional organisation. In general, these numbers show that the NRM bodies in the GBR 
are small organisations with fewer than 50 staff members. On average, the six NRM 
bodies have 27 staff members. The largest is Terrain NRM with 38 total staff, while the 
smallest is CY with 15 total staff. Comparing the total staff number of each category of 
the typology with the water quality outcomes achieved, there does not seem to be a 
positive association between having more staff and achieving better water quality 
outcomes. On the contrary, there are mixed results. Figure 6.11 shows this in more 
detail.  
 
Figure 6.11 Total staff of each NRM body vs water quality outcomes achieved by 
the 2009 Reef Plan.  
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The information classifies each NRM body based on the categories of the typology of NRM 
regions. BDG=Big/Dry/Graze; STS=Small/Tropical/Sugar; and MTM=Medium/Tropical/Mild. 
For instance, TNRM was the region with the highest number of staff, but did not achieve 
the best water quality outcomes in any of the pollutants targeted. CYNRM had the lowest 
number of staff members and achieved better water quality outcomes than FBA, which 
had 30 people. BMRG and RC belong to different categories of the typology; the first is 
part of the MTM region, while the latter is located within the STS regions. Both achieved 
a similar outcome in terms of nitrogen reductions (15% and 17% reduction, 
respectively), and had the same number of staff: 30 people. Additionally, NQDT was the 
second region with the lowest number of staff (20 people); however, it achieved the best 
outcome in sediment reductions (16% reduction). While FBA was also part of the second 
largest organisations with 30 staff members and achieved the lowest pollutant 
reductions of the six NRM regions. In other words, linking the total staff of each 
organisation with the water quality outcomes achieved during the 2009 Reef Plan does 
not show any positive association, such as the largest NRM bodies achieving the best 
water quality outcomes, and the smallest ones achieving the worst. 
Something similar occurs in the relationship between the water quality outcomes 
achieved and the capacity ranking of each NRM group. This capacity ranking 
classification was developed by Robins and Dovers (2007a), and provides a measure 
to compare the capacity of each NRM body to plan and manage natural resources, in 
this case water. The classification refers to the NRM regions, not the NRM groups. 
However, as these regions are managed by the NRM groups, it represents so far the 
only attempt at developing a classification of each regional NRM group’s planning and 
management abilities.  
For example, a classification of 3 (out of a possible 10), which is the highest received 
by two NRM regions included in this study, Burdekin and Fitzroy, means that these 
regions have high access to resources (e.g. research provided by universities) and 
services (e.g. infrastructure); moderate populations and were ranked as priority regions 
under the NAP. A classification of 4 like Burnett Mary enlists fewer resources available 
(e.g. universities and research centres); smaller populations; but good access to 
financial resources. Regions classed as 7, such as Wet Tropics (T NRM), have a high 
number of research centres; but small areas; as well as low potential access to 
resources. Being classed as 8 refer to lower access to learning and technical support; 
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moderate to high populations in relatively small areas; and good access to services. 
This is the case of Mackay Whitsundays managed by Reef Catchments. Finally, a 
classification of 9 involves having no universities or research centres; a reasonable 
access to services; small population and varied regional area sizes, which is the case 
of Cape York. As with the case of total staff numbers, there is no positive association 
between the capacity ranking of the NRM regions and their achievement of water quality 
outcomes. See Figure 6.12 for more detail. 
 
Figure 6.12 Capacity rank per region (1=highest capacity; 10=lowest capacity) vs 
water quality outcomes achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan. In this case, the 
information is not classified using the typology of NRM regions. 
Moreover, Mackay Whitsundays, one of the regions ranked amongst the lowest in 
capacity in Table 6.8 (ranking of 8) and part of the STS regions, achieved the best water 
quality outcomes in pesticides and nitrogen. Fitzroy Basin and Burdekin, part of the BDG 
regions, were classed highest (3) among the NRM bodies in the GBR. Yet Fitzroy 
achieved the lowest pollutant reductions and Burdekin (managed by NQDT) had the 
best water quality outcome of sediment reductions. BMRG, for their part, achieved the 
second best water quality outcomes in terms of nitrogen and pesticides and the Burnett 
Mary region (part of the MTM category) had also the second best capacity ranking of 4. 
CY did not achieve the worst water quality outcomes, despite that the Cape York region 
(part of the MTM category) was ranked with the lowest capacity of 9.  
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Furthermore, the capacity ranking reinforces the absence of a positive association 
between total staff and water quality outcomes achieved. One could expect, for 
example, that the largest organisations, such as TNRM, would also belong to the 
regions with higher capacity, but this is not the case, as the Wet Tropics (which manages 
Terrain) has a capacity rank of 7, closer to the lowest ones. NQDT and FBA are smaller 
than Terrain NRM and their regions (Burdekin and Fitzroy, respectively) were the 
highest ranked organisations of the GBR classed as 3. In analysing total staff and 
capacity vs water quality outcomes achieved, there are mixed results. Hence, there is 
no positive relationship between the capacity of each NRM body and the water quality 
outcomes achieved. The results vary as with the total staff and water quality outcomes 
relationship. 
None of the elements of the governance structures discussed (Table 6.8) of the NRM 
groups allow identifying the impact of their regional collaborative governance 
approaches. Rather, they refer to the groups’ composition, such as the board’s 
composition or total staff, or to their measured capacity, elements or aspects that do not 
contribute to differentiate between the formal collaboration that each NRM group 
followed during the 2009 Reef Plan. In general, there does not appear to be any element 
or indicator that could represent the regional collaborative governance approaches. It 
was discussed in Section 6.3.2 that the regional collaboration was essential to 
implement the 2009 Reef Plan and that this collaboration occurred by the partnership 
relations of three actors: the NRM groups, landholders and regional agriculture industry 
organisations. The differences among this depiction of regional collaboration occurred 
in the manner that these actors interacted, which is not captured by any of the elements 
of the governance structures shown in Table 6.8. Moreover, these interactions follow 
mostly informal patterns that are not registered in any official or research account.  
However, for this study, there is one element of the governance structures that 
distinguished the collaborative governance approaches: the existence of coordinators 
among them. The role of the coordinators was to engage with the landholders to support 
them in their adoption of better land management practices. Improved land 
management practices would reduce the pollutant loads into the GBR and thus, improve 
the quality of water. In this sense, coordinators serve as a proxy indicator to differentiate 
between the collaborative approaches of the NRM groups. They represent a tangible 
element of collaboration that can be analysed in order to explore the impact of regional 
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collaboration on the water quality outcomes achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan. 
Coordinators were identified as extension or land management officers by the NRM 
bodies and their role was to facilitate landholders’ decisions regarding the adopting of 
improved land management practices. In this regard, they played a key collaborative 
role by engaging landholders to adopt voluntarily changes in their land management 
practices. In some cases, coordinators were appointed directly by the NRM groups: 
others they were sub-contracted through an agriculture business company. Apart from 
providing a hint on the different regional collaborative approaches of the NRM groups, 
the existence of coordinators also offer a potential explanation to why some NRM 
groups achieved better water quality outcomes despite having less funds available. 
Alternatively, it may help explain why some NRM bodies achieved worst water quality 
outcomes even if they had more funding available for on-ground delivery.  
The comparison of the regional collaborative governance approaches is presented 
without using the typology of NRM regions developed previously, as it shows more 
directly the likely impact of proxy indicator on the six NRM regions. The typology is used 
afterwards to complement the explanation around the implications of the impact of 
collaboration on the water quality outcomes, in order to offer a contextual explanation 
to the coordinators proxy variable. Figure 6.13 below shows that there is a positive 
tendency between having four or more coordinators and achieving better water quality 
outcomes.5  
For example, BMRG, CY, FBA RC and TNRM had coordinators available during the 
2009 Reef Plan (either appointed directly or sub-contracted). However, FBA and CY 
had four or less coordinators and achieved worst water quality outcomes than the three 
other regions that had from four to seven coordinators. NQDT had no direct coordinator 
role in its organisational scheme. Coordinators were part of a complex management 
scheme in which other organisations performed that role. Hence, their contribution is 
not clear. BMRG had seven coordinators appointed directly by the organisation, which 
were identified as extension officers, in the period of Reef Rescue implementation 
(2008-2013). The NRM region achieved better water quality outcomes in nitrogen and 
pesticides than other three NRM bodies — FBA, NQDT and TNRM — despite having 
                                                          
5 The information about the number of coordinators available during the implementation of the plan was 
provided by interviewees from the regional NRM bodies. It is important to note that this information was 
separate from the semi-structured interviews. 
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considerably less funding for on-ground delivery available. 
 
 
Figure 6.13 Total numbers of coordinators per NRM group vs water quality 
outcomes achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan (information is not classified using the 
typology of NRM regions). *NQDT had no direct facilitator role within its 
organisation as there were other organisations involved in this  role. 
It is interesting to see that the Wet Tropics, managed by Terrain NRM, had more than 
double the funds of BMRG (33 vs 16.3 million) and achieved very similar outcomes than 
BMRG in terms of nitrogen and pesticides reductions. Terrain NRM had also seven 
coordinators or extension officers sub-contracted through an agriculture business during 
Reef Rescue. The region achieved a better outcome for sediment reductions than 
BMRG.  
The variety in the numbers of coordinator or facilitator roles offered by some of the NRM 
groups, such as Reef Catchments or Fitzroy Basin, indicate the changing priorities of 
land management year-to-year, according to the agriculture sectors impacting water 
quality: grazing, sugarcane, and horticulture. RC had between four and seven 
coordinators also sub-contracted to a private agriculture business during the five year 
period of the policy, and the Mackay Whitsundays region achieved the best water quality 
outcomes in pesticides and nitrogen, while also receiving one of the highest amounts of 
funding (A$32 million). Interestingly, RC had fewer coordinators than BMRG and 
achieved better water quality outcomes; however, it had more than double of funds 
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available (as in the case with TNRM). RC also achieved better water quality outcomes 
than TNRM with similar number of coordinators and slightly less funding. 
FBA had between three and four coordinators for the Fitzroy region and it achieved the 
lowest pollutant reductions in the six NRM regions, despite being among the top-funded 
regions, with 30.6 million available for on-ground delivery. This could suggest that 
having fewer coordinators relates to achieving less pollutant reductions; however, due 
to the reduced data, it was not possible to develop a regression analysis between 
coordinators and water quality outcomes variables. Hence, there is no linear relationship 
between these variables that would allow affirming that having more coordinators 
associates with achieving better water quality outcomes. 
On the other hand, NQDT achieved the best outcome in terms of sediment reductions, 
but it is not clear if they had coordinators available to support the delivery of the 2009 
Reef Plan. CY was the region with less funding available, and achieved a similar 
outcome in sediment reductions than RC (8% and 9%, respectively), one of the top-
funded regions. CY had one coordinator available. Briefly, this analysis shows that the 
existence of four or more coordinators in an NRM body tends to contribute with the 
achievement of better water quality outcomes, regardless of being appointed directly or 
sub-contracted through an agriculture business.  
Another aspect to consider in the analysis is the sub-contracting of the coordinators’ 
role, which does not represent a collaborative governance practice, but rather a 
business approach that is related to market governance. In this sense, it represents an 
example of how collaborative governance in Queensland natural resource management 
interacts with other governance approaches to attain its goals. Nonetheless, stronger 
regional collaborative approaches indicated by the existence of more coordinators 
(regardless of the nature of their appointment) seemed to contribute positively in 
achieving better water quality outcomes despite the funding received for on-ground 
delivery. On the other hand, the coordinators proxy variable contributes by reducing the 
uncertainty that prevails on the relationship between collaborative governance and 
environmental outcomes. Figure 6.14 below shows the relationship between regional 
collaborative approaches and environmental outcomes, based on an adaptation of the 
Process-Outcomes governance framework. 
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Figure 6.14 Adapted Process-Outcomes governance framework, focused at the 
regional scale of collaboration. The proxy variable of regional coordinators 
serves to reduce the uncertainty on the relationship between collaborative 
governance and environmental outcomes. 
In order to provide a better understanding, the analysis about the impact of regional 
collaboration on water quality outcomes through the coordinator variable is 
complemented by a set of external factors identified by the interviewees from the six 
regional NRM bodies. In general, these regional stakeholders considered that the NRM 
regions would have been able to achieve larger pollutant reductions with more funding 
for on-ground delivery. However, when asked about why in some cases this was 
contradicted during Reef Rescue — such as a region achieving better outcomes despite 
having less funding — there were two types of explanations offered: 1) approaches to 
collaboration that facilitated more effective implementation; and 2) external factors.  
Table 6.9 divides both explanations between their main features. In the first explanation, 
the appointment of coordinators to support regional collaboration during 2009 Reef Plan 
was suggested by the interviewees as having a positive impact on the achievement of 
better water quality outcomes. This view is based on perceptions from the stakeholders, 
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rather than on evidence provided by them. The agreement between the results of the 
coordinator proxy variable analysis and stakeholders’ perceptions suggest undertaking 
more focused research on the impact of collaboration through the use of coordinators 
once the present plans (e.g. the 2015 Reef Plan) are implemented. It should be noted, 
as well, that the interviewees from the regional NRM bodies were reluctant to discuss in 
detail about potential comparisons between them. The majority of them said that they 
were unaware of the funding amounts received by other regions. 
Table 6.9 Factors that contribute in explaining different achievements on regional 
water quality outcomes. 
 
Regional collaboration Higher levels of cohesion between the stakeholders 
Specific engagement roles (e.g. coordinators) 
Informal regional collaboration 
External factors Staff skills (e.g. technical knowledge) 
Weather events (e.g. cyclones or floods) 
Land size and land-use of each region 
Market shifts (e.g. price changes) 
Data standards 
Time-frame of the water quality plan 
 
The role (and potential influence) of the external factors is essential to complement 
the analysis about the impact of regional collaborative governance on water quality 
outcomes (following Figure 6.14). For instance, Burnett Mary’s highest reduction in 
nitrogen could be partially explained by market shifts, such as the price of production 
inputs. Interviewee RB5 pointed out that the nitrogen and pesticide reductions ones might 
have also been consequence of a change in the price of fertilisers. In 2009, the price 
of fertiliser more than doubled from previous years due to the increases in fuel prices, 
which made the farmers reduce their use or employ it more efficiently by putting it 
underneath the ground. Interviewee RB12 explained that the change in the price of 
fertiliser was coupled with a reduction in world sugar prices in the first couple of years 
of Reef Rescue.  
In terms of the approach to regional collaboration, interviewee RB4 explained that the 
trust that developed through the informal relationships between the NRM group, the 
industry representatives and the landholders could have contributed to higher rates 
of change in management practices. This might also explain why before the 
implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan, there were already different land practices in 
place from sugarcane. For example, some farmers built dams to stop the run-off and 
use the water contained in them for irrigation. So part of the achievements in nitrogen 
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could have reflected the sugarcane practices of previous years. 
Another important external factor was the data standards followed by each NRM group. 
Each of them adopted different ways of reporting changes in land management 
practices and reductions in the three pollutants. As a consequence, the data standards 
across the regions in the GBR were inconsistent and this might also explain why some 
regions achieved better water quality outcomes. In other words, the way of collecting 
data and reporting it by each NRM group to the Paddock to Reef modelling program 
(which presented the results of the 2009 Reef Plan), might partially account for the 
differences in the water quality outcomes achieved. In this regard, interviewee RB12 
stated that there were different levels of rigour in the methodologies followed to report 
the pollutant reductions and there might have been over-reporting in some regions (no 
specific region was identified by the interviewee). The inconsistency of data standards 
across the regions is summarised in this comment from interviewee RB9: 
“I would take those numbers (the water quality outcomes of Tables 6.3, 6.5 and 6.7), not 
with a grain of salt, but I would be very cautious about relating them back to level of 
investment or the quality of governance." 
In terms of regional collaboration, interviewee RB9 added that, through better 
coordination and cohesion, it is highly probable that better water quality outcomes would 
have been achieved. This view was reinforced by interviewee RB12, who considered 
that the issue was not about having more funding available for on-ground delivery, but 
about better integration within the collaborative approach: 
"The only thing we didn't do well was integrate: was get collaboration between Queensland 
Government and Australian Government.”  
This stakeholder added that there was enough funding for the water quality plan and 
the water quality outcomes achieved through collaboration, compared with previous 
water planning efforts, did make a significant difference for the GBR catchment. 
Interviewees RB6 and RB7 explained that the figures on water quality outcomes, 
particularly the sediment reductions, were not comparable as the land areas of some 
regions were significantly bigger. The land area external factor links with the typology of 
NRM regions. For instance, the land area explains the low achievements in water quality 
of the Fitzroy region, which is the largest NRM region in the GBR. It is about three times 
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the size of the Mackay Whitsundays, which achieved the best water quality outcomes 
in nitrogen and pesticides. For this reason, the pollutant reductions in larger areas were 
less likely to be visible than in smaller regions, such as Burnett Mary or the Wet Tropics. 
Following this logic, these regions should have received more funding for on-ground 
delivery: a funding amount that matched its land area.  
In addition, interviewee RB6 argued that the implementation efforts were strongly 
impacted by weather events that occurred in the Fitzroy region, such as cyclones and 
floods. However, the weather events also affected other NRM regions analysed during 
the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan. Therefore, they were subject to the same 
climate unpredictability, which they highlighted as factors that affected the 
implementation of the program in their respective individual reports on Reef Rescue 
Achievements (BMRG, n.d.; FBA, n.d.; and TNRM, n.d.). A likely consequence of the 
regional collaborative approach, though, was that by the end of the policy, around 2013, 
there were more landholders willing to change than incentives available. As a regional 
actor briefly explained: 
“In 2008 we begged people to take projects; in 2013 we were turning people away” (RB6). 
Apart from collaboration supported by adequate funding, interviewee RB2 considered 
that staff skills and a longer time-frame for the plan would have contributed to better 
water quality outcomes of the 2009 Reef Plan. Staff skills refer mainly to the ability of 
managers to identify the areas or ‘hotspots’ in a region that have the greatest impact on 
the GBR’s catchment, and prioritise the actions to address the water quality issues in 
those areas. That would render higher achievements in pollutant reductions. So far, the 
ability to identify regional ‘hotspots’ has been absent in the water quality plans. In 
addition, the complex nature of the water quality issue, as RB3 explained, requires 
longer time-frames to demonstrate change in the water quality conditions. Thus, instead 
of a five year period allocated to Reef Rescue, it would be better to design a plan with 
10 or 20 year time-frames. The recent Reef Plan addresses this time-frame factor by 
planning water quality targets on a 35-year time horizon (Australian Government, 
2015b).  
Interviewee RB8 said that the water quality outcomes were reflective of the land-uses 
in each region. This external factor also links with the typology of NRM regions. For 
instance, a region that is devoted mainly to grazing, such as those in the BDG category, 
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would get a larger outcome on sediment reductions. This is true for the case of Burdekin, 
which achieved the highest sediment reductions, but not of Fitzroy. Moreover, the Wet 
Tropics, despite being a region from the STS category focused largely on sugar cane 
farming, achieved the second highest sediment reductions, as Figure 6.8 shows.  
Interviewees RB8 and RB10 argued that more funding for on-ground delivery would not 
have made a difference as the outcomes would probably have remained the same. First, 
the engagement of landholders was voluntary and, therefore, there was a limit on land 
practice change. Secondly, they considered that doubling the amount of funding would 
not have doubled the achievements on water quality outcomes. This logic is based on 
the 80-20 rule of investment, in which the investor receives 80% of the investment return 
with 20% of the effort. Continuing the effort leads only to marginal increases of the 
investment return. On the other hand, the interviewees accepted (without offering 
details) that some regions that received less funding might have been upset. This 
probably explains the limited cross-regional collaboration during Reef Rescue. 
Interviewees from the ‘high collaboration’ sphere (federal and state governments, as 
well as agriculture industry representatives coded in Table 6.1) also offered views on 
why more reductions in pollutants were achieved in some cases by regions with less 
funding. However, they were careful to not identify a particular region or engage in 
comparisons. For instance, interviewee AI2 explained that better outcomes with fewer 
funds available might have been the result of having an extension officer on the ground 
that focused on engaging the landholders in its region to participate in Reef Rescue. As 
mentioned previously, extension officers were another name for the coordinators’ role. 
This view supports the finding of the positive association between coordinators in place 
in a given NRM region and achievement of better water quality outcomes. Interviewee 
SG3 considered that rather than levels of funding received, the results reflected the levels 
of cohesion between the stakeholders of a region. At certain times, the interviewee 
added, that some regions had quite fractured relationships between the stakeholders, 
leading them to less effectiveness in the implementation of the policy.  
Interviewee SG2 argued that the key factor explaining the impact of funding were the 
staff skills in the regions. In this case, the regions with more qualified people would 
have been able to achieve more. These skills, such as technical knowledge, fit with 
the view from interviewee FG1, who explained that this type of skills allowed a more 
appropriate prioritisation and project selection towards the areas with more impact. To 
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support this view, the interviewee said that 95% of the water quality outcomes were 
caused by 50% of the land management projects (this represented a more specific 
example of the 80-20 investment rule). This shows the partial efficiency of the policy. 
Rather than more funding, improvements in the project selection would have led to 
better outcomes. The staff skills could also have been involved in the ability of each 
region to collect data and report it to the Paddock to Reef program. In consequence, 
staff able to use more comprehensive methods of data collection could have 
influenced a higher estimate of pollutant reductions for a given region. 
While it is clear that stronger forms of collaboration, as indicated by the role of 
coordinators, might have facilitated effective implementation, it cannot be ignored that 
the impact of the external factors to the regional collaborative approaches could have 
been more significant, such as staff skills or market shifts. In this case, collaborative 
governance seems partially responsible for the outcomes achieved by the water quality 
plan as it can be viewed as the motor that sustained the machinery of the planning effort. 
However, the different regional water quality outcomes achieved seem to respond more 
to the external factors identified by the stakeholders interviewed.  
On the other hand, there is no clear evidence of how the relationship between the impact 
on water quality (pollutant loads) shown in Tables 6.3, 6.5 and 6.7, and reduction of 
pollutants. For instance, whether it is more difficult to show a reduction when the 
contribution of pollutant loads is higher (as in the case of Wet Tropics with nitrogen or 
Burdekin with sediments) or, on the contrary, higher reductions are obtained in the 
regions with the smallest impacts on water quality, such as Burnett Mary with nitrogen 
or Cape York with sediments. This relationship requires more investigation but is out of 
the scope of this study. 
6.4 Discussion and conclusion 
The impact of different regional collaborative governance approaches to the water 
quality environmental outcome in Queensland natural resource planning was analysed 
through a case study analysis of the GBR that was based on document reviews as well 
as interviews with the key stakeholders of the plan evaluated. Regarding our first 
research question about the role of collaboration in the implementation of 2009 Reef 
Plan, I found that there was a consensus between the stakeholders’ perspectives on 
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the fact that collaborating was essential to achieve the water quality outcomes, even 
though it had a limited nature and, in general, it was viewed as a working relationship 
rather than as a process of deliberation and consensus-building between the 
stakeholders.  
Reconsidering Ansell and Gash’s (2008) definition on collaborative governance, 
regional collaboration in Reef Rescue had a limited scope, and was not seeking 
deliberation or consensus-based decisions between the parties. Limited or narrow 
collaboration is used as a technique to facilitate cooperation, rather than a broader 
approach, in which collaboration deepens participation and deliberation in public affairs 
and, thus, enhances democratic consent (Ansell, 2012). This limited collaboration was 
motivated by devolution of responsibility for delivery from the federal to the regional 
level, on the assumption that this level of governance was best suited to implement the 
policy (Kroon et al., 2016). From the perspective of water quality outcomes achieved by 
the water quality plan, it can be said that collaboration made possible the 
implementation of the plan but was moderately effective in improving the water quality 
conditions, as the overall water quality condition of the GBR remained poor after the 
governance intervention. 
The study also found that collaboration interacted with top-down processes of 
governance at higher levels of government, such as the federal and state levels. As a 
consequence of this interaction, collaboration was counterpointed by regulations 
introduced by the state level. In this regard, the limited nature of collaboration was 
constrained by higher (and more powerful) levels of government, which directed the 
policy, despite that the official documents emphasise the collaborative approach as a 
successful example that should be continued by further policies (Australian 
Government, 2011). Further, in the stakeholder views included in this research, 
collaboration occurred in combination with top-down governance strategies, resembling 
a mixed governance approach used as a tool to solve a policy problem. 
The type of collaboration perceived by the stakeholders during the 2009 Reef Plan 
represents an example of the account of Scott and Thomas (2017) of collaborative 
governance as a ‘toolbox’ used to solve public problems. Moreover, the mix between 
collaboration, through incentives and more top-down mechanisms such as regulations, 
fits with the conceptualisation of collaborative governance offered by Scott and Thomas 
(2017). In their view, collaborative approaches are characterised by a variety of tools, 
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such as participation incentives, formal agreements, rules and deliberative forums that 
support collaborative governance “as a means to an end” (p.3). Within the collaborative 
governance arrangements of 2009 Reef Plan, I found that the main role of collaboration 
was to develop working relationships (either formal or informal) at the regional level, 
between the NRM groups and the regional agriculture industry to promote practice 
change among the landholders. Collaboration had a key but limited role, which 
contradicts the official view that presents 2009 Reef Plan and its Reef Rescue strategy 
as a landmark of collaborative efforts (Australian Government, 2014a). 
Regarding the second research question, about the impact of the regional collaborative 
approaches on the water quality outcomes, I focused on key elements of the 
governance structures of the NRM bodies — mainly, the existence of coordinators as a 
proxy for collaboration. I found that, despite funding amounts allocated for on-ground 
delivery, the appointment of more than one coordinator to promote land management 
practice change among the landholders had a positive contribution on water quality 
outcomes achieved. The analysis of the coordinators proxy variable suggest that 
stronger collaboration (noted by more coordinators in place to engage with landholders) 
contributed to achieving better water quality outcomes. It was also suggested by the 
stakeholders interviewed that relying on extension officers renders a stronger 
collaborative governance approach, which would likely lead to better water quality 
outcomes.  
The positive contribution of coordinators in achieving improved outcomes is supported 
by Conrad (2015). In her study about regional water planning in California, she also 
found a positive impact of coordinators (‘network managers’). For instance, the 
Californian regions with coordinators available had stronger collaboration and, as a 
consequence, better performance in the management of water quality issues. Ansell 
(2015) found something similar in a public health study. He examined three global public 
health initiatives that relied on collaboration, such as AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. In 
his study, he found that collaboration was stronger in the initiatives as they had 
coordinators. Moreover, coordinators improved the delivery of these public health 
programs by linking the efforts at the global and state levels.  
The study was able test the relationship between coordinators per NRM group and 
water quality outcomes by reviewing past organisational structures of the regional NRM 
bodies and asking participants of the regional NRM sector about the appointment and 
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number of devoted to coordinator roles. The positive tendency between coordinators 
and water quality outcomes achieved could also indicate the development of trust at the 
regional collaborative approach. Trust is an important benefit of collaboration that could 
represent an intermediate outcome that led to the water quality outcomes. However, 
some of the coordinator positions were sub-contracted, which represent a business 
relationship where trust is not important to deliver a service. The sub-contracting 
strategy also shows the interaction of collaborative governance with market approaches 
(apart from top-down ones) to govern the delivery of environmental outcomes. Rather 
than representing a contradiction to collaboration, sub-contracting might be located 
within the collaborative governance ‘toolbox’ of Scott and Thomas (2017) design for 
problem-solving.  
Furthermore, although the findings on the coordinators’ impact might suggest that more 
funding should be allocated for this position, it stands as a partial explanation for the 
impact of collaboration. Other variables mentioned by the stakeholders interviewed to 
test the impact of collaboration were the informal relationships developed between the 
regional actors as well as the levels of cohesion between the regional stakeholders. For 
these variables, it would be appropriate to develop proxy variables in further studies. 
For example, examining informal relationships and levels of cohesion would imply 
relying on a different evaluation framework that involves network analysis, and a 
different governance definition that includes informal collaboration in its governance 
conceptualisation. Hence, this remains an area for further research.  
Regulations were mentioned as having a role in the water quality outcomes achieved 
by only one of the stakeholders interviewed. The effect of regulations, however, was not 
identified either by the stakeholders or by the official documents. Kroon et al (2016) 
highlight that the state government suspended enforcing the regulations in 2012, and 
there were no assessments about their effectiveness.  
Overall, the main contributions of this chapter are the development of the typology of 
NRM regions and the proposal to use a specific collaborative role (e.g. coordinators or 
extension officers) to deal with the difficulty in attributing the environmental outcomes 
to a tangible element of the collaborative governance approaches. The typology serves 
to contextualise the nature of the water quality problem and the different impact on water 
quality in each NRM region. The coordinators proxy variable contributes to address part 
of a gap encountered by previous research (Ulibarri, 2015). “The less proximate 
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outcomes are to the collaborative action or the more dependent they are on other 
contributing or intervening factors, the more difficult it is to attribute the specific outcomes 
directly to collaborative efforts” (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 724).  
In other words, the chapter puts forward a tangible variable of a rather abstract shaping 
factor such as collaborative governance that could reduce the uncertainty on the 
relationship between less proximate outcomes (e.g. environmental outcomes) and the 
collaborative intervention (as Figure 6.14 shows). Nonetheless, given the lack of a linear 
correlation between more coordinators and more percentage reductions of pollutant 
loads, it is only possible to suggest that the existence of extension officers might partially 
contribute to a better achievement of environmental outcomes, in this case the water 
quality conditions.  
On the other hand, the water quality outcomes achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan through 
Reef Rescue depended on six external factors that each region experienced to a 
different degree. Developing ways to measure these external factors is a further 
research area. Three of them seemed to have a closer connection to the regional water 
quality outcomes achieved: staff skills, data standards and market shifts. Staff skills 
might have contributed to develop more sophisticated data collection methods that 
resulted in better water quality outcomes reported. Price changes of agricultural inputs 
as well as products due to shifts in international demand and supply on agriculture 
activities (driven mainly by profit performance) would have also motivated significant 
changes in land management practices that led to better water quality outcomes.  
Regarding the other three external factors, weather events, land area/land use and time-
frame of the water quality plan, their impact seems less direct and difficult to grasp. 
Cyclones and floods were experienced by all the NRM regions during the five year 
period of the policy (2008-2013); hence, their impact appears less significant when 
exploring the different regional water quality outcomes, and land area/land-use as well 
as the time-frame of the policy remain initial conditions of the plan, which cannot be 
modified.   
From the water quality outcomes achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan compared with the 
original targets, it could be inferred that the performance of regional collaborative 
governance — following our approach of analysing governance based on its outcomes, 
as Rotberg (2014) suggests — fell short of the expectations as the outcome figures 
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were far from the original targets. However, the figures on the outcomes are based on 
estimates, which do not allow any conclusive statements about governance. Moreover, 
the NRM regions were subject to the same water quality targets despite their different 
contexts, shown by the typology of NRM regions.  
Perhaps, a more effective policy would consider the contexts and, accordingly, develop 
targets suited to the differing regional contexts. Focusing on the different impact of 
regional collaborative governance, though, the main implication is to highlight that 
through more collaboration, rather than more funding for on-ground delivery, it is more 
likely that better results could have be achieved. This hints at the need to introduce 
governance reforms to the collaborative planning efforts. For instance, develop closer 
ties between the NRM groups and the regional industry bodies as well as between the 
NRM groups themselves. 
The need for governance reform has also been presented by Brodie and Pearson 
(2016), who argue for the need of developing more coordinated efforts when 
implementing natural resource plans. In this regard, the governance modifications could 
include the promotion of collaborative approaches that include extension strategies to 
motivate the participation of landholders. The type of extension strategies or methods, 
though, needs more research. Governance reform of collaboration should also offer 
greater access to the regional stakeholders in the deliberation about the 
implementation decisions developed at federal and state levels of governance, such as 
the water quality targets and the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. While other 
studies (Leach and Pelkey, 2001; Koontz and Newig, 2014) have found that funds 
for on-ground delivery are decisive to improve environmental outcomes, in the regions 
analysed in this study, funding did not have the most significant impact in the outcomes 
achieved. Hence, it emphasises the importance of improving the collaborative 
approach, regardless of the funding available. 
Additionally, with similar funding or at least through a consensus-based process where 
all the stakeholders are involved in deciding the funding allocation, the regions might 
be able to collaborate closer between them during the implementation process. This 
could also avoid developing feelings of resentment and unfairness amongst 
stakeholders. This analysis, however, is limited by the reluctance of the stakeholders 
interviewed in providing details about implementation approaches and comparing them 
to other regions. For instance, the stakeholders avoided discussing thoroughly aspects 
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of their regional collaboration as compared with those of the other regions. This type 
of information is also absent from the official documents.  
Additionally, the analysis of the coordinators proxy as a measure of the impact of 
collaborative governance needs further refinement. For instance, expand the use of this 
variable in more than one policy, and develop a method to include the level of skills of 
the coordinators. The proxy variable would deliver more certainty if it combines the 
number of coordinators and their skills. It would also be worth examining their effect in 
other collaborative environmental policies, either from Australian or international cases.  
The next chapter presents the examination of the general collaborative governance 
approach, which includes the other levels of governance involved in 2009 Reef Plan 
implementation. It highlights the strengths and weakness of collaboration as well as the 
tensions found within this governance approach.  
139  
CHAPTER 7: HOW GOVERNANCE PROCESSES IMPACT ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES: A PROCESS-OUTCOME 
GOVERNANCE EVALUATION OF COLLABORATION IN THE GBR 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the role of collaboration in the achievement of water 
quality outcomes for the Great Barrier Reef. It also analysed the impact of the NRM 
regional collaborative approaches on the different regional water quality outcomes 
achieved. The analysis of the impact of the regional collaborative approaches on the 
regional water quality outcomes was complemented with contextual elements of the 
NRM regions — such as the typology of NRM regions and governance structures of the 
NRM bodies — to understand how they achieved different water quality outcomes. This 
chapter focuses on the general evaluation of the collaborative governance effort, 
including not only the regional level as in the previous chapter, but also the state and 
federal levels that were involved in the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan (the ‘zoom 
out’ phase of Figure 3.3, Chapter 3). The evaluation focuses on 2009 Reef Plan and 
Reef Rescue, the main implementation strategy of the plan, to provide an answer to the 
research question: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the collaborative 
governance approach? 
For this purpose, the analysis relies on the governance evaluation framework selected 
for this study (Chapter 3). The framework includes processes and outcome-oriented 
approaches of governance evaluation, as it allows disaggregating the processes of 
collaboration to see how they impacted on the water quality outcomes achieved by the 
2009 Reef Plan. Throughout the process-outcome analysis, two main tensions were 
identified: 1) providing incentives for behaviour change while promoting regulations; and 
2) using a collaborative approach while, simultaneously, relying on competition to 
achieve the outcomes. The results of the study show that collaborative governance had 
an overall positive impact in facilitating achievement of water quality outcomes (a similar 
trend found in Chapter 4). This suggests that stronger collaboration would benefit 
environmental planning and policy efforts, leading to better environmental outcomes. In 
other words, enhanced collaborative governance would more likely facilitate than hinder 
the achievement of environmental outcomes. However, given the uncertainty identified 
in the previous chapter, and highlighted by Figure 7.1, regarding the links between 
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governance processes, outputs and consequences (e.g. outcomes), the research 
recognises that enhancing collaboration would not automatically lead to improved 
environmental results. This means that there is no causal relationship between 
governance processes, outputs and consequences (which cover the water quality 
outcomes studied in this thesis). Other variables such as the external factors identified 
in Chapter 6 (staff skills, market shifts, land area and weather events) have to be taken 
into account, as they also have an influence on the outcomes.  
Figure 7.1 Evaluation of the governance process in the implementation of 2009 
Reef Plan (adapted from Rauschmayer et al., 2009). 
It is important to present briefly what is understood by each of the processes of the 
collaborative governance process criteria (the large circle in Figure 7.1). For this reason, 
I present a table that includes each process criteria with an explanation of the concept 
based on the literature. Table 7.1 shows the concepts of the governance process criteria 
and their explanation. 
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Table 7.1 Brief review of the collaborative governance processes 
 
Stakeholder 
engagement 
Defined as the “process where individuals, groups and organisations choose to take an active 
role in making decisions that affect them” (Reed, 2008, p. 2418). Including all the key 
stakeholders, particularly from non-state sectors, is a key feature of collaborative governance, 
according to Ansell and Gash (2008). Generally, stakeholder engagement is assumed to lead 
to more legitimate governance processes that render a sense of ownership to the parties 
involved. This sense of ownership is what motivates the stakeholders to work together and 
achieve mutual goals (Lachapelle and McCool, 2005). It is not clear, as stated in the literature 
review (Chapter 3), if more engagement leads to better results in planning and policy 
processes of collaboration. Engagement processes are usually characterised by power 
inequalities between the stakeholders, allowing some actors the possibility to veto the 
process. Deep power differences can transform engagement processes into ‘talk shops’ where 
decisions are delayed (Reed, 2008). Debate continues about what constitutes a legitimate 
stakeholder as interests, needs and priorities are continually changing (Brody, 2003).  
Coordination Aside from engaging with stakeholders, implementing a plan or policy collaboratively also 
requires coordination, which refers to the degree of alignment or integration between policies 
and plans of different actors (Higgins et al., 2014). In the collaborative governance literature 
within environmental planning and policy, there has been little focus on this coordinative 
aspect, with few theoretical or practical discussions. Morrison et al. (2004) is one of the few 
studies that have focused on discussing the coordination aspect of collaboration. Contrary to 
the present study, Morrison et al. (2004) consider coordination as an element of integration. 
Coordination is one of the most challenging aspects of collaborative governance, given the 
fragmentation between government levels in federal systems such as Australia, and the 
consequent difficulty of defining their roles and responsibilities (Higgins et al., 2014). 
Cooperation is a key part of the coordinating aspect within collaboration as it is the “process 
where parties with similar interests plan together, negotiate mutual roles and share resources 
to achieve joint goals but maintain separate identities” (Morrison et al., 2004, p. 248). 
Regulations The literature on collaborative governance includes regulations as part of the key aspects of 
this approach: despite the apparent contradiction of using regulations to collaborate. Through 
pragmatic lenses, regulations are believed to underpin and reinforce collaborative efforts, and 
rules should even be developed through collaboration (Ansell, 2012). Regulations belong 
more to top-down or hierarchical governance approaches (Jessop, 2011). However, this policy 
instrument has been incorporated in network or collaborative governance approaches as 
regulations are considered necessary to underpin collaborative governance efforts in 
environmental policy and planning. For instance, Scott and Thomas, (2017) include 
regulations in their conceptualisation of collaborative governance, arguing that this instrument 
is fundamental in collaborative processes. This view is also shared by Emerson et al. (2012), 
who include regulations in their collaborative governance concept and practice. 
Public 
participation 
Public participation is different to stakeholder engagement as it refers to a wider form of 
participation. Stakeholder engagement involves the people directly involved in the 
environmental planning issue, while public participation seeks to include the general citizens 
located in the area of the issue, whether it is a community, region or city. Supporting public 
inclusion is the argument that citizens or communities that depend more on a given natural 
resource are the ones with the least say on how that resource should be used (Buchy and 
Race, 2001). Instead of offering a pragmatic benefit, public participation renders more a 
democratic quality to the governance process, allowing the possibility to redistribute power to 
those actors that usually lack any power (McCool and Guthrie, 2001). 
Learning Learning occurs mainly when stakeholders engage and when the public participates in NRM 
planning, but also through open and representative decision-making processes. Apart from 
underpinning behaviour change, another role of public learning is to generate knowledge by 
transferring it between the members of the community. Considered one of the beneficial 
products in the deliberations between stakeholders and the community, learning is 
emphasised in the NRM literature as a tool for solving problems that complements the 
traditional technical responses (Muro and Jeffrey, 2008). Local knowledge is prioritised in this 
process. Similar to the other governance elements, there is limited research about the role and 
impact of learning within natural resource planning and management. 
Decentralisation Devolving responsibility for the delivery of environmental outcomes to local levels is also 
known as decentralisation. This is another important aspect within collaborative governance 
processes, in which state actors usually delegate implementation of environmental plans and 
policies to non-state actors at lower levels. In the context of GBR natural resource planning, 
delegation to non-state actors such as the NRM groups and the agriculture industry groups 
entails a decentralisation of power from the centre to regional and local levels. The process fits 
with the ‘subsidiarity’ principle, which states that lower levels of governance are in a better 
position to deal with regional or local issues as they are closer to the issues and, therefore, 
their knowledge is decisive (Marshall, 2007). Or as Wyborn and Bixler (2013) argue “the 
relevant principle, sometimes called the subsidiarity principle, may be phrased thus: the goal 
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should be as much local solution as possible and only so much government regulation as 
necessary” (p. 59).  
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. First, I present the methods of data analysis 
followed in the process-outcomes evaluation on the impact of collaborative governance 
on environmental outcomes. I order them separately for practical purposes, explaining 
first the process-oriented evaluation and then the outcome-oriented evaluation. The 
second part focuses on the results of the evaluation, where I follow the same structure 
as in the methods section, organising the results in process-oriented and outcome-
oriented. However, both refer to the same evaluation process I used to analyse the 
impact of collaborative governance on the water quality outcomes of my case study.  
The collaborative governance processes are classified as positive, negative and neutral, 
in terms of what aspects facilitated or blocked the achievement of water quality 
outcomes. The third part discusses the results; relating the findings to the literature and 
identifying the outcome-oriented evaluation, identifying the strengths and weaknesses 
of the collaborative governance approach in its achievement of water quality outcomes. 
Finally, the main findings are summarised in the conclusion. 
7.2 Methods  
The examination of collaborative governance processes is based on the six 
collaborative governance processes criteria developed in Chapter 4 (Table 4.4). 
However, I added two more collaborative governance processes — incentives and 
competition — that are relevant for the case study. See Table 7.2 for more detail. 
 
Table 7.2 Modified collaborative governance criteria on the impact of 
collaborative governance on environmental outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
Collaborative governance criteria  
  
1. Stakeholder engagement 
2. Coordination 
3. Participation 
4. Learning 
5. Regulations 
6. Decentralisation 
7. Incentives* 
8. Competition* 
*The researcher added two more elements to the criteria that are specific to the Reef case study: 7) incentives and 
8) competition. 
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Following Rauschmayer et al. (2009), this study uses the two governance evaluation 
approaches (processes and outcomes) for a ‘substantive’ as well as an ‘instrumental’ 
reason. The substantive reason, argues Rauschmayer et al. (2009), identifies obstacles 
to implementation such as the information considered or ignored; the depth of 
deliberation during the collaborative approach; or the potential conflicts among the 
stakeholders. The analysis refers to these implementation obstacles as the weaknesses 
of the collaborative approach. The instrumental reason promotes a learning process 
among the actors and organisations involved that facilitates the governance process. 
The study refers to this learning process as the strengths of the collaboration, after the 
planning intervention took place.  
In the end, this might contribute to improvements such as addressing the weaknesses 
of the collaborative governance arrangements for implementing water quality plans. 
Rauschmayer et al. (2009) add a ‘normative’ reason for combining processes and 
outcome-oriented evaluations, which refer to principles of good governance. In this 
study, normative valorisations, such as principles, are not considered: the focus here is 
on identifying the strengths and weaknesses of collaborative governance in plan 
implementation, rather than providing a good governance diagnosis.  
The process-outcomes governance evaluation uses the stakeholder perspectives 
obtained from the semi-structured interviews, and the water quality data from the 2009 
Reef Plan monitoring. The process-oriented assessment is based on rankings from the 
interviewees about the eight aspects of the collaborative criteria (Table 7.2). The 
assessment criteria relies on the perceptions of stakeholders, which are designated by 
Rauschmayer et al. (2009) as empirical research, constituting one of the two main 
sources for assessing collaborative or participatory governance processes. The 
outcome-oriented evaluation is positioned as the consequence of these processes and 
this evaluation identified the impact of collaborative processes in terms of being positive, 
neutral or negative for the achievement of environmental outcomes. The outcome-
oriented analysis discusses the effectiveness of the planning intervention based on the 
governance processes. Effectiveness is viewed as the difference between the water 
quality plan targets and the water quality outcomes.  
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7.2.1 Process-oriented evaluation 
The evaluation of collaborative governance processes uses the set of criteria presented 
in Table 7.2 of this chapter of collaborative governance in environmental policy and 
planning. The assessment criteria integrate the key aspects of collaborative governance 
that have been examined by previous studies in the environmental policy and planning 
domains. For the purpose of the process-based evaluation, a set of statements for each 
criterion were assessed by the stakeholders interviewed. The assessment of the 
statements was done based on a five point Likert scale: Strongly Agree; Agree; Neutral; 
Disagree; and Strongly Disagree (5=Strongly Agree; 1=Strongly Disagree).  
Figure 7.2 shows the scale in more detail. The results were analysed using Excel to 
group the results from the Likert scale and obtain the percentages on the views of the 
stakeholders regarding the collaborative governance processes. The results are 
presented using radar graphs. Each process of collaboration included a number of 
statements that focused on the implementation phase of planning and their impact on 
the water quality outcomes. The set of statements assessed by the interviewees is 
shown in Appendix E. 
 
 
 
 
0                      1                           2                               3                                  4                                    5 
Figure 7.2 Rank of collaborative processes on their impact on environmental 
outcomes. 
Reponses to these statements were obtained from twenty one interviewees6  that were 
directly involved in either: the implementation of 2009 Reef Plan and Reef Rescue 
throughout 2008 to 2013; the final stages of the program; or had detailed knowledge of 
program implementation and results. Interviewees included: federal government; state 
government; regional NRM bodies; agriculture industry; conservation sector; and 
academic sectors. In this section, the study complements each of the collaborative 
criterions with comments made by the same 21 interviewees to illustrate or reinforce 
their views. The analysis links the results from the interviewees with previous 
international studies to compare the evidence, and to provide an additional benchmark 
                                                          
6 Contrary to the previous chapter, where 22 stakeholders participated, in this part of the study 21 
participants collaborated as one participant preferred not to answer the statements. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
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from the scientific literature. Table 7.3 presents the distribution of participants per 
stakeholder group as well as its interview codes. 
 
Table 7.3 Distribution of participants in the general evaluation of collaborative 
governance and its impact on environmental outcomes. 
 
Stakeholder group No. of participants Interview code 
Agriculture industry 3 AI1; AI2; AI3 
Conservation sector 1 CS1 
Federal government 1 FG1 
Regional NRM bodies 11 RB1; RB2; RB3; RB4; RB5; RB6; 
RB7; RB8; RB9; RB10; RB11 
State government 4 SG1; SG2; SG3; SG4 
Academic sector 1 AS1 
Total 21  
 
 
7.2.2 Outcome-oriented evaluation 
Through different paths, good governance processes promote good governance 
(Stirling, 2006). Moreover, “the governance process will shape the outcomes and 
therefore becomes intimately wrapped up with the process” (Peters, 2016, p. 310). Most 
likely, good processes of collaboration produce good outcomes such as social or 
environmental improvements (Innes and Booher, 1999; and Carr et al., 2012). In this 
evaluation, I argue that improved governance processes would very likely contribute to 
achieve better water quality outcomes. Or, conversely, that issues in the governance 
processes contribute to block the achievement of the expected water quality outcomes.  
For this study, good governance facilitates or enables the achievement of expected 
environmental outcomes, which improve the environmental health of the 
area/ecosystem intervened (environmental outcomes become the benchmark to which 
governance processes are compared). Rotberg (2014) suggests good governance 
means being effective at achieving the targets of an environmental plan or policy, based 
on the governance processes that drive or steer a plan, such as the water quality plan 
of interest here. The outcome-oriented evaluation is done backwards. From the final 
results, the water quality outcomes, to the processes in order to offer a more detailed 
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picture than the one offered by the water quality data. In other words, I present the 
collaborative governance story behind the numbers (see Table 7.4 for the water quality 
outcomes achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan).  
The governance developments behind the environmental outcomes would allow a better 
understanding of how collaboration contributed to the achievements of the water quality 
plan. This assessment is based on the stakeholder perspectives regarding the 
governance processes. The participants’ perceptions represent a second measure, 
additional to the official water quality data, to complement the analysis around the 
effectiveness of collaboration. They represent indirect measures of the environmental 
outcomes in outcome-oriented governance evaluations (Mandarano, 2008). The 
purpose is to offer more clarity on the link (featured in Figure 7.1) between the 
collaborative governance processes, its output and consequences (e.g. environmental 
outcomes). This might reduce the uncertainty that characterises complex environmental 
issues, such as water quality. 
Table 7.4 Water quality outcomes achieved per NRM group in the 2009 Reef Plan 
(Queensland Government, 2014). 
 
NRM Group  Reduce nitrogen by 
50% (by 2013) 
Reduce sediment by 20% 
(by 2020) 
Reduce pesticides by 
50% (by 2013) 
Overall 
water quality 
condition 
Big/Dry/Graze 
NQ Dry 
Tropics 
10% 16% 13% Moderate 
FBA 3% 4% 5% Poor 
Small/Tropical/Sugar 
Reef 
Catchments 
17% 9% 42% Moderate 
Terrain 
NRM 
8% 13% 26% Poor 
Medium/Tropical/Mild 
Burnett-
Mary 
15% 3% 28% Poor 
Cape York 6% 8% 0 Moderate 
GBR 
catchment 
10% (low contribution 
in reducing nitrogen, 
not even half the 
target) 
11% (moderate 
contribution, a bit more 
than half the target was 
met; longer time-frame) 
28% (moderate 
contribution, a bit 
more than half of the 
target was met) 
 
Poor 
7.3 Results 
The results of the general evaluation of the case study are presented in two parts. The 
first one presents the results of process-oriented collaborative governance evaluation, 
which is based on each collaborative governance process of the criteria used by this 
study (Table 7.2). The second part links the results of the process-oriented with the 
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outcome-oriented in order to provide the general picture of the impact of collaborative 
governance on water quality outcomes achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan (Table 7.4). 
7.3.1 Process-oriented evaluation 
7.3.1.1 Stakeholder engagement 
The purpose of assessing stakeholder engagement was to explore the extent to which 
the involvement of key stakeholders in the implementation of Reef Rescue contributed 
to the achievement of the 2009 Reef Plan water quality targets. In the responses, 
however, there is no clear differentiation between the engagement on plan development 
and plan implementation. It was seen by the interviewees as a continuum that led to the 
results of the program. Within the process evaluation, stakeholders rated three 
statements that explored the impact of stakeholder engagement on water quality 
outcomes (see Appendix E for more detail). Given the focus of my study is on the 
relationship between governance and environmental outcomes, the assessments on the 
quality of engagement or the sense of ownership from the process were considered out 
of scope of this study.  
There was consensus among the stakeholder views on the positive contribution of 
engaging stakeholders. Around 57% of the respondents strongly agreed on the 
statement that the stakeholders were engaged during implementation and that this led 
to better water quality outcomes. The rest agreed on this statement and none of the 
respondents strongly disagreed. This supported one of the objectives of the 2009 Reef 
Plan: to use a partnership approach for developing and implementing the plan 
(Queensland Government, 2009). Figure 7.3 shows the distribution of stakeholder 
rankings for each statement of the stakeholder engagement process. Most respondents 
(around 90%), emphasised that the engagement between regional NRM bodies and 
regional industry groups was the major contributor for better achievements. Interviewee 
RB7 argued that the level of stakeholder engagement was unparalleled: 
“This was the first time in terms of Reef investment or Reef intervention that we actually 
had multiple stakeholders actually trying to work together. It certainly wasn't perfect by any 
stretch, but at least we had industry, we had NRM on the same page, and working towards 
the same goals. It is the first time it happened at that scale, whole of Reef.” 
This confirms, as discussed in Chapter 6, that collaboration at the regional level (rather 
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than state or federal) had the most decisive impact on the outcomes. On the other hand, 
collaboration of the conservation sector — represented by an international conservation 
NGO — occurred mainly during the development of the 2009 Reef Plan. Their role was 
minimal during implementation.  
 
Figure 7.3 Stakeholder rankings of the statements on stakeholder engagement. 
One purpose of stakeholder engagement is information sharing. In Chapter 6, 
interviewee RB8 commented that exchanging information was the main benefit of the 
collaborative approach. The exchange occurred through a vertical process, from the 
federal level towards the regional and local levels, rather than horizontal, such as 
between regions or from the local level and upwards. A respondent from the regional 
NRM sector (RB9) supported this approach by stating that information was a one-way 
process that did not promote a two-way dialogue: 
“Just because the stakeholders were informed doesn't mean they chose to inform 
themselves, so the level of understanding that was achieved, you know, I might tell you 
something but it doesn't mean you hear me or understand me, so you need that feedback, 
that dialogue. Consultation has gotta be two-way." 
Most of the respondents (86%) agreed or strongly agreed that the stakeholders were 
informed periodically about implementation progress (Figure 7.3). Two remained neutral 
about this statement and one disagreed with the information sharing process in place. 
The respondents, on the other hand, did not provide details about the means or tools 
used to share information. In addition, they did not differentiate between formal or 
informal channels of exchange. In this regard, respondent RB7 explained that the 
0
1
2
3
4
5
AI1
AI2
AI3
CS1
FG1
RB1
RB2
RB3
RB4
RB5
RB6RB7
RB8
RB9
RB10
RB11
SG1
SG2
SG3
SG4
AS1
Stakeholder Engagement
Engaging
Informing
Power
Divergence
149  
process of sharing information was “patchy.” There was no explicit objective in the 2009 
Reef Plan about information sharing, although it was embedded in the partnership 
approach in the form of close stakeholder consultations that should have been followed 
during implementation. 
The views regarding differences in power and access to resources among stakeholders 
as not affecting the achievement of water quality outcomes reduce the beneficial impact 
that stakeholder engagement had in the Reef Plan. In this regard, 62% of the 
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that different power levels as well as 
access to resources between the stakeholders did not have an impact on the 
achievement of the water quality outcomes (Figure 7.3). These respondents considered 
that power divergences were evident and they had a negative impact on the 
implementation of the plan. However, they were careful not to identify the powerful 
actors that benefited from this perceived power imbalance. Of the responses, 24% 
though agreed or strongly agreed that power differences between stakeholders did not 
influence the achievement of water quality outcomes. However, 14% of responses 
remained neutral.  
In terms of access to resources and power, the federal and state governments were the 
most powerful actors, although it is not clear that they gained the most benefit from the 
water quality outcomes achieved, particularly since water quality is still a pressing 
environmental planning issue. The other powerful actor, the agriculture industry, 
seemed the one that gained most from the outcomes, as it did not compromise as much 
as was expected in terms of practice change. This was not supported by the interviews, 
but the evidence for this could be based on the agriculture land management practice 
outcomes for grazing, sugar cane and horticulture that fell short of the original targets 
(Queensland Government, 2014).  
Nonetheless, interviewee AI1 from the agriculture sector said that the NRM bodies had 
more power as they administered the funds of Reef Rescue: 
“Certain industries had limits to the incentives they could access and some of the practice 
change had more of a public than a private benefit (e.g. fencing areas), which didn’t have 
the profitability expected by the agriculture industry.”  
Aside from this, land management practice changes led to less profitability for some 
industries and had more public than private benefits. Interviewee SG1 explained, on the 
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other hand, that the resources such as funding were not available to all potential 
providers. Some funds were allocated without clear water quality outcomes evident. 
Nonetheless, the respondents preferred to avoid any political discussion about the 
matter. In this statement, the general agreement was that divergences in power and 
resources represented a barrier for the achievement of the environmental outcomes of 
the plan.  
7.3.1.2 Coordination 
For practical purposes in the GBR context, coordinating is considered as dealing with 
the alignment and integration between the efforts at the federal, state, regional and local 
governance levels. Integrating the efforts requires cooperation from all the governance 
levels involved as well as defining clearly the responsibilities between the stakeholders 
at each governance level.  
Around 71% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that stakeholder’s 
responsibilities were clearly defined. The rest remained neutral or disagreed (see Figure 
7.4 for more detail). Respondents felt that this aspect worked out well in Reef Rescue’s 
implementation because, as interviewee FG1 explained, they were contracted to 
perform specific roles. For instance, the regional NRM bodies were selected to deliver 
the water quality grants. These entities, for their part, engaged, along with the regional 
industry groups, the landholders by awarding them the grants to improve land 
management practices. This also points out to the limited nature of collaboration, which 
was viewed in practice as a working relationship supported by contracts, more 
contractual than relationship-building oriented.  
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Figure 7.4 Stakeholder rankings of the statements on coordination. 
Figure 7.4 combines the five statements that focus on the extent of cooperation from 
the federal, state and regional levels when implementing the 2009 Reef Plan, as well as 
the clear definition of responsibilities among these governance levels. Most of the 
respondents (67%) agreed or strongly agreed that the federal government effectively 
cooperated in implementing the plan’s objectives. The respondents recognised this 
cooperation as adopting a top-down or hierarchical form through which this stakeholder 
provided the funding for Reef Rescue. With the state government cooperation, there 
were mixed views among the respondents. Around half (42%) agreed or strongly agreed 
that this stakeholder cooperated with the planning effort as it also provided funds; but 
more than half disagreed (29%) or were neutral (29%) about this cooperative role due 
to the fact that the state government introduced regulations unilaterally during the 
implementation process.  
Some of the interviewees that disagreed suggested leaving aside this stakeholder from 
the collaborative scheme as they halted rather than promoted coordination. At the 
regional level, there was consensus about the effective cooperation between the 
regional NRM bodies and the agriculture sector (90% agreed or strongly agreed on this 
statement). This reinforces the view — discussed in Chapter 6 as well as with the 
evaluation of stakeholder engagement — that regional collaboration was the most 
important for implementing the water quality plan. Finally, the evaluation shows a 
general agreement regarding the fifth statement on cooperation among all the 
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stakeholders (95% agreed or strongly agreed on this statement). This renders the 
impression that the stakeholders were satisfied with the level of cooperation between 
them and, in turn, comfortable with how coordination unfolded in the 2009 Reef Plan. It 
must be noted, however, that this satisfaction refers mostly to the federal and regional 
levels. The state government was viewed as an outsider that disrupted the coordinative 
effort through the regulations. As interviewee RB7 stated: 
“So we had Reef Rescue, which was a voluntary program, primarily about incentives, and 
then what happened at the same time is the state government introduced regulation, and 
there was no, there was little thought given to how you might integrate and deliver these 
two programs. So the regulation caused an enormous amount of discontent in the industry 
and, actually, made engagement around Reef Rescue very difficult.” 
7.3.1.3 Regulations and Incentives 
Apart from engaging public and private stakeholders and seeking to coordinate the 
outputs of these engagements, another important aspect of the collaborative process is 
regulations. Regulations were used as part of the tools to implement the 2009 Reef 
Plan. They were targeted to sugarcane and grazing land uses, the largest agricultural 
land uses as shown by Figure 5.3, Chapter 5. As it was stated in previous chapters, 
Reef Rescue consisted in providing incentives to change the behaviour of landholders. 
The program represented the ‘carrot’, while the regulations were the ‘stick’ of the water 
planning effort. For that reason, in this section the key regulatory aspect of collaboration 
is contrasted with incentives in order to find out how the stakeholders viewed the 
combination of these policy instruments. In their evaluation, the stakeholders highlighted 
the existence of tension between the simultaneous use of regulations and incentives.  
Although some of the interviewees mentioned that these two instruments complemented 
each other, Figure 7.5 shows that, in more than half of the rankings (52%), incentives 
and regulations opposed each other, highlighting the tense relationship found between 
these two measures for changing landholders’ behaviour. This opposition is illustrated 
by the contrasting positions of blue and red lines in Figure 7.3, where stakeholders that 
strongly agreed or agreed that voluntary adoption of practices led to better water quality 
results, at the same time, disagreed or strongly disagreed that regulations also 
promoted the achievement of better water quality outcomes. Others preferred to remain 
neutral about the regulations, although they agreed or strongly agreed on incentives. In 
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the rest, respondents prefer to remain neutral with either tools, or agreeing on both. Only 
one respondent disagreed on incentives and agreed on regulations.  
The interviewees from the state level explained that as a governance design, it makes 
sense that regulations complement incentives, as enforcement instruments are 
designed to change the behaviour of those that are not motivated by the incentives. 
However, during the implementation of the water quality plan, the introduction of 
regulations generated anger and distrust among the regional and industry stakeholders. 
As interviewee AI1 explained: 
“Some farmers are probably going, well, why am I going to make this investment in my farm 
if you’re only going to regulate me? Why am I going to put all this money? So there were 
issues there.” 
The regulatory measures were introduced without any form of consultation or 
collaboration by the state government. This unilateral decision reduced the momentum 
of the 2009 Reef Plan and Reef Rescue implementation strategy. The general 
perception among the respondents was that they had a negative impact of the 
achievement of the water quality outcomes. This view is illustrated by interviewee RB6: 
“Nobody likes being told what to do, so it's about people making decisions themselves, and 
sometimes you need to incentivise what you're trying to get them to do to get them to take 
that step. Now, when we talk about best management practices and that teaching people 
that there's a two-fold outcome: they can profit by better use of land and, in turn, you can 
get an environmental outcome as well. That's the key thing. For some of the groups, you 
need to be able to offer incentives that make them decide what the projects are and what 
they're going to do, because every landholder will have a list of projects: it's about you 
changing the priorities by offering incentives.” 
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Figure 7.5 Stakeholder rankings on the impact of incentives and regulation tools 
in achieving water quality outcomes. 
 
More than half of the interviewees argued that the decision to introduce regulations 
during Reef Rescue implementation were due to political motives. Although the same 
political party was in power at the state and federal levels, the governments had different 
agendas and objectives. In a sense, the uncoordinated efforts and power inequities from 
both levels of government (in which the state government was viewed as the non-
cooperative and ‘outsider’ actor) led to a negative impact of regulations. In other words, 
the lack of coordination and power divergences between the levels of governance found 
in the previous evaluation sections added to a fail attempt at regulating land 
management practices. The most adverse reaction to regulations came from the 
regional level, such as the regional NRM bodies and the regional agriculture industry, 
who considered that this ‘stick’ instrument promoted fear and reluctance to change 
among the industry: 
“I’m a strong believer regulations don’t work. I don’t care who the individual is nobody likes 
being told what to do, so it’s about people making decisions themselves, and sometimes 
you need to incentivise what you’re trying to get them to do to get them to take that step” 
(RB5).  
Interviewee SG2 added that, overall, it was not possible to evaluate the different impact 
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of regulations and incentives on land practice change and water quality outcomes. 
Official evaluations only accounted for total behaviour change of landholders as the 
evaluation tools available did not allow to examine the individual impact of each policy 
instrument on the plan results. 
In line with the first statement, on the view that regulations ineffectively promoted 
compliance with the Reef plan’s objectives, most of the respondents were neutral (24%) 
or disagreed (38%) that the regulatory tools increased understanding of practice change 
(see Figure 7.6). Two of them declined to rate this statement (RB2 and RB3); arguing 
that they did not have sufficient knowledge to answer it (this explains the absence of 
two points in the radar of Figure 7.6 regarding the understanding aspect). The rest of 
the respondents (29%) agreed on this statement, which suggests that while they 
understood the objective of regulating, they did not agree with its purpose of promoting 
practice change. 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Stakeholder rankings of statements of regulations. 
 
The evaluation of the regulatory aspect of collaboration included a statement focused 
on the regional level of collaboration led by the regional NRM bodies. It was designed 
to evaluate the role of this non-profit institution in the implementation and achievement 
of water quality outcomes. It is worth explaining that the NRM bodies are non-statutory 
collaborative organisations, which in practice means that they their outputs or actions 
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have no legal binding. If they were statutory organisations that had legal power, perhaps 
they would be able to achieve better environmental outcomes.  
However, only 23% of respondents agreed with the view that becoming statutory 
organisations would lead to improved achievement of water quality outcomes. Obtaining 
the percentage views from Figure 7.6, most of the stakeholders thought (57% disagreed 
or strongly disagreed) that the shift from non-statutory to statutory bodies would have a 
negative impact on the water quality outcomes, mainly because they would lose 
legitimacy and trust at their regional level. Becoming a statutory body would make them 
appear as a government institution rather than the community nature that the non-
statutory condition grants them. This view reinforces the overall negative impact 
attributed to regulatory tools in the water quality planning efforts.  
Finally, contrary to the negative impact attributed to regulations, there was consensus 
between the respondents (95% agreed or strongly agreed) that providing incentives 
effectively drove practice change among the landholders. This highlights the positive 
stakeholder view on the incentives, and the reason why most of them were comfortable 
with Reef Rescue. Only interviewee AI3 disagreed with this statement, explaining that 
what actually drove land practice change of landholders was a previous culture of land 
stewardship as well as opportunities to gain more profits. However, this does not 
contradict the second statement on incentives, as incentives can be seen as a form of 
profit for the agriculture industry.   
7.3.1.4 Public participation 
In this study, public participation is viewed as an aspect that reinforces collaboration by 
including the views of the citizens, or the community, in the solution of the natural 
resource planning problem. Figure 7.7 indicates the response ratings from the 
interviewees, in which there was partial consensus on the view that the interests of the 
citizens within the regions were not incorporated in the water quality plan. 71% of the 
responses strongly disagreed, disagreed or remained neutral about the inclusion of 
public participation in the implementation of the program.  
Moreover, 14% of them were even surprised by this statement as they pondered that 
public participation was not required in the planning process, either at the development 
or implementation stages. Respondents from the regional NRM sector and the state 
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government, nonetheless, perceived that citizens were included in the implementation 
process. On the other hand, while the public did not participate directly in Reef Rescue, 
in the majority of the respondents’ view (52%) suggested at least it was informed about 
the progress of the program and this was beneficial for the water quality outcomes 
achieved. However 48% disagreed or remained neutral on the second statement, 
explaining that citizens were informed periodically through raising-awareness events 
developed by the NRM groups as well as through their newsletters; however, it was not 
clear for them if this had any beneficial impact on the water quality outcomes achieved. 
 
Figure 7.7 Stakeholder rankings of the statements on public participation. 
 
7.3.1.5 Learning 
One of the expected benefits of collaboration is the process of learning that it allows. 
Through collaborating and sharing information, the actors learn from their planning 
experiences to improve them in the future, such as adopting better practices, re-define 
objectives and goals, or improve communication between the stakeholders. In the 
stakeholder engagement aspect, it was highlighted that the information exchanged 
between the stakeholders was the main benefit during 2009 Reef Plan implementation. 
Information sharing, on its part, promotes the learning process that facilitates 
adaptability, which is required when dealing with complex issues, such water quality in 
a large ecosystem.  
Either promoted by collaboration or not, it seems that since 2003, the stakeholders of 
Reef’s water quality planning have been involved in a learning process. This is illustrated 
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by the three subsequent GBR water quality plans over 2003 to 2013, each intending to 
improve or amend the previous effort. The recent Reef 2050 Plan, published in 2015, 
can also be included in this learning process as it considers water quality among its key 
themes to protect the GBR (Australian Government, 2015b). Collaboration was adopted 
as a governance approach in 2009 and onwards. Hence, it is expected that collaborative 
governance in the planning process reinforced learning. The evaluation of learning by 
the respondents intended to confirm the existence of this learning process, and its 
impact on the water quality outcomes. Three statements were rated by the respondents, 
in which they were not clear about the benefit that learning has rendered to water quality 
planning.  
The majority of the respondents (67% agreed or strongly agreed) considered that 
learning occurred in the implementation of the previous 2003 Reef Plan, which was 
beneficial for achieving the water quality outcomes (see Figure 7.8). However, 24% of 
the respondents (from the regional NRM and academic sectors) strongly disagreed or 
disagreed with this statement. No detail was provided about the ways that the previous 
plan experience contributed to achieve the water quality outcomes of the 2009 Reef 
Plan. It was only assumed by the respondents that there was a positive legacy from the 
first water quality plan in 2003. The only concrete example of the positive impact of 
learning was that it allowed including the industry sector in the 2009 Reef Plan, which 
was excluded from the 2003 planning process. 
 
Figure 7.8 Stakeholder rankings of the statements on learning. 
The information sharing that occurred during stakeholder engagement, particularly at 
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the regional level of collaboration, might have translated into knowledge to support Reef 
Rescue implementation. The majority of the respondents (71%) strongly agreed or 
agreed on the fact that knowledge sharing on the regional conditions (e.g. regional 
contexts or governance structures) took place during plan implementation (based on 
Figure 7.8 rankings). Nonetheless, interviewee RB7 added that learning was partial as 
the NRM groups did not exist when the 2003 Reef Plan was devised. The groups were 
created around 2005. However, 24% of the interviewees were neutral about this 
statement as they were unsure about the knowledge process actually being shared. 
RB10 (representing 5%) strongly disagreed, considering that knowledge sharing did not 
take place at all. 
Finally, 86% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the experience with Reef 
Rescue as part of the 2009 Reef Plan definitely provided the right path to deal with water 
quality (based on Figure 7.8 rankings). It allowed learning not only of what practices 
worked but also of which ones should be suppressed. This was proved by the 2013 
Reef Plan, which maintains the collaborative approach with slight adjustments in terms 
of the plan objectives and goals (Australian and Queensland Governments, 2013). 
Interviewee RB7 mentioned that, overall, Reef Rescue showed the utility of using 
incentives as a planning tool to motivate behaviour change. Only interviewee CS1 
strongly disagreed with this third learning statement, arguing that so far progress 
towards the water quality objectives was limited. FG1 preferred not to answer about this 
aspect. 
7.3.1.6 Decentralisation 
In the Australian NRM context of environmental governance, and discussed in Chapter 
2, decentralisation adopted the form of regionalisation, represented by the creation of 
the NRM regions. Previously, it was explained that decentralisation on the 2009 Reef 
Plan implementation occurred from the federal to the regional level of governance, 
where the community-based NRM bodies were designated as the actors responsible to 
deliver the water quality outcomes by offering incentives to the target group: the 
landholders. My evaluation of decentralisation was based on three statements that focus 
mainly on the role of the NRM bodies in plan implementation. 
Regarding the resources available for the NRM regions, only respondent (AI3) 
disagreed with their positive contribution to achieve water quality outcomes (see Figure 
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7.9). Most of the respondents’ rankings (86% agreed or strongly agreed) show 
satisfaction with the resources that were in place to implement the plan, such as the 
funding received and staff knowledge and skills. Two remained neutral. A similar level 
of agreement was found with the third statement (76% agreed or strongly agreed) as 
only the same respondent AI3 disagreed on this, while four respondents, representing 
19%, were neutral. In other words, most of the stakeholders found that devolving the 
delivery of the water quality objectives to the regional level was beneficial for the 
outcomes. However, two respondents from the agriculture sector (AI2 and AI3) felt that 
they had similar or better capacity than the NRM groups to become the vehicle of the 
water quality plan delivery. Without stating it explicitly, they hinted that if they had been 
given the role of the NRM groups perhaps better water quality outcomes would have 
been achieved. 
 
 
Figure 7.9 Stakeholder rankings of the statements on decentralisation. 
 
Through the devolution of responsibility, the NRM groups also had more autonomy to 
deliver the plan. For instance, they were able to select the strategies they wanted to 
follow for engaging the landholders and allocating the water quality grants. This 
autonomy led to different collaborative approaches followed by each regional body that, 
in consequence, led to different water quality outcomes. In terms of the autonomy, 
around half of the respondents (38%) were neutral about its benefit on the outcomes, 
and around half (48%) agreed that it was beneficial. Those in the neutral position 
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maintained that the autonomy was not a significant factor for achieving the water quality 
outcomes.  
Interviewee AI1 argued that the collaboration between the NRM groups and the industry 
bodies was more important. In this way, they were able to provide consistent information 
to the target group, increasing their adoption of better land management practices. 
Interviewee SG2 considered that the autonomy granted seemed a bit excessive and the 
NRM groups lacked enough guidance, particularly in the reporting methods followed 
(e.g. there was no standardised data reporting method across the NRM groups). 14%, 
however, disagreed on the beneficial role of autonomy provided to the NRM bodies. 
This position was illustrated by a comment from interviewee RB7: 
“It's actually a strength and weakness (the increased autonomy), so the strength is that it 
led to a lot of creativity and innovation, 'cause these organisations were autonomous, we 
could do what we liked. So, in that respect I think it was good. What it didn't, the flip side 
though, is that we end up with a lot of inconsistency in terms of subsistence, in terms of 
monitoring systems, evaluation systems.” 
7.3.1.7 Competition 
Apart from incentives, competition is the second aspect I added to the collaborative 
processes criteria as it is another singular feature of the Reef Rescue strategy. That is, 
the incentives included to motivate behaviour change on the landholders were provided 
through a competitive process. Landholders were offered the financial resources (e.g. 
money or equipment) after presenting a water quality improvement project to compete 
for grants. The projects were evaluated by a panel that included people from the NRM 
groups as well as agriculture industry representatives. The grants were awarded to the 
projects that met their requirements (e.g. cost-efficiency and feasibility). In this regard, 
there is an apparent contradiction between adopting collaboration and drawing upon 
competition. These apparent contradiction or tension was reinforced by the fact that the 
six NRM regions were subject to the same water quality targets, despite their different 
contexts (such as land size, land uses and NRM bodies’ governance structures).  
Figure 7.10 indicates the respondents’ assessment of competition. In the first statement, 
most of respondents (71%) were neutral or disagreed that competition led to better 
water quality outcomes. These views appear to show a general discontent with 
competition; however, the explanations offered about this statement were not against 
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competition. On the contrary, for these respondents better water quality outcomes would 
have been achieved if the competitive process was more efficient. For instance, usually 
there were more grants available than applicants, and the competition process limited 
itself to allocate the funds rather than promote the best water quality projects. In addition, 
the stakeholders interviewed explained that there was some sort of collaboration before 
competing for the water quality grants. This collaborative process occurred between the 
regional industry representatives and the landholders, in which the former helped the 
latter in developing their water quality proposals.  
 
 
Figure 7.10 Stakeholder rankings of statements on competition. 
 
The majority of respondents (71%) were either neutral or disagreed that competition 
complemented collaboration; while 29% agreed or strongly agreed on the opposite: 
there was complementarity between competition and collaboration. Most of the 
respondents that shared this view were from the regional NRM sector. This supports the 
finding that there was tension between competing and collaborating. As interviewee 
RB8 explained: 
“So the competition there was not good for us, because it meant we weren't working 
collaboratively, we were competing; regions were competing for the money. The competing 
for money for stakeholders, I guess it was a good thing because you're trying to get people 
to think about what they wanna do and why, and to really do that for the right reasons. 
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However, sometimes it put people off because the smaller farmers, for instance, just went 
'oh I'm not going to get a grant, because the big farmer is going to get the grant over me'.”  
In this view, competition not only affected the smaller landholders in their prospects to 
be incorporated in the water quality planning efforts. Competition was also identified by 
the respondents as a major factor behind the low or almost inexistent cross-regional 
NRM collaboration. Interviewee RB1 added: 
“Within the Reef Alliance (the main collaborative institution of Reef Plan), the biggest 
sources of conflict were around money and competing for money. Overall, they agreed on 
what needed to be done with the water quality problem. Also agreed on how to do it, but in 
terms of who would manage the money and that... like BMP (best management practices) 
was a great example. The industry felt that BMP was theirs to lead, and yet there were a 
number of landholders who just wouldn't engage with industry." 
Finally, regarding the final statement about competition being in the best interest of the 
stakeholders, there were mixed views from the respondents. Around half (43%) agreed 
that competing for grants was in their best interest, while the rest (57%) disagreed or 
remained neutral about this statement. This illustrates the contradictory impact of 
competition in Reef Rescue seen by the respondents. Moreover, the stakeholders did 
not deliberate around the suitability of using competition as this was decided solely at 
the federal level. Hence, they would have preferred more inclusion towards deciding 
how to allocate funding. Interviewee RB5 summed up the mixed views around the 
impact of competition by stating: 
"I'm a firm believer that competition makes things healthy, because it keeps everyone on 
their toes. That being said, there is one Great Barrier Reef, there isn't twenty Great Barrier 
Reefs. There is one Great Barrier Reef region, there's not six regions, so it's like looking 
after yourself, you don't just look after the head, the wrist and the body and that, because 
the rest of the body will die.” 
7.3.2 Outcome-oriented evaluation 
According to the official information, the collaborative governance arrangements were 
key for the successful delivery of the 2009 Reef Plan (Australian Government, 2011; 
and Australian Government, 2014a). However, the official water quality outcomes fell 
short of the original targets. According to the simple effectiveness criterion, the water 
quality plan failed to significantly improve water quality. What is the contribution of 
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collaborative governance? And, given the complexity of the issue, is it valid to judge it 
as a failure? As I found in the previous chapter, more funding for on-ground delivery 
does not necessarily lead to better water quality outcomes; hence, the collaborative 
governance processes need improvements as well.  
Apart from this, the external factors — such as land area, market shifts or weather 
impacts identified in the previous chapter — need also to be taken into account when 
determining if collaboration failed. As Rauschmayer et al. (2009) argue, better 
governance processes reduce uncertainty. Therefore, rather than providing a strong 
verdict regarding the success or failure of collaborating (a black or white picture), I offer 
a more nuanced outlook on the impact of collaboration, highlighting that collaborative 
governance is not the only variable that would lead to better environmental outcomes. 
In this sense, there is no cause-effect relationship between collaborative governance 
processes and environmental outcomes. Other variables, such as the regional context 
and the political arena have also a decisive role that was not taken into account for this 
governance evaluation.  
The main assumption is that improving the collaborative governance process would lead 
to better environmental outcomes. And this is supported by the main finding discussed 
in the previous chapter. That is, despite funding, if there is strong collaboration in place, 
better environmental outcomes are likely to be achieved. How do you improve it?  In the 
previous process-evaluation of collaborative governance processes of 2009 Reef Plan, 
I seek to disentangle the key aspects of collaboration, how they performed in the views 
of the stakeholders, and also how they created new issues within the governance 
arrangements. So how do you improve the governance processes? The next section 
shows the impact of the governance processes in terms of being positive, neutral and 
negative to the environmental outcomes achieved. In the view of this study, the 
improvements in terms of governance arrangements should target the processes that 
had a negative impact. By rating the collaborative governance processes, I seek to 
inform policy about required amendments to the governance arrangements as well as 
establish further research areas within the environmental planning and policy areas. 
With better collaboration though, there is no guarantee that the intended water quality 
outcomes will be achieved. But, based on the collaborative processes ratings, it will at 
least facilitate them to a greater extent, allowing even to modify the targets and goals of 
the water quality plan through deliberation. 
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7.3.2.1 Impact of collaborative governance processes on water quality outcomes 
in the GBR 
The purpose in this section is to explain the environmental outcomes through the 
outcome-oriented evaluation that is informed by the processes evaluation, on the belief 
that good governance processes contribute to better outcomes. From the water quality 
outcomes shown by Table 7.4, particularly the last column about overall water quality 
condition, the effectiveness seems low. Before the planning intervention, water quality 
was poor and it remained in the same condition after the intervention. However, without 
collaboration, according to the stakeholder views presented in Chapter 6, nothing would 
have been achieved. At least, the pollutant reductions began to occur. The water quality 
outcomes become the criteria through which I examine the issues in the collaborative 
governance process evaluated, based on the stakeholder perspectives around the 
collaborative-implementation criteria as well as the findings of similar research.  
I seek to reduce the uncertainty by identifying what worked and what did not worked so 
well in the governance processes. Table 7.5 groups the results of the process 
evaluation, classified by positive, neutral and negative impact on the water quality 
outcomes. These results are complemented by Figure 7.11, which re-elaborates the 
Process-Outcomes governance evaluation framework with the findings of the case 
study. It is important to note that the uncertainty between governance processes and 
outcomes cannot be completely reduced as the external factors have to be taken into 
account. A potential further research area could be to focus on a number of external 
factors and measure their influence on the environmental outcomes. The next section 
discusses the results of this process-outcomes examination of collaborative governance 
in its impact on water quality outcomes.  
Table 7.5 Impact of collaborative governance processes on water quality 
outcomes. 
 
Collaborative 
governance process 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Stakeholder engagement X   
Coordination   X 
Regulations*   X 
Public participation  X  
Learning X   
Decentralisation X   
Competition**  X  
*Incentives are embedded within the regulations element as they offer contrast between the two policy instruments 
used to implement the 2009 Reef Plan. 
**Competition was added to the GBR case study, as it was a unique feature not found in other collaborative processes 
evaluations. 
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Figure 7.11 Process-Outcome governance evaluation framework adapted to the 
GBR case study results.  
The (+) sign indicates a positive impact of the collaborative governance process, while (–) indicates a 
negative impact and (0) a neutral impact. The overall consequence was a poor condition of water quality 
in the GBR catchment after the collaborative governance planning intervention. 
7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 Collaborative aspects with positive impact 
Stakeholder engagement 
The evaluation provided by the stakeholders to this collaborative aspect show 
satisfaction with the level of engagement during Reef Rescue (as part of the 2009 Reef 
Plan scheme). All of them agreed or strongly agreed that including the stakeholders led 
to better water quality outcomes. In addition, more than 80% identified a positive impact 
of being informed regularly or, in other words, sharing information about the water 
quality issue and the best ways of dealing with it. The most significant impact of 
engagement occurred at the regional level. For this reasons — perceptions of beneficial 
engagement and information-sharing taking place — I consider that stakeholder 
engagement was positive for the achievement of the water quality outcomes of the 2009 
Reef Plan. However, its impact was limited by the perceived power imbalances between 
the stakeholders. Although the interviewees did not necessarily identify the most 
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powerful actors, it is implied that the state and federal governments as well as the 
agriculture industry were the stakeholders with more capacity to alter the course of 
events or ‘shift the course of the tide’. Hence, the divergent power between the 
stakeholders (e.g. access to resources, introduce regulations or block measures) might 
have impacted the full potential of stakeholder engagement and, in consequence, this 
had a negative effect in the achievement of the water quality outcomes.  
For instance, the state government had the ability to introduce regulations unilaterally 
to promote behaviour change according to their goals, while the agriculture industry had 
the capacity to reject and thus force the withdrawal of the regulatory instrument 
established by the Queensland Government. Power differences also impact on 
equitable access to resources. In this case, the federal government provided most of 
the funding for the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan through Reef Rescue. The 
other actors, such as the regional NRM bodies, agriculture representatives and 
landholders, did not have the ability to access other sources of funding. They were 
subject to the interests and preferences of the federal government. Additionally, the 
inequity in resource access was also reflected in the different funding amounts received 
by the NRM bodies to implement Reef Rescue. The majority of the stakeholders, then, 
were dependent on the funding that the central actor, the federal government, decided 
to offer.  
Considering the evaluation of the three stakeholder engagement statements, 
engagement between state and non-state stakeholders was not only positive, but crucial 
for implementing the water quality plan, particularly because it allowed sharing 
information about ways to achieve the water quality outcomes. This links with the 
findings by Carter et al. (2015) and Ulabarri (2015), who found that engagement and 
joint action had a positive impact on environmental outcomes. In this regard, it is 
important to stress that the engagement that was crucial for the 2009 Reef Plan 
implementation occurred at the regional and local levels. This was also recognised by 
a previous independent audit of the water quality plan (Lloyd Consulting, 2010). Upper 
levels, such as state and federal, were more decisive during plan development. 
Notwithstanding this positive impact of engagement, the evaluation also found that there 
were power and resource differences that might have been a barrier for achieving the 
plan’s water quality targets. Power and access to resources represent the political 
dimension of the stakeholder engagement process that is out of the scope of the studies 
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reviewed in Chapter 3 as well as in this study. This remains one of the areas that require 
further research, such as how do power divergences among the stakeholders shape 
collaborative governance and impact on the environmental outcomes? 
Learning 
In general, more than 50% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed on the three 
statements used to rank the learning aspect. In the respondents’ view, learning to deal 
with the water quality issue occurred not only from the past planning experience with 
the 2003 Reef Plan. Learning also took place in the implementation process through 
knowledge-sharing of regional conditions, and what was learned with the 2009 Reef 
Plan supported the development of future plan policies. As a consequence, and based 
on the positive experience with learning perceived by the interviewees, I identified a 
beneficial impact of the learning aspect within the collaborative governance effort to 
implement Reef Rescue.  Moreover, a learning curve of adjustments and redefinitions 
of goals targets can be seen throughout the Reef’s water quality planning efforts since 
2003 until 2015, a period in which four water quality plans have been established for the 
protection of the GBR.  
This learning curve, though, would show a slightly beneficial impact on water quality 
after the planning interventions. At least in the case of the water quality outcomes 
achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan through the Reef Rescue strategy, the role of learning 
was beneficial to the environmental outcomes. More clearly, it contributed to adopt a 
collaborative approach that included the agriculture industry (a sector not considered in 
the previous planning process), which led to the provision of incentives for land 
management practice change, achieving, in the process, better results than the previous 
water quality plan. However, there were no detailed explanations about specific aspects 
where learning contributed. The respondents’ rates only show that there was a general 
positive impact of learning on the water quality outcomes achieved in 2013. This fits with 
Mandarano (2008) study that also found a positive impact of learning on environmental 
outcomes. The positive impact of learning, on the other hand, is contradicted by a 
federal government report, which stated that the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms 
of the 2009 Reef Plan (e.g. the Paddock to Reef program) did not promote learning. 
Instead, they only introduced onerous administrative paperwork (Australian 
Government, 2015c).  
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In their evaluation, the interviewees shared the view that the long learning process, 
involved in dealing with the complex water quality issue, has represented a case of 
adaptive management. Nonetheless, there are no studies that have examined this 
potential adaptation case in which collaboration is embedded. A further research area 
suggested by this study would be to find out if this learning process represents an 
example of adaptive governance or, on the contrary, a series of fragmented plans to 
deal with a still unsolved issue.  
Decentralisation 
According to the stakeholders’ perceptions in this study, decentralising the 
implementation of the water quality plan to the regional level had a beneficial impact on 
the water quality outcome achieved. First, the resources devolved to the NRM regions 
through the NRM bodies facilitated the achievement of water quality outcomes. Second, 
for around 90% of the respondents, the NRM regions were the appropriate vehicle to 
deliver the plan goals and targets. Hence, both the role of the NRM bodies and the 
decentralisation of the plan for its implementation through regional collaboration were 
positive for achieving the environmental outcomes. Moreover, as it has been mentioned 
before, without these decentralising process that supported regional collaboration 
nothing would have been achieved by the plan. In other words, and according to the 
views of the respondents (stated also in Chapter 5), a centralised approach would have 
been unable to achieve any progress in terms of the water quality targets. Only one 
interviewee from the agriculture sector (AI3), suggested the delivery of the plan should 
have been done through the regional agriculture organisations instead of the NRM 
bodies. This view was based on the assumption that the agriculture organisations in the 
regions have more capacity to implement the programs.  
On the other hand, the third statement about autonomy of the NRM groups is also 
adapted from a hypothesis developed by Scott (2015), who assumes that increased 
responsibility (translated as autonomy in this study) for a collaborative group is 
associated with beneficial environmental outcomes. According to the respondents’ 
views, the association between increased autonomy and beneficial environmental 
outcomes is likely to be inexistent. Some would rather advocate for less autonomy and 
more standardisation in the governance processes. As stated in Chapter 2, this seems 
to reinforce the contradictions found in the collaborative approach used in the GBR. The 
tension highlighted between offering incentives and introducing regulations is 
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complemented by the apparent contradiction identified between granting more 
autonomy and developing regulations. For instance, allowing for more flexibility while 
also suggesting standardisation among the NRM regional approaches. A further 
research area is to explore how to achieve a balance between consistency through 
regulating, and innovation through autonomy.  
Even though the respondents found that devolution and resources available for the NRM 
regions had a positive impact on the outcomes achieved, they were also reluctant about 
the benefits of increased autonomy for the NRM groups. However, they did not consider 
that the effects of autonomy had a negative impact on the water quality outcomes. So, 
in general, it seems that from the respondents’ views, decentralisation was associated 
with beneficial outcomes. This positive impact of decentralising relates with the findings 
by Wild River (2016), in the sense that lower levels of government are likely to obtain 
more beneficial environmental outcomes if they are allowed to work beyond statutory 
requirements. It also supports the central role played by the NRM groups in the GBR’s 
collaborative governance approach to natural resource planning. 
7.4.2 Collaborative aspects with negative impact 
Coordination 
Within the multi-level governance setting of this case study, the interaction between the 
federal government and the regional bodies was considered positive by the 
interviewees. So was the interaction at the regional level between the NRM bodies, the 
agriculture industry organisations and the landholders. Even though the federal level 
interacted in a top-down manner with the regional actors, in the stakeholders view they 
cooperated as they provided funding to change land management practices during the 
five years of Reef Rescue. Overall, almost 100% of the respondents were satisfied with 
the levels of cooperation, leaving the perception that coordination among the federal, 
state and regional levels was positive for changing the land management practices that 
led to the achievement of the water quality outcomes. However, viewed in more detail, 
I consider that coordination had a negative impact on the implementation of the water 
quality plan due to two factors: 1) the unilateral introduction of regulations by the state 
government; and 2) the poor coordination ties between the state and federal 
governments. In the first factor, the lack of coordination of the state government with the 
other levels of governance regarding the introduction of regulatory measures impacted 
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the momentum of the collaborative scheme by reducing trust and increasing fears 
among the stakeholders.  
Moreover, the poor coordination led to confusion about the role of regulations and their 
purpose. In the end, the state government withdrew the regulatory measures before the 
end of the plan. For this reason, around half of the stakeholders from the regional NRM 
bodies and the agriculture industry considered that the state level should not be 
considered as part of the collaborative approach. The second factor that impacted 
negatively on the water quality outcomes was the poor coordination between the state 
and federal levels. Each of them seemed to follow their own lead, without agreeing on 
the policy instruments or the funding mechanisms. For instance, interviewee RB12 
mentioned that the federal government never recognised formally the regulations. 
Hence, the interaction at the upper levels of governance was not really collaborative, 
and the effort to deliver the plan was left to the regional level.  
In line with the literature review of Chapter 3 — in which Koontz and Newig (2014); Kim, 
J. H., et al. (2015); and Rogers and Weber (2010) state a positive impact of coordination 
on environmental outcomes — this study found that coordination had a negative impact 
in the achievement of water quality outcomes. Moreover, although coordination was 
rated fairly well among the respondents, there was fragmentation among the higher 
levels such as the federal and state governments, which used different instruments 
(incentives and regulations) to foster behaviour change among the landholders. A 
federal government review also found that the implementation of NRM polices, such as 
the 2009 Reef Plan, was fragmented (Australian Government, 2015c). The interviewees 
also suggested that fragmentation occurred at the regional level as there was almost an 
absence of cross-regional interactions. Additionally, some NRM groups had better 
cooperation than others. Nonetheless, this can also be explained by the informal 
networks of collaboration developed in their respective regions. Hence, another area 
that needs further research (but out of the scope of this study) is to investigate the 
contribution of informal collaboration processes between the stakeholders in 
coordinating tasks.  
Coordination remains one of the most challenging aspects of collaboration, which 
highlight the difficulty in aligning the efforts of the stakeholders within a multi-level 
governance system. Aligning the efforts of state and non-state actors is compounded 
by the power divergences that exist among the stakeholders (which links with the 
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stakeholder engagement process). Usually, the most powerful actors align the 
coordinating objectives to their goals or disrupt the interactions with a measure or policy 
that advance their interests. The fragmentation that characterised the collaborative 
governance arrangements in the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan (and the 
difference between upper levels and the regional level of governance) led to tensions, 
such as the opposition between offering incentives and regulations, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
Regulations 
The second collaborative process with a negative impact was regulations. The 
regulatory measures were worsened by the fragmentation of the multi-level governance 
system, in which the lack of coordination in aligning this instrument to the plan goals led 
to anger and confusion between the other stakeholders. Therefore, there was tension 
between using incentives to change landholder’s behaviour and then introducing 
regulations with the same objective of changing behaviour. In principle, there seems to 
be a contradiction between collaborating and regulating as collaboration suggests 
voluntary participation, whereas regulation prompts compulsory engagement. However, 
theory on collaborative governance considers that regulations are part of the 
collaborative effort (Koontz and Thomas, 2006; Ansell and Gash, 2008; Ansell, 2012; 
and Scott and Thomas, 2017). There is no contradiction between collaborating and 
regulating within these collaborative governance conceptualisations. More precisely, 
regulations are a tool that supports collaborations (Scott and Thomas, 2017) and these 
regulations, on their part, should be developed through collaboration (Ansell, 2012).  
In the views of the respondents of this study, nonetheless, the use of regulations 
contradicted the expected effect that regulating provides within collaboration, namely a 
complement to support the collaborative approach. In the stakeholders’ evaluation, 
regulations undermined the collaborative efforts between the stakeholders and 
generated a conflicted environment. One reason could be that the regulations were not 
developed collaboratively, as theory assumes, but rather were adopted and 
implemented by the state government, which was a powerful actor within the governing 
arrangements with the ability to develop this instrument in a top-down fashion. Hence, 
the effect of enforcing instruments was negative for the achievement of water quality 
outcomes, which fits with Koontz and Newig (2014) study. This was also supported by 
an independent review of the 2009 Reef Plan, which stated that the plan was not well 
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embraced due to the regulations, particularly by the agriculture industry groups (Lloyd 
Consulting, 2010). Within this collaborative aspect, a further area of research suggested 
is to focus on developing evaluation instruments to account for the impact of regulations 
on environmental outcomes. 
Another interesting insight provided by the examination of a potential change from non-
statutory to statutory bodies, which was based on a hypothesis developed by Scott 
(2015), states that increased formalisation of a collaborative group, that is stronger 
institutional presence, is associated with beneficial environmental outcomes. The 
hypothesis was modified and adjusted to the purpose of this study, where respondents 
were asked if they thought that the increased formalisation of the NRM bodies would 
lead to better achievements of water quality outcomes.  More than half of the 
respondents considered that shifting the status of the NRM bodies between non-
statutory to statutory organisations would be negative to their role in regional 
governance.   
The non-statutory nature distinguishes the NRM bodies from the government, and 
according to the interviewees against the shift to statutory entities, this non-government 
or community-based reputation grants them the advantage of being considered part of 
the regional community, facilitating the role of engaging and promoting behaviour 
change. Hence, apart from the perceived negative impact of regulations by respondents 
in the achievement of water quality outcomes, the majority also rejected the idea that 
transforming NRM bodies into statutory entities would contribute to better achievement 
of water quality outcomes.   
7.4.3 Collaborative aspects with neutral impact 
Public participation 
The majority of the respondents in the evaluation agreed that the views of the public 
were not incorporated in Reef Rescue. More than half, though, agreed that the public 
was at least informed about the progress of the program. While the lack of inclusion 
might suggest a negative impact of this process on the water quality outcomes, the fact 
that, according to the stakeholder views, the public was informed, neutralises this 
impact. Revisiting Arnstein’s (1969) classic typology of participation, the role of public 
participation in the respondents’ view resembles the act of informing or consulting, 
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where communication between the actors occurred through one-way rather than two-
way flows of information: from the government to the regional communities. In other 
words, citizens received information but had no input in developing it.  Therefore, it had 
a neutral impact on the water quality outcomes. This links with the lack of two-way 
dialogue or deliberation perceived in the stakeholder engagement aspect. Taken 
together, public participation and stakeholder engagement during the implementation of 
Reef Rescue did not promote dialogue from the bottom-up. It was perceived as a top-
down process in which the regional and local actors followed the guidelines adopted at 
higher levels of governance, such as federal and state. It is important to mention that 
power inequalities between the stakeholders are also present in this process, in which 
the public remains the least powerful actor. Including the citizens, then, becomes an 
instrument for power redistribution, “away from entrenched interests to those who have 
formerly been relatively powerless” (McCool and Guthrie, 2001, p. 320). 
It should also be noted though that, as some interviewees explained, the collaborative 
process behind the 2009 Reef Plan and Reef Rescue did not require the participation 
of the public in its core objectives. For instance, interviewee RB8 stated that while 
participation might contribute on raising awareness of the water quality issue in the 
regions, it does not have any impact on the landholders’ decisions to change behaviour. 
Moreover, being a complex issue that deals with technical specificities such as water 
pollutants and agriculture management practices to reduce them, it was perhaps 
redundant to promote participation of less expert actors. However, the 2015 federal 
government review of natural resource policies stressed that more community 
consultation was required in setting the outcomes and targets of the plans and policies 
(Australian Government, 2015c). In this regard, interviewee AI2 said that participation 
should be included as the plan is based on the citizens’ taxes.  
Hence, contrary to Daley (2007); Newig and Fritsch (2009); and Biddle and Koontz 
(2014), who found a positive impact of participation in their studies, this evaluation found 
a neutral impact of public participation because it was not actually in place. At this point, 
the literature is not clear about the benefits of including the public in the solution of 
environmental issues. Ross et al. (2002) argue that there is no strong evidence behind 
the assumption that high levels of participation are preferable than lower ones. This 
argument is supported by Buchy and Race (2001), who, in a study of the Australian 
Landcare program, found little evidence that participation delivered tangible differences 
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to outcomes. The appropriate role of public participation in environmental policy and 
planning remains an area of further research.  
Competition 
Apparently, the competitive process contradicts collaboration as collaborating is more 
about sharing, while competing is more about gaining advantages. Considering this, it 
might seem that competition, which is introduced by a market governance approach, 
would have a negative impact on collaborative governance processes. From the 
respondent views regarding the assessment of the competitive aspect of the 
collaborative process, it is likely that it had a negative effect on the water quality 
outcomes achieved. This is because most of the respondents considered that it 
contradicted the collaborative approach and was not in their best interest. However, it 
is important to state these respondents did not view competition as negative per se. On 
the contrary, competition would have been beneficial for the water quality outcomes if it 
was more efficient. In this regard, the impact of competition was likely to be positive for 
Reef Rescue. This opposition between negative and positive perceived impacts led to 
a neutral impact of this aspect in the evaluation. 
Furthermore, the mixed views by the stakeholders about competition tended to be 
neutral regarding its impact on water quality outcomes as well as being a complement 
to the collaborative governance approach. This neutral position was also preponderant 
regarding competition as representing their best interest. In other words, it seems that 
the stakeholders were against competing in principle, but supported this mechanism 
once it was considered as a tool for on-ground implementation. This was based on the 
belief that competing increased efficiency in the delivery of the water quality plan 
objectives. There was an ambivalent position in this process that illustrates the tension 
between competition and collaboration. On the one hand, some of the respondents said 
that competing was necessary to avoid rent-seeking and ensure quality in the 
implementation process. Therefore, it was in their interest to compete. On the other 
hand, some respondents considered that competition created conflict at the regional 
level of collaboration and countered the collaborative governance approach. 
This is the second tension, along with the regulations/incentives instruments, found 
within the collaborative governance process of Reef Rescue. Similar to the regulations, 
competition was introduced in a top-down manner by higher levels of government. In 
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this case, competition was required by the federal government who provided the funds 
for the water quality incentives. Regulations, as stated previously, were introduced by 
the state government. Regulations appeared to halt the drive of collaboration, while it is 
unclear if competition facilitated or impeded the achievement of the water quality 
outcomes.  
The theory on collaborative governance does not discuss competition and how it fits 
with this approach. Hence, there is no benchmark available from the literature review to 
contrast these findings. Interviewee SG2 explained that competition was adopted by the 
government following a business approach to natural resource planning where 
competing is supposed to offer increased investment returns. However, the respondent 
added that there is insufficient knowledge about its appropriate use on NRM planning in 
the collaborative setting. For the federal government review, competition for grants 
undermined the collaboration partnerships, “groups no longer collaborated to the same 
extent (p. 34)”. It also undermined the trust (social capital) that was built previously 
between the stakeholders (Australian Government, 2015c). This represents another 
area that requires further research, in order to find out how competition promotes or 
halts collaboration, as well as how appropriate it is to promote competition within a 
collaborative governance approach. 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter analysed the impact of collaborative governance on water quality outcomes 
based on the reasoning that governance processes facilitate (or undermine) the 
achievement of environmental outcomes; in this case, the water quality outcomes 
achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan through Reef Rescue. The impact of collaborative 
governance was examined through a Process-Outcomes governance evaluation 
framework that combined a series of collaborative governance processes with the water 
quality outcomes achieved in a period of five years (2008-2013). It is important to note 
that, contrary to other studies that draw on numerous data samples from multiple case 
studies to study the impact of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes 
(Newig and Fritsch, 2009; and Scott, 2015), this research draws on a large case study 
to explore in-depth this impact.  
The benefit of relying on the case study approach was that it allowed identifying how 
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the governance processes performed. Also, it was possible to highlight the strengths 
and weaknesses of the collaborative governance approach. In this regard, the study 
found that the stakeholders perceived a positive impact of stakeholder engagement, 
learning and decentralisation processes on the achievement of water quality outcomes. 
The three positive collaborative elements represent the strengths of the collaborative 
governance efforts behind the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan. The coordination 
and regulations elements were perceived as having a negative impact on the 
achievement of the water quality outcomes and, therefore, represent the weaknesses 
of the collaborative approach. The perceived impact of public participation and 
competition remained unclear and received ambivalent views. As a consequence, the 
study classified them as having a neutral impact on the achievement of environmental 
outcomes.  
Along with the strengths and weaknesses of collaborative processes identified, the 
evaluation also identified two tensions within the governance approach: 1) the tension 
between regulations and incentives to promote land management practice changes; 
and 2) the tension between competition for funding and collaboration for the 
achievement of water quality outcomes. These tensions illustrate that collaborative 
governance was not adopted in a “pure” form. Instead, it was mixed with top-down and 
market approaches. Hence, the combination of different governance approaches to 
implement the same plan led to tensions that most likely affected the achievement of 
the water quality outcomes. This means that, in practice, there needs to be awareness 
among the actors involved that there is no pure collaborative governance. Different 
governance approaches occurred within the collaborative governance setting, such as 
hierarchy (regulations) or market mechanisms (competition). This study contributed in 
identifying the tensions among the governance of water quality in the GBR, which 
provides valuable information to the decision-makers in the challenge of selecting a 
more appropriate mix of governance approaches to achieve the environmental 
outcomes.  
Additionally, the chapter showed the absence of a cause-effect relationship between 
governance and outcomes (social, environmental or economic). On the contrary, there 
is an indirect relationship between governance and outcomes, where the first represents 
a driver rather than a cause of the latter. Addressing the weaknesses of the collaborative 
governance effort might contribute to facilitate a better achievement of environmental 
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outcomes. However, this would not necessarily lead to achieving the original targets of 
the plan or policy. Therefore, apart from governance, other variables are also involved 
in the solution of environmental issues, which illustrate the degree of complexity of the 
water quality issue. Based on the process-outcomes governance evaluation framework 
(Figure 7.11), these variables refer to funding amounts available as well as external 
factors (which were also identified in the previous chapter), such as land area, land-
uses, market shifts, weather events as well as the socio-political context of the case 
studied. 
The examination of the processes-outcomes was based on the views of key 
stakeholders that were involved in the implementation of the water quality plan. These 
stakeholders rated a series of statements that referred to seven collaborative 
governance processes: stakeholder engagement; coordination; regulations; public 
participation; learning; decentralisation; and competition. The focus on a single case-
study limits the generalisability of this study’s findings to different social and 
environmental contexts. They remain comparable in a national context. However, the 
use of an evaluation framework combining governance processes and outcomes can 
be applied internationally and in other planning and policy domains, not only for 
environmental issues.  
Additionally, this examination is limited to the perceptions of the stakeholders, which do 
not form a larger sample as only some of them were involved in Reef Rescue and the 
2009 Reef Plan. As this study represents an examination of past events, some of the 
people directly involved have moved to other jobs. Nonetheless, the perceptions are 
compared with the actual data on water quality outcomes, which adds robustness to the 
evidence around the impact of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes. 
The next chapter builds on these significant findings to develop a synthesis of all the 
findings in the research, and discuss in more detail the implications of this study on the 
impact of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes. The next chapter also 
addresses the fourth and final research sub-question of this study, highlighting future 
directions (along with recommendations) for collaborative governance research within 
environmental policy and planning, based on the findings of the case study analysis.  
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CHAPTER 8: SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
Governance is important. Understanding how societies attempt to control their economies 
and societies, and how they do so in a more or less democratic form, is crucial for 
understanding the quality of life for the citizens of countries (Peters, 2016, p. 316).  
At its core, governance is concerned with improving quality of life. A fundamental aspect 
that enhances our life quality is the condition of the environment. In the attempt to grasp 
how societies attempt to control their economies and societies to influence quality of life, 
this study focused on the environment and one of its main resources, water. In the above 
statement by Peters, I would add the quality of life, not only of humans, but also of other 
living beings as this study considered the impacts of governance on the water quality of 
a marine environment, which sustains marine life and, indirectly, human life through 
economic and leisure activities. When considering quality of life from an environmental 
perspective, the condition of the environment reinforces the quality of life of citizens, but 
this is more complicated to understand as, contrary to economic development, the 
improvements on the overall quality of life as a result of healthy environments occur in 
the long-term.  
This section discusses the ways that collaborative governance impacted on water 
quality in the GBR to understand the importance of governance in the attempt to control 
an economic activity (agriculture) and a society (the NRM regions in the GBR) towards 
achieving  better environmental conditions. Improved environmental conditions translate 
into better quality of life for humans and other beings. In the case of the GBR, its 
environmental condition determines the quality of social and economic benefits, such 
as income or enjoyment for the communities along the GBR’s regions (GBRMPA, 2014). 
Therefore, governance is important because it contributes to the quality of the 
environment and, as a consequence, on the quality of life of a given country. The focus 
on environmental outcomes (e.g. achievement of better environmental conditions) 
represents a pragmatic evaluation of governance that leaves aside the examination of 
democratic standards. The purpose of this chapter is to synthesise the findings 
presented in previous chapters and highlight their implications for governance research 
and practice in environmental policy and planning. To frame this discussion, I re-
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consider the main research question and sub-questions presented in the Introduction 
(Chapter 1). I elaborate on the significance of these findings using related literature and 
the conceptual governance evaluation framework to expand into what and how we can 
learn about the evaluation of governance in the complex natural resource planning and 
management areas. 
It is worth noting that examining governance, its processes and its impact on outcomes, 
contributes to clarifying the vagueness that usually accompanies the concept and 
practice of governance. The general fuzziness of governance has already been 
discussed by previous scholars. For instance, Peters (2016) argues that the vague 
nature of the term and practice of governance runs the risk of finding governance 
everywhere. Hence, governance would seem to express a similar logic stated by 
Wildavsky (1973) for planning, in the sense that if governance seems to be everything, 
then maybe it’s actually nothing. To show that governance is in fact ‘something’, I 
adopted an established definition of collaborative governance provided by Ansell and 
Gash (2008) in their seminal work about the concept and practice of collaborative 
governance (Chapter 2).  
Then, I analysed the impact of collaborative governance on outcomes (environmental 
outcomes in this case) as a way of delimitating an area of influence of governance. 
Subsequently, the identification and assessment of the governance processes 
(collaborative governance criteria developed in Chapter 4, Table 4.4) within the area of 
influence showed where governance was taking place and what type of impact it had 
on water quality outcomes. This clarification of governance by delimiting its role and 
area of influence, identifying its processes and showing its impact on environmental 
outcomes contributes to a better understanding of governance practice.  
The chapter proceeds in this order. First, I focus around the key findings of my study to 
discuss about the impact of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes in 
Australian natural resource planning and management. The key findings section is 
divided in three sub-sections, framed by the three case study research questions. In the 
first one, I focus on the role of collaborative governance in the implementation of the 
2009 Reef Plan, discussing about the governance arrangements behind the water 
quality planning effort. In the second sub-section, I discuss the impact of collaborative 
governance on water quality outcomes at the regional level (where the implementation 
efforts were concentrated), highlighting that collaboration made a positive difference in 
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the achievement of water quality outcomes. In the third sub-section, I discuss about the 
strengths and weaknesses of the overall collaborative governance approach in the 2009 
Reef Plan, based on the application of the Process-Outcomes governance evaluation 
framework. In the second section, I present the implications of this study based on the 
key findings discussed, framed by the fourth research question. I also include a series 
of recommendations for policymakers and planners. In the third section, I present the 
limits of this study and summarise the further research areas that were identified in 
previous chapters. In particular, I emphasise the need to further study governance 
aspects and roles in order to improve environmental policy and planning. Finally, I offer 
a brief recapitulation of the research and its significance. 
8.2 Key findings 
8.2.1 The role of collaborative governance: limited but mildly beneficial 
To find out about what difference collaborative governance made with respect to the 
environmental outcomes achieved, I focused first on its role in the implementation of the 
Reef Plan through the first research question: What was the role of collaboration in the 
implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan? 
In the case-study analysis, I found two main things: 1) collaboration at the regional level 
was perceived as essential because without it, it is highly likely that no water quality 
outcomes would have been achieved; and 2) collaboration had a limited scope as it was 
confined largely to the regional level and, compared to theoretical notions, it lacked more 
participatory and deliberative components. The first aspect, the essential role of regional 
collaboration, implies that the actors of the water quality plan acknowledged 
regionalisation7 and collaboration as the most appropriate approach. Collaboration 
introduced a different way of doing things that had a perceived overall positive impact 
at the regional level, as one actor pragmatically observed: 
This was the first time in terms of Reef investment or Reef intervention that we actually had 
multiple stakeholders actually trying to work together. It certainly wasn't perfect by any 
stretch, but at least we had industry, we had NRM on the same page, and working towards 
the same goals. It is the first time it happened at that scale, whole of Reef (extract from 
                                                          
7 Regionalisation, as mentioned in Chapter 5, refers to the devolution of responsibility to the regional level 
for the delivery of NRM and planning. It involves a territorial decentralisation for environmental policy and 
planning tasks in which, nonetheless, central governments still retain control of the regional processes. 
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Chapter 7, p. 174). 
This essential role attributed to collaborative governance was reinforced by the fact that 
collaboration has been the approach followed in subsequent water quality plans for the 
Reef, from 2013 and onwards. In this respect, collaboration has become, for pragmatic 
rather than democratic reasons (more ‘what-gets-things-done’ than ‘what-gets-things-
more-equal’ view), the foundation to govern the GBR. However, due to this pragmatic 
view, collaboration had a limited scope as it was marginal at upper levels of governance 
and the collaborative approach had no larger deliberative or participatory ambitions. In 
this regard, it resembled more what Ansell (2012) denominates ‘narrow’ collaboration, 
which is used as a technique to solve conflict and promote cooperation between 
stakeholders, than ‘ambitious’ collaborative governance.  
The ambitious modality of collaboration, as Ansell explains, deepens participation and 
deliberation in public affairs, contributing to reconstruct democracy. This would lead to 
stronger engagement processes that would be more durable, fairer, robust and efficient 
(Emerson et al., 2012). In the Australian context, Curtis et al. (2014) argue that effective 
collaboration requires inclusive deliberation processes. There was no sense of this 
ambitious collaboration in the collaborative approach of the 2009 Reef Plan, which could 
be seen in three important aspects: 1) lack of deliberation by stakeholders in funding 
allocation and definition of water quality targets; 2) lack of public participation in the 
overall scheme of the plan; and 3) exclusion of the local governments from the 
collaborative governance arrangements.  
The above three aspects point out to an unwillingness of sharing spheres of power by 
the central governments. Hence, the collaborative approach studied confirms what 
Cheshire et al. (2007) and Bell and Hindmoor (2009) have stated previously, about the 
limits of collaborative or participatory governance processes, where central 
governments retain control and ability to determine the path of the policy, despite official 
rhetoric about partnerships or joint government. Taylor (2010) found the same limited 
approach to collaboration in Australian environmental governance. The pragmatic and 
narrow approach to collaboration adopted for water quality planning though, achieved 
mild improvements in water quality (see water quality outcomes achieved in Table 7.4, 
Chapter 7), showing that collaboration was not only about ‘talk and no action’, as argued 
by Lubell (2014). Scott (2016) also found that collaboration actually led to actions in his 
study about water quality improvements in the US. 
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The limited role of collaboration can also be explained through the governance 
arrangements of the GBR water quality scheme. As shown by Figure 6.2 in Chapter 6, 
collaboration did not occur in a ‘pure’ form. It was mixed with hierarchical (top-down) 
and market governance approaches. In this regard, it is rare that a governance 
approach occurs in a ‘pure’ form as it is usually combined with other governance 
approaches (Meuleman, 2008); and in Australia it adopts a ‘hybrid’ form of top-down 
and bottom-up approaches (Lockwood and Davidson, 2010). For collaborative 
governance approaches, this ‘impurity’ in their arrangements has been identified by 
Emerson et al. (2012); Lemos and Agrawal (2006); Koontz et al. (2004); and Scott and 
Thomas (2017). The governance arrangements, classified as ‘high’ and ‘regional’ 
collaboration, also illustrate the limited scope of collaboration, confined mostly at the 
regional level, where NRM groups are the main actors. Figure 8.1 presents a modified 
version of the governance arrangements, including the governance approaches used at 
each level to illustrate the ‘impure’ form that collaborative governance adopted. Based 
on Rhodes (1996) and Jessop’s (2011) classification of three main governance 
approaches, (A) denotes a hierarchical governance approach; (B) refers to market 
governance; and (C) refers to collaborative governance, which is the type of network 
governance approach analysed in this thesis. 
The ‘high’ collaboration domain was composed by the federal and state levels of 
governance, in which non-state actors such as the international conservation NGO and 
peak industry bodies participated. The relationships between the state and non-state 
actors within this collaborative domain followed a (C) approach. However, the state and 
federal levels relied on (A) towards the regional domain of collaboration. However, the 
state and federal levels relied on (A) towards the regional domain of collaboration. This 
top-down control by federal and state governments confirms what was stated above 
regarding the limited sharing of spheres of authority between the levels of governance 
that occurs in network or collaborative governance approaches.  
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Figure 8.1 Governance arrangements of the 2009 Reef Plan, indicating the 
governance approach followed by each level of governance in the Reef Plan. 
A=hierarchy; B=market; and C=collaboration (source: prepared by author). 
The federal government combined (A) with (B) by providing incentives to the regional 
actors, which were administered by the NRM bodies. (B) was also expressed in its 
regionalisation strategy of devolving responsibility to the regional level, in which it 
followed market notions of efficiency by using lower levels of governance (given its close 
proximity to the environmental issues), as instruments for more effective 
implementation. The use of (A) by the state government was expressed in its use of 
regulations. The Figure shows a collaborative approach (C) between the state and 
federal governments. However, the collaboration between these levels was minimal 
and, at times non-existent, as demonstrated by the lack of consultation between the two 
levels regarding the introduction of regulations.   
The lack of collaboration between state and federal levels in Australian environmental 
policy and planning responds to structural constraints of its political system. Within this 
system, the state level has a high degree of autonomy as it has constitutional powers 
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over its natural resources. The participation of Australian states and territories in federal 
water quality policies is voluntary (Robins and Kanowski, 2011). The poor collaborative 
ties between federal and state levels also responds to a weakening of the state-federal 
partnership that supported initially the regional model of governance. This was a result 
of the more centralised 2008-2013 CfoC program, in which the 2009 Reef Plan was 
embedded. In this regard, the governance arrangements of the 2009 Reef Plan are an 
example of the languishing collaborative ties among state and federal governments. 
This has been highlighted as a governance issue by Curtis et al. (2014); Robins and 
Kanowski (2011); and Vella et al. (2015).  
At the regional collaboration domain, where collaboration between the regional actors 
was decisive for the achievement of the water quality outcomes, this approach was 
mixed with (B) approaches. (B) was seen by sub-contracting engagement services from 
the NRM bodies to the industry groups as well as the competitive grants processes used 
by the NRM bodies to allocate water quality funds to local producers. An important thing 
to note in this regional domain of collaboration is that the local governments were 
excluded from the 2009 Reef Plan scheme. This represents another example of 
‘narrowed’ collaboration, which did not have inclusion within its core objectives.  
What strikes the observer when inspecting closely regional collaboration in the 2009 
Reef Plan is that, at times (and despite the stakeholders’ perceptions), regional on-
ground implementation became more a market approach than a collaborative approach, 
as it relied on competition and sub-contracting strategies to change the behaviour of 
local producers, which were the target group of the policy. Collaboration, in this sense, 
resembled more a business approach of service delivery. This was reinforced by the 
federal government’s policy of providing incentives through regionalisation, using the 
regions as vehicles for service delivery, confirming the predominant neoliberal ideology 
behind the natural resource planning and management efforts, identified by Lockwood 
and Davidson (2010). Moreover, Curtis et al. (2014) argue that the focus on 
environmental outcomes promoted by CfoC (rather than other outcomes, such as 
improving knowledge or building trust), led to emphasising market governance. This 
contradicts the official rhetoric that tends to highlight only the collaborative approach 
behind the implementation of 2009 Reef Plan (Australian Government, 2011; and 
Australian Government, 2014a), leaving the impression that water quality planning was 
all about collaboration.  
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Returning to Peter’s (2016) quote in the Introduction of this chapter, about the 
importance of governance: analysing the role of collaborative governance represents 
the first step towards explaining how state and non-state actors attempted to control 
agriculture and NRM regions to improve water quality in the GBR. In this sub-section, I 
showed that collaboration was narrow, and its impact was limited and complicated by 
the combination of market and top-down governance approaches within the 
collaborative framework of the 2009 Reef Plan. The next sub-section discusses about 
the impacts of regional collaboration on regional water quality outcomes in the GBR, as 
the next step in explaining the significance of the collaborative approach in improving 
water quality conditions and, by extension, life quality.  
8.2.2 Impact of regional collaborative governance: moving beyond uncertainty 
For the second step in the analysis of collaborative governance and its importance 
(based on the environmental outcomes achieved), I focused on the most immediate 
scale of implementation, in which the outcomes were produced. In this sub-section, I 
‘zoom in’ into the regional collaboration domain of the collaborative governance 
arrangements (Figure 8.1). As stated in the Introduction (Chapter 1), focusing on the 
appropriate governance scale is fundamental to provide a better understanding of the 
impact of governance on environmental outcomes. In this case, I selected the regional 
scale as it was the scale where on-ground implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan 
occurred. Moreover, the stakeholders of the policy identified the regional governance 
scale as the essential one and the scale where water quality outcomes were produced. 
The main purpose of analysing the regional scale was to contribute in reducing the 
uncertainty among the relationship between collaborative governance and 
environmental outcomes. Hence, I focused on the following research question: How 
regional collaborative governance approaches impacted on environmental outcomes 
achieved by the NRM regions of the GBR? 
In the analysis of the six NRM regions, I found that: 1) there was a positive tendency 
between the existence of coordinators in the NRM bodies to engage with the local 
producers, and the achievement of better water quality outcomes; 2) funding for on-
ground delivery8 was not as significant as expected in determining the achievement of 
                                                          
8 By funding for on-ground delivery, I refer to the water quality grants offered by the federal Reef Rescue 
program as incentives to change land management practices. The grants were administered by the NRM 
bodies, which allocated them through competitive processes among the local producers. 
187  
water quality outcomes; and 3) context and external factors play a significant role in the 
link between collaborative governance and environmental outcomes. This confirms the 
view that governance is more an indirect than direct driver of outcomes.  
In the first finding, the use of the coordinators proxy indicator of collaborative 
governance clarifies to some extent the different impact of regional collaborative 
governance on the water quality outcomes achieved per NRM region. In general, the 
regional collaborative governance approaches of the NRM bodies consisted in either 
collaborating directly with the local producers to change land management practices 
and reduce land pollutant runoff, or in sub-contracting this task to regional industry 
groups who worked with the local producers to introduce land management changes. 
At the regional level, the NRM bodies were the central actor and hence, the analysis 
focused mostly on them. 
The coordinators proxy variable became a tangible element of each ‘operational’ 
collaborative effort that allowed identifying a relationship between collaborative 
governance and environmental outcomes. In this case, it contributed in reducing the 
uncertainty that usually pervades the relationship between collaborative governance 
and environmental outcomes. This is an uncertainty previously noted by Koontz and 
Thomas (2006); Mandarano (2008); and Newig and Fritsch (2009). The analysis 
suggests that regional collaboration had a positive impact on water quality outcomes 
through the role of coordinators (or facilitators) that promoted change in land 
management practices amongst local producers. This coincides with Scott (2015), who 
also found a positive tendency — in a series of US watershed councils — between 
having coordinators and improved water quality outcomes. Moreover, this suggests, as 
I stated in the second finding, that collaborative approaches were more important than 
funding for on-ground delivery in the achievement of water quality outcomes. This is 
seen through the fact that regions with more coordinators, but less funding, achieved 
better water quality outcomes (Figure 6.13, Chapter 6). This contradicts the positive 
relationship between increased on-ground funds for delivery and improved water quality 
outcomes found by Scott (2016).  
Nonetheless, this does not mean that there is a correlation (cause-effect relationship) 
between coordinators and improved water quality outcomes. It only suggests that there 
appears to be a positive contribution of coordinators, which are a function of the 
collaborative approach. Hence, there appears to be a positive contribution of 
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collaboration on water quality outcomes, which by no means is conclusive. In Australia, 
so far and to my best knowledge, a similar analysis about the impact of regional 
collaborative governance on environmental outcomes has not been undertaken. This 
means it is not possible to compare what I found with other Australian cases.  
On the other hand, the regional collaborative approaches — in which the coordinators 
variable represent a function — reflect the ‘impurity’ of the collaborative governance 
arrangements. As noted in the previous section, regional collaboration was mixed with 
a market governance approach. As I pointed out in Chapter 6, in some cases the 
coordinators’ positions were sub-contracted to agriculture businesses. This fits with 
Emerson et al. (2015) and Scott and Thomas (2017) view of collaborative governance 
as a ‘toolbox’ to solve public issues. Market mechanisms such as contracting services 
are part of the collaborative ‘toolbox’. In this view, collaborative governance includes 
common policy tools, such as regulations, partnerships or contracts. This provides 
another hint to the limited impact and role of collaboration found in this study, as the 
inclusion of tools from other governance approaches resembles an expanding umbrella 
that, nonetheless, cannot manage to cover all the damp areas.  
The mixed governance approach between market and collaboration represents also an 
example at the regional level of what Curtis et al. (2014) noted about the effect that 
focusing on environmental outcomes had on governance of the national CfoC program: 
a predominance of market governance. By shifting the perspective from impact-of-
collaboration-on-environmental-outcomes to impact-of environmental-outcomes-on-
collaboration, it can be seen that the focus on achieving outcomes altered the 
collaborative approach by relying on market mechanisms of governance.  
Moreover, the focus on environmental outcomes seems to have weakened the 
emphasis on collaboration in favour of more business-style strategies, based more on 
contracts than on relationship-building. This impact on regional collaboration (moving to 
an emphasis on market mechanisms) was not noted by official rhetoric or by the 
stakeholders that participated in this research. This also explains why collaborative 
governance, despite the positive contribution of coordinators, was also limited at the 
regional level, following the same pragmatic view of collaboration found in the first 
research question. This was also reinforced by the weak collaborative ties between the 
NRM regions of the GBR, which were highlighted in Chapter 6. 
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The limited (but mildly beneficial) impact of regional collaborative governance on water 
quality outcomes is better understood when comparing the water quality targets of the 
2009 Reef Plan and the outcomes achieved (Table 7.4, Chapter 7). The collaborative 
approaches of each NRM region (distinguished by the coordinators variable) partially 
explain the impact of regional collaboration on water quality outcomes. This illustrates 
that environmental governance capacity, in the form of regional collaboration, is 
necessary to achieve environmental outcomes (Chapman, 2014). The other part of the 
explanation is provided by context and external factors, which play a significant role in 
outcome achievements. This represents the third finding of the regional scale analysis, 
framed by the second research question. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, it is important to 
incorporate contextual conditions in the analysis of how governance impacts on 
environmental outcomes. Context and external factors show that collaborative 
governance is not applied ‘uniformly’. This depends not only on the multi-governance 
setting, but also on the different contextual conditions and capacities of the regional 
organisations responsible of implementing the plan or policy. 
Context is given by the nature of the water quality problem in each of the six NRM 
regions of the GBR. The water quality issue per region was distinguished according to 
population, land sizes and uses, as well as contribution of pollutant loads in the Reef 
catchment (see the typology of NRM regions, Tables 6.2, 6.4 and 6.5, Chapter 6). Even 
though the six NRM regions faced different water quality issues, such as some having 
large land grazing areas (Burdekin and Fitzroy), and others having small sugarcane 
areas (Mackay Whitsundays and Wet Tropics), they were held to the same water quality 
targets by the 2009 Reef Plan. This relates with the inappropriate project selection of 
the plan, pointed out by the stakeholders. Project selection is part of staff skills, identified 
as a key external factor within the implementation of the plan (Table 6.9, Chapter 6). An 
important consequence of not taking the context into account was not being able to 
identify the areas with most impact on water quality, the so-called ‘hotspots’. As one 
actor form the agriculture sector explained: 
“Reef Rescue was just blanket, from my understanding it was just investment all around, 
so not necessarily where you really need it to put all the investment to get the best 
outcome… and there were components were maybe they’ve been funded for things that 
weren’t having a great or the best public benefit, more of a private benefit.” 
The inappropriate project selection was also highlighted by an evaluation report on 
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management effectiveness of the GBR (Hockings et al., 2014). In addition, applying the 
same water quality targets for all NRM regions represents another example of the limited 
role of collaboration within the mix of other governance approaches, as the targets were 
defined by the central government in a hierarchical way.  
Apart from the nature of the water quality problem understood through the typology of 
NRM regions9, governance structures of the NRM bodies were the other contextual 
element (Table 6.8, Chapter 6). Although similar in general, the governance structures 
reflect different implementing capacities of the NRM bodies, which are also related with 
the different regional water quality outcomes achieved. What was surprising in this 
regard was that, regardless of funding, regions with less capacity10 (as rated by Robins 
and Dovers, 2007a) achieved better water quality outcomes (Figure 6.12, Chapter 6). 
Coincidentally, these regions also had more coordinators available to implement the 
plan, which reinforces the positive impact of regional collaboration.   
Context was complemented with external factors to the collaborative approaches. 
Among these main factors was funding for on-ground delivery. According to the second 
finding of this section, this type of funding appeared less significant than the regional 
collaborative approaches in the achievement of water quality outcomes. However, this 
does not mean that funding is not important. It only means that it should be allocated 
differently. Apart from staff skills mentioned above, data standards were another key 
external factor influencing the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan. Both are 
interrelated and can be considered more as internal factors as they form part of the 
internal composition of the NRM bodies. It is worth noting that data standards may have 
had a significant influence in the final water quality outcomes reported by each region 
to the federal government. Moreover, data standards probably contributed in reflecting 
the differences in water quality outcomes achieved, as each NRM body followed 
different methods to report their achievements. It might be possible that NRM bodies 
with higher staff skills were able to apply more sophisticated data standards that 
reported better water quality outcomes. As one regional actor explained: 
“The rigour in which that was done, that was done by the project officers that were working 
                                                          
9 The typology of NRM regions in the GBR represents a novel element in the analysis of governance of the 
GBR. To the best of my knowledge, there have not been similar attempts at typifying the different contexts 
of NRM regions within the GBR.  
10 The capacity of the NRM regions was ranked according to access levels to resources (e.g. research, 
finances, and infrastructure), population numbers, and priority levels in federal water quality policies. 
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on the project within the region, and there's different quality of that data. So, generally it's 
ok, but it's really, I know that there was a lot of over-reporting, no sorry, not a lot, there was 
over-reporting.” 
Hence, the lack of ‘uniformity’ in implementing the collaborative approach is also seen 
through divergent data standards followed by the NRM bodies. This also points out to 
monitoring and reporting issues. There were other external factors influencing 
implementation, such as weather events (e.g. floods and cyclones) and market shifts 
(e.g. international price changes); however, their impact stood more aside of the NRM 
bodies’ internal structures. 
Surprisingly, the stakeholders did not mention politics (e.g. impact of politicians’ 
decisions or political ‘lobbying’ in NRM and planning) among the external factors, 
despite its implicit importance in collaborative processes (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 
2000). Perhaps, stakeholders did not mention politics in order to avoid controversy. For 
example, they did not discuss about issues with other regions or enter into comparisons 
about their efforts, even though it was accepted that different funding amounts led to 
resentments between regions. This also contributes to explain the poor cross-regional 
collaboration during the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan. On the other hand, the 
analysis of the impact of politics on the relationship between collaborative governance 
and environmental outcomes has not been considered by previous literature and stands 
out of the scope of my study. 
In summary, coordinators had a positive trend associated with the achievement of better 
water quality outcomes. The coordinators proxy variable also contributed in 
distinguishing between the collaborative approaches followed by the regional NRM 
bodies. The positive association between having coordinators and achieving more 
pollutant reductions partially explains why NRM regions with less funding achieved 
better water quality outcomes. This reinforces the view that governance acts more as 
an indirect driver of outcomes. Apart from regional collaboration, context and external 
factors complement the explanation of achieving better water quality outcomes despite 
more or less funding. For contextual purposes, the water quality issue was not the same 
in each of the six NRM regions. However, in the 2009 Reef Plan the regions were 
subjected to the same water quality targets. Regarding external factors, a key finding 
was that funding for on-ground delivery does not necessarily leads to achieving better 
water quality outcomes. Additionally, staff skills interrelated with data standards (aside 
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of coordinators) had an important contribution in terms of variances in water quality 
outcomes achieved. They represent direct drivers of outcomes.  
This analysis of collaborative governance at the regional scale represented the second 
step in explaining — following Peter’s (2016) quote on the importance of governance — 
how agriculture and the NRM regions were governed through collaboration to improve 
water quality. In this sub-section, I suggested that regional collaboration had a positive 
impact on the water quality outcomes achieved. I also contributed in clarifying the 
relationship between regional collaborative governance and environmental outcomes, 
reinforcing the argument that governance is an indirect driver of environmental 
outcomes. In this regard, it is essential to take into account other variables apart from 
governance, such as context and external factors to understand the environmental 
outcomes achieved. The next sub-section discusses how the overall collaborative 
processes (incorporating all the other governance levels) impacted on the water quality 
outcomes achieved by the 2009 Reef Plan.  
8.2.3 Process-Outcomes governance evaluation of collaboration in the GBR: 
mixed impact and tensions  
In this sub-section, I ‘zoom out’ from the regional scale presented in the previous section 
to a wider scale, which includes the high collaboration domain of collaborative 
governance arrangements (Figure 8.1). The purpose of this ‘zooming out’ is to cover all 
governance levels in the discussion about the overall impact of collaborative 
governance on water quality outcomes of the 2009 Reef Plan.  This represents the third 
step in the analysis of collaborative governance and its contribution in achieving 
environmental outcomes. The discussion is framed by the Process-Outcomes 
governance evaluation framework (Rauschmayer et al., 2009) to focus on the third 
research question of this study: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the 
collaborative governance approach?  
Through the application of the Process-Outcomes governance evaluation framework, I 
found that: 1) collaborative governance processes had a mixed impact, some facilitated 
while others blocked the achievement of water quality outcomes; and 2) this mixed 
impact of collaborative governance responds to the mixed or ‘impure’ condition of the 
collaborative approach, which created tensions between regulations vs incentives, and 
competition vs collaboration. 
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The first finding offers a glance inside the ‘circle’ of collaborative governance processes 
of the 2009 Reef Plan (Figure 8.2 below, also shown in Chapter 7). This analysis 
contributed to reduce the vagueness around the practice of governance, mentioned in 
the Introduction of this chapter. This represented another way of showing that 
governance is ‘something’, a process of steering and coordinating through different tools 
the achievement of goals behind an environmental planning effort. So far, and to my 
best knowledge, previous research within Australia had not assessed the collaborative 
processes and its impact on environmental outcomes. The identification of these 
processes was based on a review of collaborative governance criteria developed in 
Chapter 4. Therefore, a key contribution of this research was to open the ‘box’ of 
collaborative governance through the use of the Rauschmayer et al. (2009) framework, 
and find out how its different processes impacted on water quality outcomes. One of the 
main implications of this governance analysis was to make explicit how collaborative 
governance represents an indirect driver of water quality outcomes, either by facilitating 
or blocking their achievement.  
Figure 8.2 Process-Outcomes governance evaluation framework with the results 
from the case study analysis of the GBR, adapted from Rauschmayer et al. 
(2009). 
The (+) sign indicates a positive impact of the collaborative governance process, while (–) indicates a 
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negative impact, and (0) a neutral impact. The overall consequence was a poor condition of water quality 
in the GBR catchment after the collaborative governance planning intervention. 
The mixed impact of collaborative governance coincided with the same mixed impact 
found in the review of Chapter 4. In both, different elements of collaboration (identified 
in the collaborative governance ‘circle’ of Figure 8.2) had either a positive, neutral or 
negative impact on environmental outcomes. The positive elements were seen as 
facilitating achievement of outcomes, while negative elements were viewed as blocking 
them. Neutral elements did not have a clear impact. As shown by Figure 8.2, stakeholder 
engagement, learning and decentralisation facilitated the achievement of outcomes, 
and represent the strengths of the collaborative governance approach. Competition and 
public participation had a neutral impact on water quality outcomes, representing 
elements that could become strengths of collaboration. Coordination and regulations 
blocked the achievement, representing the weaknesses. Stakeholder engagement 
validates the pragmatic approach adopted for collaboration, in which stakeholders 
engaged to implement the plan and inform about its progress, devoting limited time and 
space for negotiations or deliberations. The positive impact of stakeholder engagement 
was also found by Vella et al (2017) in their unpublished report on the evaluation of 
Queensland regional NRM arrangements, which included the 14 regions of the state. 
Collaboration was functional but not inclusive, as stakeholders accepted that power 
differences and access to resources limited the scope of engagement and, in 
consequence, the achievement of water quality outcomes. This view was synthesised 
by a regional actor: 
“There were certainly differences in power and access to resources… If you're talking about 
an outcome in terms of engagement and feeling empowered, and that sort of thing as it 
is… Then yes, it probably did have an outcome, it probably did have a negative outcome.” 
The process of learning, particularly of knowledge sharing, represents the second 
strength, confirmed by improved collaboration and water quality outcomes achieved in 
comparison with the 2003 Reef Plan, as well as subsequent plans for water quality that 
rely on collaboration (Australian and Queensland Governments, 2013). Contrary to what 
Curtis et al. (2014) argue about the CfoC (where the 2009 Reef Plan was embedded) 
that focused more on a business approach than on learning or building trust, the 
stakeholders interviewed felt that they learned from past planning experiences. As one 
regional actor stated, reflecting on the legacy of the 2009 Reef Plan and Reef Rescue 
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in their present efforts (which confirms also the essential role of regional collaboration): 
“Trust is not really a thing to improve as it is something that the NRM group has worked 
with the industry in the past eight years (referring to the process started by the 2009 Reef 
Plan). The NRM group now has trust on the agriculture industry and that is why the industry 
is responsible of delivering the program.” 
Learning was also identified as a strength by Vella et al (2017) evaluation of general 
regional NRM arrangements. The authors highlight especially the capacity of the NRM 
bodies in Queensland to gather knowledge from multiple sources (i.e. scientific, 
indigenous and policy), playing the role of “knowledge brokers”. Decentralisation 
represented the third and final strength of collaborative governance. This shows that the 
regionalisation strategy of devolving responsibility to the regional level for plan delivery 
has had a positive impact. Regardless of its limited sharing of power, the decentralising 
process involved in the collaborative approach was perceived as beneficial for achieving 
water quality outcomes. This confirms Robins and Kanowski’s (2011) finding on 
decentralisation as being the preferred approach by stakeholders to implement NRM 
and planning. It also coincides with the positive impact of decentralisation in the GBR 
context found by Taylor and Van Grieken (2015).  
Competition and public participation were neutral, as they did not have a perceived 
impact on water quality outcomes. Given the predominance of neoliberal ideology in 
Australian water quality planning and management (mentioned in the discussion of the 
first research question), competing for funding or other resources in collaborative 
governance was perceived as largely normal by the stakeholders. Hence, it became in 
their view a neutral process. Public participation was also considered neutral as the 
stakeholders perceived it was not part of the plan. The lack of public participation (as 
argued in Chapter 7) supports the limited role of collaboration found in the first research 
question, as the public (e.g. citizens of regional communities) was not involved in the 
collaborative processes. This also contradicts the findings by Vella et al (2017) –at least 
for the NRM regions of the GBR that plan and manage water quality− who considered 
that participation was consistent along the governance arrangements of Queensland 
NRM regions. Additionally, given the mixed governance approaches within collaborative 
governance, this shows the paradox of participation, where hierarchy and network 
approaches such as collaboration, have not been effectively combined to promote public 
participation (Curtis and Lockwood, 2000). The weaknesses of the collaborative 
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approach are represented by coordination and regulations. Coordination has been 
highlighted as a persistent governance challenge of natural resource management and 
planning, mainly due to the Australian multi-level governance setting (Morrison et al., 
2004; and Peterson et al., 2010). 
Regulations, along with competition, link with the second finding of this section, 
regarding the tensions found in collaborative governance: regulating while providing 
incentives; and collaborating while promoting competition. The tensions respond to the 
‘impure’ condition of collaboration previously highlighted, in which other governance 
approaches such as hierarchy (regulations) and markets (competition and incentives) 
interact. This fits with Beck’s (1992) concept of ‘second modernity’, where he sees social 
evolution characterised by tense relationships between contradictory phenomena that 
coexist and even need each other. Within this logic, for example, “both strong leadership 
and decentralised ownership are needed” (Meuleman, 2015, p. 12301). Furthermore, 
Lockdown and Davidson argue that ‘pure’ modes of governance are poorly equipped to 
respond to the complexity and multi-scalar character of coupled social and natural 
systems” (2010, p. 388). However, as this study shows, ‘impure’ governance 
approaches can also lead to tensions that contribute in blocking the achievement of 
water quality outcomes. The tensions found are also inherent to governing at multiple 
scales (Ansell and Torfing, 2015). In this case, apart from the regional scale, the 
collaborative effort included national, state and local scales.  
For instance, regulations promoted fear and unwillingness to collaborate from the local 
producers, the target group of the plan, while competition contradicted the collaborative 
nature of the 2009 Reef Plan, excluding potential participants that could not compete 
with larger producers. It is important to note, though, that these tensions were not 
perceived as negative per se by the stakeholders. On the contrary, regulations and 
competition were viewed in principle as beneficial to the collaborative approach. The 
stakeholders only considered that they required adjustments to have the desired effect 
on water quality outcomes. An actor from the federal level exemplified this position, 
regarding the tension between incentives and regulations: 
“The two things (incentives and regulations), they should've worked side by side, with the 
voluntary approach targeting one section of the industry, the regulatory approach targeting 
a different segment of the industry, but yeah, the way regulations were rolled out, it was 
really, it was really challenging… There wasn't enough consultation in my opinion, and so 
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they came as a big surprise and yeah, everybody was pretty angry.” 
This supports Ansell’s (2012) argument about the need to have regulations to underpin 
collaborative governance, but with the essential requirement of developing them 
collaboratively. This tension also responds to the poor collaborative ties between the 
federal and state governments mentioned in the findings of the first research question. 
With regards to competition, this was a unique element of the collaborative approach of 
the 2009 Reef Plan; hence, there are no studies to compare its impact. The stakeholders 
involved in this study generally considered that competition complemented collaboration 
as it promoted efficiency, but were not clear about the ways to design this element to 
achieve a beneficial impact on water quality outcomes. This view was illustrated by one 
actor from the state level: 
“The common wisdom of government investment (in NRM) is taken from the commercial 
world, where competition is, usually, gets you the best price. But I don't know enough to 
know whether that's well translated into natural resource management working in that 
collaborative setting with farmers.”  
Reconsidering Peter’s (2016) quote, this section represented the third step in explaining 
the attempt to control through collaboration an economic activity (agriculture) and a 
broad society (NRM regions) to improve water quality in a key Australian ecosystem 
(the GBR). I showed that collaborative governance had a mixed impact on the 
achievement of environmental outcomes, similar to the one found by other studies 
(Chapter 4).  Through the examination of collaborative processes, I was able to indicate 
which ones facilitated and which ones contributed in blocking the achievement of water 
quality outcomes. In this way, I made explicit the ways in which collaborative 
governance drove indirectly the achievement of environmental outcomes. In addition, I 
indicated explicitly the tensions (regulations versus incentives, and collaboration versus 
competition) created by the combination of hierarchy and market approaches within the 
collaborative governance arrangements of the 2009 Reef Plan. The next section 
discusses the implications of the impact of collaborative governance on environmental 
outcomes, and offers a set of recommendations based on the findings discussed in 
these sub-sections. 
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8.3 Directions for collaborative governance in Australian environmental policy 
and planning: from governance failure to metagovernance 
In this section, I focus on the implications of the findings discussed in the Key Findings, 
Section 8.2. This represents the fourth and final step in analysing the significance of 
collaborative governance for the achievement of environmental outcomes. Apart from 
the implications, the section offers recommendations for improving the collaborative 
governance approach to facilitate better achievement of water quality outcomes and, in 
general, better environmental outcomes. The recommendations can be understood as 
directions to overcome what could be perceived as governance failure in water quality 
planning, given the water quality outcomes achieved. The implications and 
recommendations are framed by the main research question of this study, regarding 
how collaborative governance impacted on environmental outcomes in Australian 
environmental policy and planning. The section addresses the fourth and final research 
question: What are the implications of collaborative governance in Australian natural 
resource planning and management? 
Through the findings of the research, I infer that: 1) the governance evaluation implies 
that collaborative governance is a necessary but insufficient condition to improve water 
quality outcomes (and environmental outcomes in general); and 2) the ‘impurity’ of 
collaborative governance calls for a metagovernance role to better manage the tensions 
between mixed governance approaches. 
The first implication is given by the mixed impact of collaborative governance, which is 
shown through its strengths and weaknesses as well as its ‘impurity’. The important 
thing to highlight about this first implication is that, overall, collaborative governance 
seems to have failed as the condition of water quality remained poor after the 
implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan (Figure 8.2 provides more detail on water quality 
outcomes achieved). Before the plan, water quality in the GBR was poor and after the 
plan, this condition persisted. This indicates a governance failure, exemplified through 
the limited role of collaboration, its mixed impact and tensions, as well as the varied 
regional collaborative implementation approaches. However, I argue that failures in 
collaborative governance offer only a partial explanation as other variables are in place 
in the water quality issue, such as context and external factors (discussed in the second 
research question). Thus, I argue that these variables, shown in Figure 8.2 as elements 
of uncertainty, also account for the overall poor water quality condition achieved.  
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To use an analogy, focusing on the collaborative governance variable is like focusing 
on ways that the captain and his crew select the direction of the steering wheel (Figure 
4.1, Chapter 4) to reach the mainland. Context and the external factors refer, on the 
other hand, to the physical conditions of the ship, navigation instruments, abilities of the 
crew, passenger’s responses, weather conditions as well as influence of other ships 
sailing the same ocean. This implies that improving the direction of the steering wheel 
(e.g. head northeast or southwest) does not guarantee reaching the destination. In the 
context of this study, improving collaborative governance does not guarantee achieving 
the goals of a plan or policy, e.g. targeted environmental outcomes. 
In other words, it would be simplistic to state that the policy or plan failed because there 
were failures in governance. Or, through another perspective, assume that by correcting 
governance failures, the targets and goals of an environmental plan or policy would be 
achieved. This links with the uncertainty prevailing in the relationship between 
collaborative governance and environmental outcomes due to multiple variables 
involved in environmental issues. This unavoidable uncertainty has been stressed by 
Emerson and Nabatchi (2015); Newig and Fritsch (2009); Scott (2015); Scott (2016); 
and Ulibarri (2015). As a consequence, I argue that collaborative governance in water 
quality planning and management is necessary but insufficient to improve environmental 
outcomes. This is reinforced by the main finding of Chapter 4, where I reached the same 
conclusion after reviewing international studies focusing on the impact of collaborative 
governance on environmental outcomes. This implies that the collaborative path 
adopted for water quality planning in the GBR has been appropriate. However, it 
requires modifying the collaborative approach to improve its role as facilitator (or indirect 
driver) in improving environmental outcomes.  
The required modifications to the collaborative approach lead to the second implication 
of this evaluation. Overcoming the failures of collaborative governance call for a 
metagovernance role that could facilitate better achievement of environmental 
outcomes. Metagovernance refers to the “governance of governance” (Jessop, 2011, p. 
106). It is designed to deal with the tensions introduced by the interaction of different 
governance approaches within the ‘impure’ collaborative governance approach. This 
means that the ‘impurity’ of collaborative governance is not a negative condition. In fact, 
there are no ‘pure’ governance approaches and, therefore, it would be misleading to 
recommend attaining a ‘pure’ collaborative governance model. So far, the only means 
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available to improve the performance of ‘impure’ governance is metagovernance, as it 
involves “rebalancing market, hierarchy and networks” (Meuleman, 2008, p. 68). It is 
important to remind that collaborative governance is a type of network governance.  
As metagovernance is designed to manage governance failure, it becomes a tool 
outside the collaborative governance ‘toolbox’ of Scott and Thomas (2017). A tool that 
would allow a better use of the governance ‘umbrella’ for either expanding it or reducing 
it as necessary to cover from the damp areas. An example of this metagovernance 
‘umbrella’ is the Better Regulation Toolbox established in the European Union, which 
includes a variety of tools from different governance approaches to improve the 
implementation of sustainable development goals (SDGs) (Meuleman, 2015, p. 12305) 
The metagovernance role to improve the collaborative approach in the water quality 
issue fits with the Network Management metagovernance tool of Sorensen and Torfing 
(2009). Network management introduces the figure of a network manager or 
metagovernor that can contribute not only in reducing tensions within the collaborative 
governance process, but also increase equality of these processes through more 
inclusion and deliberation. In this way, metagovernance — apart from contributing in 
achieving better environmental outcomes — could promote the democratisation of the 
collaborative approach. This links with Ansell’s (2012) view of ‘ambitious’ collaborative 
governance. Hence, a likely consequence of relying on metagovernance would be to 
improve the limited impact of collaboration in water quality policies and plans.  
Considering the collaborative governance arrangements of the 2009 Reef Plan (Figure 
8.1), the federal and state governments could adopt the role of metagovernors. In this 
regard, both actors had a decisive coordinating function of regional governance, as the 
one envisioned by Montin et al. (2014), and illustrated by the federal incentive-based 
role and the state regulatory-based one. Both levels of government can be seen as 
metagovernors that failed to conduct metagovernance in the implementation of the 2009 
Reef Plan due to their poor collaboration ties. In this case, the federal level cannot rule 
out the state when attempting to metagovern as the state government has jurisdiction 
over natural resources, such as water.  
A way to improve the combination of the three governance approaches (hierarchy, 
market and network) would be through an agreement between the potential 
metagovernors (state and federal governments) to coordinate the implementation of the 
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water quality plan. In this way, for example, a better combination of governance 
approaches would ensure that regulations are effective at changing the behaviour of the 
reluctant land holders, while the incentives are allocated to the appropriate landholders. 
Metagovernance would also contribute to improve the coordination weaknesses in the 
multi-level governance implementation setting, which were discussed in the previous 
research question as well as in Chapter 7. There was an agreement between both 
government levels to implement the 2009 Reef Plan11. However, it did not translate into 
practice, according to how the governance arrangements operated and the tensions 
they created. The lack of collaboration between both government levels was also 
highlighted by the stakeholders that participated in this study. In 2015, an updated 
agreement was established to implement the Reef 2050 Plan. The metagovernor role 
could fit in this current plan.   
Returning to the ship analogy of collaborative governance, the metagovernor would be 
an advisor or group of advisors of the captain with specialised skills and training to 
oversee the ship’s route progress to mainland. The metagovernor is an entity from the 
government. Meuleman (2008) assigns the metagovernor role to a group of public 
managers. This group or entity from the government should have the ability to 
understand the tensions created by the interactions of hierarchy, market and 
collaboration, and manage them to improve their performance. The paradox behind 
metagovernance though is that it requires collaboration between the actors that appoint 
this role. In the case of the GBR, it would require collaboration between the stakeholders 
shown in the collaborative governance arrangements (Figure 8.1). Hence, the call for 
metagovernance of collaborative governance suggests the need for stronger 
collaboration. From the governance evaluation perspective I adopted, metagovernance 
is a way of improving the limited impact that collaboration had in the achievement of 
water quality outcomes. In this way, metagovernance contributes to making governance 
more effective. 
However, Sorensen and Torfing (2009) warn about the limits of metagovernance, 
highlighting its complexity and “inherently imperfect strategic practice” (p. 253). The 
authors underline two key dilemmas in metagoverning: 1) excessive vs insufficient; and 
                                                          
11 The 2009 Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement was established between the Queensland 
and Australian governments to provide a framework through which both governments would work together 
for the protection of the GBR (Australian Government, 2017). 
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2) hands-on vs hands-off. In the first dilemma, the inability to find a balance between 
excessive and insufficient metagovernance can lead to political conflicts, 
underperformance of governance and fragmentation. The second dilemma also meets 
the difficulty of balancing hands-on and hands-off metagovernance, where too much 
hands-on can create implementation resistance, while too much hands-off can lead to 
loose collaborative ties between the actors. Jessop (2011) adds that metagovernance 
can also fail as it might be impossible to find the right ‘mix’ between the governance 
approaches within collaboration. He adds, somewhat ironically, that the perception of 
effective governance12 (supported by metagovernance) has depended on displacing 
governance issues elsewhere or postponing them indefinitely.  
In other words, metagovernance does not guarantee effective governance performance, 
such as achieving the expected goals of a plan or policy. It is designed more as an 
amending tool to manage the complexity of governance. This also leads to issues of 
state capacity, regarding the ability and willingness of the Australian and Queensland 
governments to metagovern. Nonetheless, this does not invalidate the use of 
metagovernance as an alternative to improve the impact of collaborative governance on 
environmental outcomes. Policymakers and planners should be aware of its limits.  
8.3.1 Contribution to knowledge 
In this section, I present the main contributions of this research, which are based on the 
key findings and research gaps. First, the thesis advanced knowledge on the role of 
collaborative governance by showing how a collaborative approach was implemented 
within environmental policy and planning. This analysis on the implementation of a 
collaborative approach addressed the research gap on the low evidence that exists 
around collaborative governance responses to environmental issues, particularly in 
Australia. The study highlighted the “impure” nature of collaborative governance which, 
aside from collaboration, mixes market and hierarchy governance approaches in its 
implementation. The role of collaborative governance is limited by its interaction with 
other governance approaches. For instance, the “impurity” of collaborative governance 
limited the expected benefits of collaborating, such as greater levels of deliberation, 
inclusion and participation from the actors involved.  
                                                          
12 Jessop understands effective metagovernance as the capacity to modify and readjust the mix of 
governance modes according to changes in the issue at hand, e.g. population growth, climate change or 
financial resources (Chapter 2, metagovernance sub-section). 
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Second, the study demonstrated how the collaborative approach had a mixed impact on 
the achievement of water quality outcomes. This addressed the research gap around the 
level effectiveness of collaborative governance arrangements in delivering environmental 
policy and planning efforts. The analysis was done through the application of a 
governance process-outcomes framework, which has not previously been applied to 
study collaborative governance. Depending on the collaborative governance process 
examined, collaboration turned out to be either: positive, neutral or negative in the 
achievement of water quality outcomes. This categorization of the impact of collaborative 
governance processes advanced knowledge by identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses within the collaborative approach examined. The process-outcomes 
analysis focus on the tensions created between the different nature and instruments used 
by hierarchy, markets and collaboration (e.g. regulations vs incentives and competition 
vs collaboration). 
 
Third, the thesis advanced knowledge regarding the relationship between collaborative 
governance and environmental outcomes. This addressed the research gap around the 
uncertainty that exists in this relationship, particularly around the contribution of 
collaborative governance in achieving improved environmental outcomes. By considering 
different levels of governance involved in environmental policy and planning (federal, 
state and regional), the study showed that collaborative governance represents an 
indirect driver of environmental outcomes. As an indirect driver, collaborative governance 
was necessary but not sufficient for improving the water quality outcomes. Moreover, the 
analysis found that context as well as external factors were drivers in achieving 
environmental outcomes. Context represented another indirect driver, providing key 
elements to understand the condition of the research subject, such as geographic and 
socio-economic characteristics. External factors, such as funding, staff skills or data 
standards, represented direct drivers in the achievement of environmental outcomes. 
Through the use of a proxy variable for collaboration (i.e. number of coordinators) at the 
regional level of governance, it was surprising that funding for on-ground delivery seemed 
less decisive than collaborative governance in the achievement of water quality 
outcomes. Thus, collaboration is one of many variables that help resolve environmental 
issues. Improving governance is an important but not a sufficient condition in the efforts 
to enhance environmental conditions, such as the quality of water. 
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Finally, the thesis found that the use of metagovernance tools could improve the impact 
of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes. In this regard, metagovernance 
provided a different perspective through which to address the limited impact of 
collaborative governance. For instance, rather than promoting the use of more “pure” 
forms of collaboration, metagovernance provides the framework to improve the 
integration of different governance approaches under the collaborative governance 
“umbrella”. This information is useful for practitioners (e.g. planners and policymakers) 
working to improve environmental conditions.  
 
8.3.2 Recommendations 
Following the discussion, I present the recommendations in a bullet-point format. I 
consider that this format allows a prompt understanding for the reader. This is also a 
straight-forward form of presenting the directions that could be followed by 
policymakers, planners or other people involved in environmental policy and planning. 
The recommendations are focused on the case study of the GBR. However, they could 
be applied to other environmental issues in the Australian context. The details of these 
recommendations have already been presented in the previous content of this 
synthesis. Through the analysis and evaluation of the impact of collaborative 
governance on water quality outcomes, I recommend the following: 
 Stronger collaboration promoted by the governance arrangements (Figure 8.1): 
o Improve collaborative ties between state and federal levels, particularly to 
agree on the tools to change behaviour (e.g. regulations and incentives) as 
well as funding. In addition, improved collaboration would support better 
coordination in the implementation of water quality policies and plans. 
o Enhance cross-regional collaboration between the NRM regions to support 
better coordination in the implementation of water quality policies and plans, 
as well as improve their reporting and monitoring standards. 
o Allocate more funding to regional collaboration, e.g. through the appointment 
of coordinators or similar roles that promote engagement of the policies’ target 
groups.  
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 Expand the limited role of collaboration: 
o Use metagovernance to improve collaborative governance: 
o Create an entity or organisation of metagovernors (e.g. public managers from 
the state and federal governments) devoted to modifying and readjusting the 
combined governance approaches (hierarchy, market and collaboration) 
according to the demands of the water quality issue. 
o Develop an agreement between the potential metagovernors, the state and 
federal governments, to establish the metagoverning entity. This would 
represent an institution outside and above the four levels of governance 
(federal, state, regional and local), devoted to steer governance approaches 
towards the achievement of environmental outcomes. 
8.4 Limits and further research areas 
The case study analysis of the GBR (Chapters 6 and 7) centred on a five-year period. 
In this time period (2008-2013), the 2009 Reef Plan and Reef Rescue program were 
implemented. The case study represents a snapshot in the governance timeline of the 
water quality plans, which run from 2003 to 2015 and ongoing. As remarked in Chapter 
3, focusing on past events in case study analysis is similar to adopting the role of a 
detective, who examines past events to understand the crime motives and how it 
occurred (Yin, 2014). In this case, I examined the impact of collaborative governance 
on environmental outcomes. Collaboration was a governance approach adopted by the 
2009 Reef Plan to improve the water quality condition of the GBR. Similar to a detective, 
this analysis allowed developing inferences (based on stakeholders’ perceptions, data 
and documents) about the implications on the impact of collaboration on water quality 
outcomes. Contrary to what official reports said on the role of collaboration in the 2009 
Reef Plan, this study found that the collaborative governance arrangements had a 
marginal role in plan implementation. Moreover, they were mixed with other 
arrangements, such as markets and hierarchy. As a consequence, the 
recommendations focused mainly on suggesting the adoption of stronger collaborative 
governance arrangements and expanding the limited role of collaboration. This type of 
research had not been done previously in the Australian context, and it allowed me to 
present a novel perspective into environmental governance. Studying past events 
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offered a detailed glance into affairs that occurred in the real world. It is not, therefore, 
a study of the dead past (Yin, 2014).  
Recent developments have altered the course of events in the GBR’s water quality 
planning and management, such as modifying the water quality targets and prioritising 
land-uses (Australian and Queensland Governments, 2013; and Australian 
Government, 2015b). However, the governance challenges found in this study remain 
relevant as water quality planning still relies on collaborative governance. Despite the 
limited focus of the five-year period of this study, the governance findings and 
implications presented are important as, so far, there has not been an evaluation of 
governance based on water quality outcomes achieved in the GBR (either at the general 
or at the regional scale of governance). Moreover, the research outputs, such as the 
process-outcomes governance evaluation can be applied to any policy and planning 
issue in the environmental realm and others. Also, this type of research can be 
undertaken in international contexts, not only in Australia.  
During the study, the majority of the stakeholders interviewed argued that the 
collaborative governance arrangements were too complex. Governance improvements, 
they added, should focus on simplifying these governance arrangements. After this 
research and based on the evidence, I would state that rather than simplifying, the 
collaborative governance arrangements require a better combination. As I 
recommended in the previous section, this could be achieved through metagovernance, 
which focuses on improving the combination of the governance approaches that coexist 
within collaborative governance. As water quality is a complex issue, it requires also 
complex solutions. Therefore, instead of achieving governance simplification, it would 
be more appropriate to achieve governance coordination.  
It is important to note that the case study analysis is based largely on stakeholders’ 
perceptions. In other words, on what the stakeholders think occurred with governance 
of in the 2009 Reef Plan and Reef Rescue. As Peters (2016) argues, governance is 
mainly determined by the decisions of the actors (individuals and organisations) that 
participate in policymaking or plan making.  However, the limit that perceptions might 
pose on the study was balanced with data on water quality outcomes achieved, the 
development of a proxy variable to assess collaboration as well as document analysis. 
This provided a contrast between what was perceived and what actually occurred. 
Moreover, this study combined two main evaluation methods used to examine 
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collaborative approaches stated by Conley and Moote (2003): measure tangible 
outcomes (e.g. comparing achieved water quality outcomes with targeted ones, and 
designing proxy variables to link collaboration to outcomes), and measure participant’s 
perceptions (e.g. short survey and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders). In 
addition, Rauschmayer et al. (2009) argue that perceptions constitute one of the main 
sources in evaluating collaborative approaches.  
Finally, focusing on governance as the main explanatory variable offers a partial picture 
on environmental policy and planning. One mainly concerned with governance roles 
and impacts, and the relevance of governance in environmental policy and planning. 
This study, hence, did not represent a multiple variable investigation. However, the 
focus on governance in its collaborative approach allowed me to offer details on how 
this variable represents an indirect driver of environmental outcomes. More important, 
it allowed me to show how this indirect driver can be improved to achieve better 
environmental outcomes.  
Due to the nature of this study, new findings lead to new questions, and limited time 
does not allow covering all issues that arise during the research. Along Chapters 6 and 
7, I identified further research areas, which I summarise below: 
 Examine informal collaboration processes between the stakeholders at the 
regional level of governance. This would require a more in-depth case analysis, 
such as comparing two NRM regions in the GBR as well as other Australian or 
international NRM and planning contexts. 
 Apply the proxy variable to other collaborative governance contexts, identifying 
ways to include within it levels of staff skills.  
 Analyse the role of public participation within collaborative environmental policy 
and planning. 
 Measure the impact of external factors (outside the governance arrangements) on 
environmental outcomes, such as market shifts, weather events, and monitoring 
and reporting methods. 
 Examine the impact of collaborative governance on other type of outcomes, such 
as social (e.g. trust, capacity building or democratic reconstruction) or economic 
208  
(e.g. job creation, sources of revenue or innovation) to offer evidence on the 
benefits of collaborating, apart from the improvement on environmental outcomes. 
 Analyse the impact of power and politics in the relationship between collaborative 
governance and environmental outcomes.  
 Compare collaborative approaches that use competition with those that do not 
rely on this tool to find out its contribution on the achievement of improved 
environmental outcomes. 
8.5 Conclusions 
In the quest to improve planning and management of natural resources, such as water, 
governance is recognised amongst the most significant but vague challenges. As stated 
by Peters (2016), governance is important as it represents the process through which 
societies attempt to control their economies and societies. Improving the conditions of 
natural resources stands within this governing attempts. Similar to most developed 
countries, Australia adopted collaborative governance approaches to improve 
environmental conditions. In theory, collaboration seemed to represent a more 
appropriate approach to manage and plan natural resources. In practice, however, the 
appropriateness and adequacy of collaboration in environmental governance is 
disputable. This study is positioned amongst those evaluating the benefits of 
collaborating based on the results it achieved. For this purpose, I focused on the impact 
of collaborative governance on environmental outcomes. This is the first study in 
Australia to adopt this focus.  
By focusing on water quality outcomes in the GBR case study, this study determined 
that collaborative governance was limited but, nonetheless beneficial. Hence, rather 
than adopting another governance approach, collaborative governance requires 
modifications to improve its contribution towards the achievement of better water quality 
outcomes. In other words, collaboration is appropriate to manage and plan natural 
resources. However, it requires adjustments to improve environmental outcomes. 
Within this task of improving collaboration, the study highlighted how collaborative 
governance in practice includes other governance approaches, representing a ‘hybrid’ 
or ‘impure’ approach to governance. This involves the creation of tensions between 
apparent contradictory elements in collaboration, such as market and hierarchy 
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governance instruments. Contrary to what could be expected, these tensions would not 
be improved by attaining more ‘purity’ in the collaborative approach. Instead, I argued 
that the ‘impurity’ could be managed through metagovernance. As a consequence, I 
developed a set of recommendations that, at its core, require stronger collaboration and 
commitment between the federal and state governments in Australia.  
As governance is concerned with the quality of life, understanding governance 
contributes in understanding its contribution to life quality of human and other beings 
(as stated in the Introduction of this chapter). By evaluating governance, I was able to 
provide an explanation of not only how collaborative governance impacted on water 
quality but, more importantly, I stressed the potentialities that lie in the collaborative 
approach to improve water quality outcomes and, by extension, other environmental 
outcomes. This effort to understand governance and its impacts on outcomes can and 
should be undertaken in environmental or other policy issues, either in Australian or 
international contexts. The main benefit, apart from reducing the vague nature of 
governance practice, is to find ways of improving quality of life, in which a healthy 
environment is included.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Chart of objectives 
 
Objectives Tasks Data Collection Data analysis Expected Outcomes 
1 Identify 
frameworks and 
criteria that 
underpin 
evaluation of 
collaborative 
governance 
approaches on 
environmental 
outcomes 
 
 
 
Question: 
 
1) Based on the 
environmental 
outcomes 
achieved, have 
collaborative forms 
of governance 
improved the 
condition of natural 
resources? 
 
1. Develop an 
evaluation 
framework by 
reviewing the 
literature about 
governance in 
environmental 
planning and its 
impact upon 
outcomes 
 
Disciplines 
involved in the 
review: 
Planning, 
Policy, Political 
Science and 
Environmental 
Management 
 
 
2. Select those 
papers that 
specifically 
relate with the 
topic 
"Governance 
and Outcomes 
(environmental)” 
from policy and 
planning 
perspectives 
 
 
3. Identify and 
select an 
evaluation 
criteria based 
on collaborative 
governance 
processes 
examined 
1.Search for the 
Literature in Google 
Scholar,ScienceDirect 
and other databases 
available (based on 
journal articles, books, 
book chapters and grey 
literature 
 
2. Read peer-reviewed 
articles and grey 
literature about collab 
governance-
plan&policy evaluations 
of implementation  
 
3. Narrow the search 
and selection to the 
main topic by using key 
words in search 
engines such as 
"environmental 
governance and 
implementation"; 
"evaluation of 
collaborative 
governance"; 
“environmental 
governance and 
outcomes”; 
“environmental 
planning and 
outcomes”; 
“environmental 
outcomes”; 
environmental planning 
implementation”; 
“collaborative 
governance and 
outcomes”; “results of 
natural resource 
management" 
 
4. Obtain elements of 
governance and 
implementation from 
the review (factors or 
variables) used to 
assess policy&planning 
initiatives related with 
environmental matters 
1. Categorize topics; 
identify definitions, 
research approaches 
and main trends within 
the field of research 
 
 
2. Organize papers 
and categorize the 
main results by topic 
(e.g. governance and 
outcomes; planning 
and outcomes; or 
implementation and 
outcomes) 
 
 
3. Identify and select 
the governance and 
implementation 
variables with the 
strongest impact in 
terms of benefits to 
the environmental 
planning process 
1. Classification of the 
different impacts of 
collaborative governance on 
natural resource conditions, 
e.g. environmental outcomes  
 
 
2. Obtain a general picture of 
evaluations on the impact of 
collaborative governance on 
environmental outcomes  
 
 
3. Develop an evaluation 
framework with a list of 
criteria (governance and 
implementation aspects).  
The criteria serve as a 
benchmark for governance 
evaluation   
 
4. Write a literature review 
paper for a Journal about the 
literature on governance and 
outcomes/results from a 
planning perspective  
2 Apply a case 
study analysis to 
evaluate the 
impact of 
collaborative 
governance on 
environmental 
outcomes within 
Australia. 
 
Questions: 
 
1) What was the 
role of collaboration 
in the 
1. Justify the 
case study. The 
GBR represents 
a key Australian 
ecosystem and 
involves 6 NMR 
regions: 
Burnett-Mary; 
Cape York; 
Burdekin; 
Fitzroy Basin; 
Mackay 
Whitsundays; 
and Wet Tropics 
 
1.Search for 
information about the 
case-study region (the 
GBR) and the sub-
regions within it in 
official websites as well 
as in research papers 
 
 
2. Review a specific 
water quality plan (the 
2009 Reef Plan) within 
the GBR to find out 
about the water quality 
outcomes, and how the 
1. Obtain a general 
picture of the GBR, in 
terms of area; 
population; history of 
water quality planning; 
socio-economic 
contribution and 
environmental 
significance. 
 
 
2. Analyse the Reef 
Plan progress reports 
to identify the water 
quality outcomes 
1. Develop an overall picture 
of the impact of 
collaboration/collaborative 
governance arrangements 
on water quality impacts 
achieved by the Reef Plan.  
 
 
3. Develop a regional picture 
of the impact of collaborative 
governance on the water 
quality outcomes achieved 
by the NRM regions. 
 
3. Write a journal 
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implementation of 
the 2009 Reef 
plan?  
 
2) How regional 
collaborative 
governance 
approaches 
impacted on 
environmental 
outcomes achieved 
by the NRM 
regions of the 
GBR? 
 
3) What are the 
strengths and 
weaknesses of the 
collaborative 
governance 
approach?  
 
 
2. Evaluate the 
impact of 
governance 
through the use 
of the 
governance 
evaluation 
framework  
 
contributed to the 
general objectives of 
the plan. 
 
Perform a series of 
semi-structured 
interviews (from 20 to 
25) with the key 
stakeholders in order to 
evaluate and discuss 
the results obtained 
from the Reef Plan.  
The key stakeholders 
include people from the 
NRM groups (CEOs 
and managers); state 
and federal levels; 
industry (farming and 
agriculture); 
conservation (NGOs); 
and scientific 
community 
(academics) 
achieved by each sub-
region, highlighting 
their different 
contributions and 
contexts (including 
their degree of 
alignment with the 
regional NRM Plans). 
Complement this 
information with 
external reviews to 
include different 
perspectives,  
 
4. Develop a proxy 
variable for 
collaboration at the 
regional level to 
distinguish impacts of 
regional collaboration 
on water quality 
outcomes.  
 
3. Coding of the 
interviews using Nvivo 
software. The purpose 
is to organize the 
topics covered in the 
examination. This 
would allow identifying 
the strengths and 
weaknesses of the 
collaborative approach 
as well as the different 
approaches to 
collaboration in each 
NRM region of the 
GBR. 
 
4. Analyse the 
information obtained 
from document 
reviews,  and 
interviews using the 
evaluation framework 
as an instrument for 
supporting the 
interpretation of 
results 
article/conference paper of 
the governance evaluation of 
water quality in the GBR 
based on the collaborative 
governance processes 
criteria obtained in the first 
objective.  
 
 
4. Develop the story of the 
impact of collaborative 
governance on the Reef Plan 
results based on the 
experience and perceptions 
of stakeholders 
 
 
 
3 Develop a series 
of 
recommendations 
from the case 
study analysis. 
 
 
Questions: 
 
1) What are the 
implications of 
collaborative 
governance in 
Queensland’s 
natural resource 
planning and 
management? 
 
1. Highlights 
main findings 
obtained from 
objective 2 
research 
questions and 
compare them 
with other 
similar studies. 
 
2. Identify the 
implications of 
the findings by 
extracting the 
main themes 
that emerged 
from the case 
study analysis 
1. Organize and review 
the findings, linking 
them to previous 
studies and to the 
general themes 
emerging from the 
case study analysis 
1. Identify the 
challenges and 
opportunities of 
collaborative 
governance in water 
quality planning within 
the Reef context. 
 
2. Deduce the 
implications of the 
findings from the case 
study analysis 
(following the 
deductive method of 
inferring information 
from the evidence and 
reasoning). 
 
In the deductive 
analysis, the 
detective/researcher 
extracts the 
conclusion of the 
investigation through 
the evidence of the 
case and ‘common’ 
sense’ to offer an 
account of what 
1. Journal paper about 
collaborative governance 
focused on the 
challenges/recommendations 
of this approach when used 
in environmental policy and 
planning. What and what 
cannot be expected from 
collaboration.  
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occurred and 
what/how it can be 
improved. 
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Appendix B. Governance frameworks reviewed 
  Title Theory Purpose Methods Findings Research 
gap 
Scope Locality/ 
Case study 
1 Governance for 
sustainability: 
evaluating 
environmental 
decisions (Adger 
et al, 2003) 
Interdisciplina
ry approach, 
‘thick 
description’ 
Understand 
environmental 
decision-
making and its 
outcomes 
Desktop 
analysis         
Case study    
Able to take 
into account 
different 
variables by 
examining a 
decision 
through a four-
criteria. 
Institutional 
framing and 
outcomes 
Local UK 
2 Framework for 
monitoring 
social process 
and outcomes 
(Chapman, 
2014) 
Ecosystem 
services 
theory                         
Adaptive 
management                 
Transformativ
e learning 
Evaluate the 
social 
outcomes of 
collaborative 
environmental 
programs 
Case study Social 
outcomes can 
be identified 
by using a 
Monitoring and 
Evaluating 
approach 
Feedback 
and 
refinements 
to the 
evaluation 
model 
Regional Kenya 
3 A goal specificity 
framework 
(Biddle and 
Koontz, 2014) 
Not clear Measure 
improvements 
in envin 
outcomes in 
collaborative 
governance 
Multiple 
case 
studies               
Surveys                        
Water 
quality data 
Collaboration 
improves 
environmental 
outcomes 
when specific 
goals are set 
Outputs 
that might 
be 
appropriate 
indicators 
for other 
collaborativ
e efforts, 
e.g. climate 
change 
National US 
4 Governance 
systems analysis 
(Dale et al, 
2013) 
Structuralist-
Functionalism 
Analyse multi-
thematic, 
complex and 
poly-centric 
governance 
systems 
Desktop 
analysis    
Case 
studies 
Governance 
systems are 
comprised by 
structures and 
functions and 
their analysis 
informs 
transformation
al change or 
improvements 
Test the 
framework 
in a range 
of multiple 
topics and 
domains 
Regional Australia 
5 Integrative 
framework for 
collaborative 
governance 
(Emerson et al, 
2012) 
General 
Systems 
theory 
Analyse the 
dynamics and 
actions 
produced by 
collaborative 
governance 
regimes 
Case study 
analysis 
Divides 
collaborative 
process by its 
dynamics 
(principled 
engagement, 
shared 
motivation, 
and capacity 
for joint action) 
and actions 
within an 
adaptive cycle 
Test the 
framework 
in a range 
of multiple 
topics and 
domains 
Internati
onal 
US 
6 Evaluate and 
design 
collaborative 
planning 
(Faehnle and 
Tyrvainen, 
2013) 
Not clear Develop a 
success 
criteria to 
evaluate 
collaborative 
planning 
processes and 
outcomes 
Desktop 
analysis     
Case 
studies                
Public 
meetings 
Offers a view 
of what a 
successful 
collaborative 
approach 
should 
accomplish 
Test the 
success 
criteria in 
other cases 
State Finland 
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7 Investigating 
Policy 
Processes: The 
Governance 
Analytical 
Framework 
(GAF) (Hufty, 
2011) 
Not clear Analyse how 
the 
governance 
process 
influences 
upon a 
dependent 
variable such 
as a problem 
(e.g. inequity 
or 
biodiversity) 
Case 
studies 
Based upon a 
clear 
governance 
definition, the 
GAF allows to 
analyse 
variations 
between policy 
and reality 
Test the 
GAF in 
other cases 
to better 
understand 
its limits 
and 
possibilities 
National Argentina 
8 Identify 
governance 
strategies that 
support 
sustainability 
(Kenward R. E. 
et al, 2011) 
Not clear Link 
governance 
strategies with 
outcomes 
related with 
increased 
sustainability 
and 
biodiversity 
Multiple 
case 
studies                      
Information 
theoretic 
modelling 
Strategies with 
adaptive 
management 
and leadership 
contribute 
strongly to 
achieve 
positive 
outcomes 
Test the 
predictions 
in other 
areas 
Internati
onal 
EU, US and 
different 
developing 
countries 
9 Good 
governance 
framework for 
protected 
terrestrial areas 
(Lockwood, 
2010) 
Rational 
choice  
adaptive 
management 
Link 
governance 
effectiveness 
with 
governance 
quality 
Multiple 
case 
studies                
Delphi 
method 
Develops a 
criteria to 
evaluate 
governance 
outcomes 
Test the 
framework 
in other 
protected 
areas and 
governance 
modes 
Internati
onal 
France, 
India, 
Scotland 
and Spain 
10 Transition 
management 
framework 
(Loorbach, 
2010) 
Transition 
management           
Systems 
theory 
Assess how 
societal actors 
deal with 
complex issues 
and 
understand 
the resulting 
transitions 
Desktop 
analysis    
Case 
studies 
Analyse and 
structure 
ongoing 
governance 
processes in 
society 
Translate 
the 
framework 
to other 
sociopolitic
al contexts 
and 
cultures 
National Netherland
s 
11 IAD (Ostrom, 
1999; 2005) 
Rational 
choice 
Identify the 
institutional 
elements of a 
governance 
system and 
their 
relationships 
to provide 
diagnosis  
Desktop 
analysis 
Case 
studies 
Understand 
and explain 
how common-
pool resources 
are governed 
Test the 
framework 
in other 
areas and 
settings 
National US 
  IAD applied as 
main framework 
              
  11a IAD applied to 
water 
management 
and planning 
(Ananda and 
Proctor, 2013) 
Use of IAD to 
evaluate a 
collaborative 
approach in a 
watershed 
Desktop 
analysis       
Case 
studies                
Workshops 
Current top-
down 
arrangements 
limit the scope 
of 
collaboration 
Collaborativ
e 
approaches 
in 
improving 
water 
manageme
nt 
Sub 
catchme
nt 
Australia 
  11b IAD and 
ecosystem-
based 
management 
(Imperial, 
1999) 
IAD seen from 
the 
perspective of 
ecosystem-
based 
management 
Desktop 
analysis   
IAD is designed 
to evaluate the 
implementatio
n of a program, 
but does not 
provide clear 
solutions about 
how to achieve 
better 
outcomes 
Institutional 
design and 
its impact 
on effective 
manageme
nt 
N/A US 
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  11c Analyzing 
complex 
water 
governance 
regimes (Pahl 
Wostl, 2010) 
IAD adapted 
and extended 
to analyze  
water 
management 
regimes and 
find out how 
change occurs 
Desktop 
analysis  
Case 
studies 
Useful for 
other contexts 
as it is 
designed for 
complex multi-
governance 
regimes 
Test the 
framework 
in other 
water case 
studies 
Regional EU 
12 Analyze 
sustainability of 
social-ecological 
systems 
(Ostrom, 2009) 
Rational 
choice 
General 
framework 
that allows 
identifying the 
factors that 
enhance 
sustainability 
Case 
studies 
Predicts when 
the users of a 
resource 
system will 
engage in self-
organization 
Test the 
framework 
in multiple 
resource 
systems 
National US 
13 Framework for 
analysing 
adaptive 
capacity and 
multi-level 
learning (Pahl 
Wostl, 2009) 
Adaptive 
management  
Social learning 
Designed to 
explain 
changes in 
governance 
using a triple-
loop of social 
learning 
Desktop 
analysis  
Case study 
Governance 
structures that 
combine 
bottom-up 
with top-down 
approaches 
lead to higher 
adaptive 
capacity  
Develop 
shared 
conceptual 
frameworks 
that take 
into 
account the 
complexity 
of 
governance 
regimes 
Regional EU 
14 Fit-for-purpose 
governance 
framework 
(Rijke et al, 
2012) 
Adaptive 
governance 
Evaluate if 
governance 
systems are fit 
for their 
purpose 
Critical 
literature 
review 
Governance is 
divided 
between 
structures  and 
processes and 
each 
framework 
should be fit to 
a context and 
purpose 
A diagnostic 
approach 
that 
requires 
empirical 
evidence 
Internati
onal 
Australia & 
Netherland
s 
15 Process-
Outcomes 
governance 
framework 
(Rauschmayer 
et al, 2009) 
Not clear Evaluate 
governance 
processes and 
outcomes 
within a single 
framework 
Desktop 
analysis 
Governance 
processes and 
outcomes can 
be evaluated 
simultaneously
, where good 
processes 
reduce 
uncertainty 
Proposed 
framework 
to 
synthesize 
governance 
processes 
and 
outcomes 
Internati
onal 
European 
Union 
16 The Advocacy 
Coalition 
Framework 
(ACF) (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-
Smith, 1999; 
and Weible et 
al, 2011) 
Adaptive 
governance 
Social 
constructivism 
Examine policy 
change by 
looking at 
policy 
advocating by 
coalitions 
within a policy 
subsystem 
Desktop 
analysis 
Case 
studies 
Policy change 
is explained by 
the adoption of 
the beliefs of a 
coalition 
around a given 
issue within 
the policy 
subsystem 
Test the 
ACF in 
other 
areas/subsy
stems, e.g. 
role of 
coalitions in 
diffusing 
policy 
innovations 
Internati
onal 
US 
 
ACF applied as 
main framework 
              
 
16a ACF applied to 
drug policy 
(Kubler, 2001) 
Use of ACF to 
understand 
change in 
Swiss drug 
policy, 
complementin
g the analysis 
with social 
movement 
theory 
Case study Successful 
change is 
explained 
through a shift 
in beliefs of 
key actors 
within a 
coalition; 
however, the 
ACF fails to 
explain 
persistence of 
coalitions 
Analyse the 
role of 
'policy 
brokers' in 
mediating 
interactions 
between 
coalitions 
National Switzerland 
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Appendix C. Indicative questions for the semi-structured interviews  
Section 1: Background information – Role and interests 
 
1. Name 
2. Organisation 
3. Title/role: 
4. What was your involvement in the implementation of the 2009 Reef Plan program? 
5. Over what period were you involved? From …………… to ……………….. 
6. In general, what is your interest in NRM planning and what do you value most of it? 
7. What was your organisation’s main interest in relation to Reef Plan and Reef Rescue (& 
water quality issues)? 
8. Why was it important to be involved in Reef Plan and Reef Rescue? 
 
Section 2: Collaboration in the implementation of Reef Rescue  
 
9. According to the 2014 Reef Rescue Achievements report, collaboration between the 
main stakeholders such as the regional NRM bodies, the agricultural sector and the 
state and federal governments was key for the successful delivery of the program. In 
your view, what role did collaboration between these stakeholders played in the 
implementation of 2009 Reef Plan?  
The evaluation instrument for collaborative governance processes (Appendix E) was inserted in 
this Section. 
  
Section 3: Effectiveness at implementing Reef Rescue 
 
The next questions discuss the effectiveness at implementing 2009 Reef Plan, based on the 
water quality outcomes achieved and the strategies followed to reduce the impacts on water 
quality. Please read the information provided in Tables 1 and 2 as this provides the starting point 
for the questions that follow.  
 
Table 1: Water quality outcomes achieved by NRM regions  
(Australian and Queensland Governments 2014) 
 
NRM bodies  Reduce nitrogen by 50% 
(by 2013) 
Reduce sediment by 
20% (by 2020) 
Reduce pesticides by 
50% (by 2013) 
Burnett-Mary 15% 3% 28% 
Cape York 6% 8% 0 
FBA 3% 4% 5% 
NQ Dry Tropics 10% 16% 13% 
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Reef Catchments 17% 9% 42% 
Terrain NRM 8% 13% 26% 
GBR catchment  10%  11%  28%  
 
Table 2: Achievements in land management practices for each region and overall water quality 
condition after implementation (Australian and Queensland Governments 2014) 
 
 
 
10. Please explain how Reef Rescue funds were allocated in relation to the implementation 
projects in each region. How did this affect the outcomes for water quality?  
11. To what extent do you consider that the intended water quality outcomes of 2009 Reef 
Plan have been achieved? 
12. To what extent were the water quality outcomes attributable to the plan, or did other 
factors influence the outcomes? 
13. Which of the three water quality outcomes reported were easier to achieve and why? 
14. Which of the three water quality outcomes were more difficult to achieve and why? 
15. Which aspects of the plan were best put into practice? 
16. Which aspects were least put into practice?  
17. Did collaboration between stakeholders make it easier to put the plan into practice? If 
“yes”, which partnerships do you think were most important for putting the plan into 
action? 
18. Did the differences in funding of Reef Rescue led to less collaboration (compared with 
previous efforts) in the implementation of 2009 Reef Plan? 
19. How would you describe the plan achievements?  
20. To what extent the mechanisms in place to monitor and evaluate progress of the plan 
were appropriate? 
21. To what extent the water quality outcomes obtained were positive for the region?  
22. Would these achievements have occurred without the collaborative arrangements in 
place? Why? 
NRM bodies 50% improved 
grazing practices 
80% improved 
sugarcane practices 
80% improved 
horticulture practices 
Overall water quality 
condition 2013 
Burnett-Mary 19%  55%  50%  Poor 
Cape York 48% 0 0 Moderate 
FBA 28%  39% 42%  Poor 
NQ Dry 
Tropics 
54%  55%  63%  Moderate 
Reef 
Catchments 
69%  49%  66%  Moderate 
Terrain NRM 23% 45%  50% Poor 
GBR 
catchment  
30% 49% 59% Poor 
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23. Following the experience with 2009 Reef Plan, what are the key challenges for the 
regional model of collaboration? 
24. What are the opportunities that this collaborative approach offers in practice? 
 
Section 4: Context  
 
25. Thinking about significant events within the regional planning context, such as the 
change of government programs (from Natural Heritage Trust to Caring for Our 
Country), how do you think they affected the way planning was put into practice with 
2009 Reef Plan?  
26. Reflecting on your experience with 2009 Reef Pan and Reef Rescue, what do you think 
could be improved in planning for water quality? 
27. Following the experience with 2009 Reef Plan, what do you think is the future of planning 
for natural resource management within the Reef region? How does this make you feel? 
 
Section 5: Feedback 
 
28. Do you have any other comments, issues or questions that you would like to raise? 
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Appendix D. Participant information sheet 
 
You are invited to take part in a research project undertaken by the University of Queensland 
(UQ). Information is provided about the project so that you can make an informed decision 
on whether or not to participate.  
 
My name is Jaime Olvera-Garcia and I am a PhD candidate at the School of Earth and 
Environmental Sciences (SEES) of UQ. My research is evaluating the impact that 
collaborative governance has had on the environmental outcomes produced by natural 
resource planning in Queensland, Australia.  
 
The main objective of my study is to find out if collaborative governance arrangements have 
effectively led to improved environmental outcomes, such as better water quality, and to 
identify the main strengths and weaknesses of collaboration. I selected the 2009 Reef Plan, 
along with its Reef Rescue programme as my case study. Reef Rescue was the 
implementation strategy of the 2009 Reef Plan, which aimed to improve water quality in the 
Great Barrier Reef. The time-frame included five years, from 2008 to 2013 in the six regions 
that comprise the Reef catchment: Burdekin, Burnett-Mary, Cape York, Fitzroy Basin, 
Mackay Whitsundays, and the Wet Tropics. My research explores the different experiences 
that each region had in implementing this programme, in terms of the role of collaboration in 
achieving water quality outcomes.  
 
Reef Rescue was created by the Australian Government in 2008 as part of the Caring for 
Our Country program. It was also a part of the 2009 Reef Plan, which provided the 
collaborative framework through which Reef Rescue was implemented. The plan was 
developed and implemented through collaboration among stakeholders from the federal and 
state government as well as from the regional Natural Resource Management (NRM) bodies, 
the agricultural sector and local environmental groups. The main goal of Reef Rescue was 
to halt and reverse the decline in the quality of water entering the Great Barrier Reef lagoon 
by 2013.  
 
To achieve this goal, a set of clear and measurable water quality targets were defined, which 
focused on reducing three main pollutants from intensive agricultural industries: nitrogen, 
sediments and pesticides. The main strategy for achieving the water quality targets was to 
promote, through collaboration, a change in land management practices. For the purposes 
of this research, collaboration is defined as a governing arrangement where one or more 
public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders to collectively make and implement 
plans and policies. Collaboration aims to improve the implementation and results of a plan 
through a series of practices and processes.  
 
The interview seeks to find out your perceptions about the role that collaboration had in the 
implementation of 2009 Reef Plan, as well as your views on the challenges and opportunities 
of collaborating in planning for natural resources.  The interview is anticipated to take 
approximately one hour. Your responses will be anonymous. It is important to mention that 
your participation is voluntary, so you may withdraw at any time without penalty 
 
This study adheres to the Guidelines of the ethical review process of the University of 
Queensland and the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research. You are 
free to discuss your participation in this study with any of my advisory team or with myself 
and all contact details are provided below. If you would like to speak to an officer of the 
University not involved in the study, you may contact Dr Paul Dargusch, the Ethics Officer 
on (07) 3365 1594 or email p.dargusch@uq.edu.au.  
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Thank you for your time and responses. 
 
 
Jaime Olvera-Garcia 
PhD Candidate 
School of Earth and Environmental Sciences 
Room 416F, Chamberlain Building│The University of Queensland, Brisbane, 
Australia 4072 
P: +61 (0)411 582 173 │E:  j.olveragarcia@uq.edu.au 
 
Advisory Team 
Prof Neil Sipe│P (07) 3365 6671│ E: n.sipe@uq.edu.au 
Prof Marc Hockings│P (07) 334-67845│E: m.hockings@uq.edu.au 
Dr Paul Schmidt│P (07) 334-67845│E: paul.schmidt@uq.edu.au 
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Appendix E. Evaluation instrument for collaborative governance processes 
I am going to make a number of statements about the implementation of 2009 Reef Plan and I 
would like you to indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement. Please rate your 
agreement as Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Neutral (N), Disagree (D) or Strongly Disagree 
(SD). Please explain your responses. 
 
Statements SA A N D SD 
Stakeholder engagement: 
1. Including the stakeholders –such as the agricultural industry, 
state and federal governments, NRM bodies and World Wildlife 
Fund− in the implementation of 2009 Reef Plan led to better 
achievements of water quality outcomes.  
2. Stakeholders were informed regularly about the progress of 
implementation through engagement processes such as 
meetings or workshops. 
3. Differences in power and access to resources among 
stakeholders did not affect the achievement of water quality 
outcomes. 
 
     
Coordination: 
1. The responsibilities of each stakeholder group (e.g. regional 
NRM bodies, agricultural industry and state and federal 
government) were clearly identified during the implementation of 
2009 Reef Plan. 
2. During implementation, the federal government cooperated 
effectively with the regions and agriculture industry in the effort 
to change land management practices (e.g. grazing, sugarcane 
and horticulture). 
3. During implementation, the state government effectively 
cooperated with the regions and agriculture industry in the effort 
to change land management practices.  
4. During implementation, the regional NRM bodies effectively 
cooperated with the agricultural industry in the effort to change 
land management practices 
5. In general, cooperation between the stakeholders involved in 
2009 Reef Plan led to an improvement in land management 
practices 
 
     
Incentives: 
1. Relying on voluntary compliance led to better water quality 
outcomes.  
2. Availability of incentive resources (e.g. funds) drove practice 
change 
 
     
Regulations: 
1. Statutory tools and guidelines in place effectively promoted 
compliance with the 2009 Reef Plan. 
2. Regulatory tools increased stakeholders’ understanding of 
practice change 
3. Increased formalisation of the NRM group (e.g. shift from non-
statutory to statutory body) would lead to better achievements of 
water quality outcomes?  
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Public participation: 
1. The views of the citizens within the regions were incorporated in 
the implementation of 2009 Reef Plan (e.g. through forums or 
meetings). 
2. Informing the citizens about the objectives and progress of 2009 
Reef Plan was beneficial for the results accomplished by the 
programme. 
 
     
Learning: 
1. The knowledge and experience that the stakeholders (e.g. 
regional NRM bodies, agricultural industry and state and federal 
governments) acquired from the implementation of the previous 
2003 Reef Plan contributed positively in achieving the water 
quality targets. 
2. Knowledge about the regional conditions was shared between 
the stakeholders involved in the implementation of 2009 Reef 
Plan. 
3. The implementation of 2009 Reef Plan provided better ways of 
managing water quality issues that could be used in future land 
planning policies. 
 
     
Decentralization: 
1. The resources of the NRM regions (e.g. financial or human 
resources) contributed to achieve better water quality outcomes. 
2. The increase of autonomy allocated to the NRM bodies led to 
better water quality outcomes. 
3. Devolving the implementation of 2009 Reef Plan to the regions 
was beneficial for the goals of the program. 
 
     
Competition: 
1. Competing for grants between the stakeholders led to better 
water quality outcomes. 
2. The competition for funds complemented the collaborative 
nature of 2009 Reef Plan. 
3. Competing for water quality grants was in the best interest of the 
stakeholders. 
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Appendix F. Ethics Approval Letter 
 
239  
 
 
 
